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ABSTRACT 
The study develops a series of theoretical frameworks to examine how environmental conflicts 
arise and how they may be resolved by testing the frameworks against empirical evidence from 
case studies. Documentary information and data from semi-structured interviews with key 
informants were analysed to provide the case studies of outdoor recreation and nature 
conservation, conducted in Britain, the Netherlands and the USA. 
It was initially assumed that recreational impacts would give rise to conflicts in each of the three 
countries irrespective of the differing institutional and cultural settings. However, a comparison 
of case studies of conflict and co-operation,, using a simple diagnostic framework, suggests that 
it is not the ostensible cause - the nature or extent of the impact of recreation on wildlife - that 
determines whether conflict or co-operation occurs; rather the motivation of the interest groups, 
their relationship and the institutional setting in which they attempt to broker a reallocation of 
resources. However, none of these factors appears to act alone, suggesting that multiple rather 
than single causality is more likely to be the norm. 
A second framework was developed, based on concepts drawn from social theory: that conflicts 
arise over the distribution of and access to resources and that they are dynamic and pass 
through successive episodes. Such conflicts may or may not be resolved depending on whether 
the outcome is reached by the exercise of superior power or by negotiation and this provides 
a possible basis for attempting to predict the outcome of each episode. A third framework, 
based on theories of participatory decision-making, provides a method of assessing 
administrative decision-making and planning systems in terms of their ability to reduce conflicts 
by facilitating negotiation. 
Elements of the second and third frameworks were combined into a fourth, which categorises 
the flill range of possible outcomes of political struggle or negotiation into a simple typology. 
It further demonstrates that the detailed course or duration of a power struggle cannot always 
be predicted because the likelihood, nature and timing of interventions, particularly by 
government agencies, cannot be foretold. These can have considerable effects on the 
distribution of power which are not easily measured. 
The study suggests that local environmental conflicts have to be seen within a broader 
perspective. The recreation versus conservation debate is partly a conflict over access to 
resources and partly symptomatic of a wider process of social change, whereby rising public 
expectations of increased access to the countryside are confronted with higher environmental 
standards. 
The study attempts to utilise and develop theory to practical ends. A rigorous theoretical 
analysis of the empirical data provides clearer insights into which factors come into play at 
which stages of the dynamic process of conflict, a more realistic assessment of how decision-
making can influence but not determine the outcomes of disputes and the crucial contribution 
of power as an impetus to secure and control access to resources. 
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THE ORIGINS OF THE STUDY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK. 
The origins of this thesis he in a study of outdoor recreation and nature conservation in England 
and Wales (Sidaway, 1988) which analysed seven case studies concerned with recreational 
impacts on wildlife habitats or species. In four of these, although the potential for conflict 
existed, the interested parties co-operated to devise management measures which mitigated any 
potentially damaging impacts. In the three other cases, the parties competed strongly over access 
to the resource and these cases can be categorised as conflicts according to the definition given 
below. 
The contrast, between conflict and co-operation, was highlighted in that report when it was 
suggested that conflicts could be distinguished by four prevailing circumstances, namely: 
- divergent philosophies: when strongly held beliefs were in opposition; 
- lack of basic understanding of relationships between species or habitats and 
humanity: when the biological impacts of the activity on the ecosystem are 
poorly understood by researchers or recreation interests; 
- unwillingness to respond to dynamic situations: on the part of any interest 
group; 
- poor communication: a fsilure to exchange information between the interest 
groups even when the channels of communication exist (Sidaway, 1988, 79). 
In the cases of co-operation, where the potentially damaging impact was being managed, these 
four conditions were not evident, lithe interest groups held divergent philosophies, these were 
suppressed to gain co-operation. The biological impacts of the activity on the ecosystem were 
understood. The interest groups were willing to respond to changing circumstances and 
communication was well established between them. In other words, the potential for conflict 
existed but co-operation was the norm and in this respect these examples provided virtual mirror 
images of the conflicts. The four features appeared to provide a simple framework for 
distinguishing between conflicts and co-operation. 
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Supported by a research grant from the Economic and Social Research Council', fieldwork was 
undertaken in the USA in 1990, and in Britain and the Netherlands in 1991 to examine how 
useful this analytical framework might be in diagnosing similar conflicts in those countries (see 
Sidaway, 1992a). Subsequently additional studies undertaken in Britain and the Netherlands by 
the author have provided further case study material but not all of the material collected between 
1987 and 1994 is sufficiently detailed to withstand rigorous analysis. 
Initial research design 
The research on which this thesis is based consists of a series of case studies in each of the three 
countries comprising semi-structured interviews with selected key informants; documentation 
about the area and any controversy; and scientific papers on biological impacts, where these 
were relevant and available. The research developed into an iterative process, phases of 
fieldwork alternating with periods of analysis and the consideration of theory. 
In the early stages, it had been assumed that recreational impacts would give rise to conflicts in 
each of the three countries irrespective of the differing institutional and cultural settings. 
However, a broader view of conflicts developed, although every attempt was made to retain the 
focus on conflicts associated with the impacts of outdoor recreation on nature conservation. 
While in Britain and the Netherlands it was possible to retain this focus, in the USA impacts are 
managed differently. European legislation on species and habitat protection is more far reaching; 
in the USA it is largely limited to protecting endangered species and that protection has been 
non-controversial`. 
A different method of selecting case studies was adopted in the USA. For reasons of economy, 
study areas were selected to provide clusters of land-use and access disputes. These were in 
North-west Montana, Western Wyoming, Colorado and Maine. The competing claims of 
conservation and recreation feature in the American case studies but are less central to major 
land use conflicts there. This broadening of focus is particularly important in attempting to 
Research grant R-000-23-1729 
2 	At the time of writing, September 1995, attempts are being made to limit the 
application of the Endangered Species Act in the USA. 
compare conflicts in North America and Europe. The parallels between Britain and the 
Netherlands appear to be more exact. 
In the NetherIands recreational impacts are frequently mitigated through land use planning and 
potentially damaging activities are segregated by spatial zoning. After an initial visit in which a 
range of potential areas was considered, it was decided to focus on areas where the status quo 
was challenged by major changes in environmental policy. Case studies were conducted of the 
Oosterschelde, a tributary of the Rhine Delta in Zeeland and at Meijendel, a coastal dune area 
north of the Hague, to examine how the existing institutional settings coped with change. 
The main fieldwork both in the USA and the Netherlands was preceded by a brief visit to an 
academic base (Yale and Wageningen Universities) to obtain an overview and advice on the 
selection of case studies and to organise a programme of interviews. 
Meanwhile, the perspectives on conflict and associated theory broadened further. An attempt 
to produce a typology of conflicts based on interests proved inconclusive and a simplistic view 
of causality developed into a study of the processes of conflict. The later case studies included 
observations on the escalation of disputes, the interactions of interest groups and the balance of 
power between them, the institutional settings and whether they exacerbate conflict or facilitate 
its resolution.. Another visit was made to the USA in 1992 to conduct a series of interviews with 
environmental mediators and to assemble literature on environmental mediation and theories of 
negotiation. 
Further work was undertaken in the Netherlands in 1992-3, the author preparing a review of the 
literature of alternative dispute resolution, using the material obtained in the USA, to provide 
a component of two studies undertaken with the Agricultural University at Wageningen. The 
first was concerning with the social impact of gravel working in the province of Limbourg (van 
Keken et at 1993) while the second, an analytical framework, was developed from the literature 
review, applied to the Oosterschelde case study and used to analyse policy planning in the 
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Voordelta of the Rhine (Sidaway and van der Voet, 1993). An extensive review of the literature 
of social conflicts was undertaken using the library of the Agricultural University at Wageningen 
in the summer of 1993. 
Given the author's familiarity with British studies of impacts, it became more important to 
concentrate on a few areas in greater depth than to increase the number of cases. Material 
obtained in previous research was reviewed, and up-dated where necessary for inclusion in this 
study. Two detailed case studies were conducted which cover the detailed processes of conflict: 
the designation of the Pentland Hills Regional Park, Lothian Region, and the access agreements 
currently being re-negotiated to moorland areas in the Peak District National Park. Following 
training in the USA as an environmental mediator in 1993, the author facilitated meetings of the 
Access Consultative Group established by the Peak Park Joint Planning Board and this provided 
further insight into the continuing conflict in that national park. 
Scope and Purposes of Social Theory: Understanding of Social Change and the Resolution 
of Conflict. 
Bottomore (1969) commented that "we are very far from possessing a sociological theory of 
conflict at the present time" and went on to note how interest in the theoretical aspects of social 
conflict had waxed and waned over the years although he was writing during a particularly 
active period of theoretical work. He suggested that theories of conflict should enumerate its 
diverse forms, state its incidence and extent, describe the varying balance between "division and 
conflict on one side, integration and harmony on the other", and investigate the causes and 
effects of conflict. 
Perhaps one of the reasons why a consolidated body of theory has not developed is that social 
conflicts have many dimensions. They occur at different levels from the inter-personal to the 
international; they vary in nature; they follow different patterns under different conditions; their 
outcomes can be classified in many ways; and they attract the attention of theorists with differing 
During this study, supported by the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Nature Management, the author conducted the literature review and took the 
initiative in devising the evaluative framework and case study analysis presented 
in Chapter 4. His co-author, Han van der Voet, provided translations of the Dutch 
reports and interviews and contributed to the analysis. 
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theoretical backgrounds and perspectives with the result that the purpose of theorizing will also 
differ from time to time. Yet all this variability has not prevented numerous attempts to develop 
an all-purpose theory; the bravest attempts being those of psychologists who are prepared to 
generalise from inter-personal theory to provide solutions to global conflict (e.g., Deutsch, 
1973). 
Within sociology, a more usual claim is to develop a "middle range" theory which explains the 
relationship of certain variables within a particular social dimension.. In this way a partial theory 
is developed which contributes to social theory in general (Coser, 1967). This research lies 
within that tradition. Lipset has commented on the limitations of grand theory and suggests 
"social science is however still at its best in advancing what Robert K Merton has called 
middle-level theories and then explaining specific time- and place-limited developments" (Lip set, 
1985, 340). 
Theories of social conflict can serve two particular purposes which are relevant to this study, 
those of understanding social change and reactions to it and those which are concerned with the 
resolution of conflict. Added to these perspectives are theories from management science, 
concerned with conflict within organisations and negotiation theory, which is the basis of much 
of the pragmatic approach to mediation and other forms of alternative dispute resolution. This 
range of theories is examined during the course of this thesis. However, rather than present one 
consolidated literature review, the relevant material is considered at various stages of the 
analysis. 
Thus this study is concerned to forge links between theory and practice by examining theory in 
the light of the empirical case studies. This is something of a departure from much theoretical 
writing which draws on other theorising but rarely evaluates theory against empirical evidence. 
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AIMS OF THE STUDY 
The overall aims of the study are 
- to assess empirically the contribution of social theories of conflict and conflict 
resolution to the understanding of conflicts between conservation and recreation; and 
- to consider whether the outcome of conflicts can be predicted. 
These aims are addressed in a series of hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1 
That it is possible to identify a series of characteristic factors which distinguish between 
conflicts and co-operation concerning conservation and recreation. These may be 
described using a conceptual framework, irrespective of their institutional, cultural and 
geographical settings. 
To consider this Hypothesis a series of characteristic factors which distinguish between 
conflicts and co-operation are identified in Chapter 2 using a set of case studies and these are 
organised into a "diagnostic" framework. 
Hypothesis 2 
That it is possible to identify the underlying theoretical concepts and social processes 
which govern the development of conflicts, and which may be used to predict their 
outcomes. These relationships may also be expressed within a conceptual framework. 
To consider this Hypothesis the relevant theoretical concepts identified in the review of social 
conflict literature in Chapter 3 are organised within a second framework which incorporates the 
factors identified in Chapter 2, but which is "dynamic" in that it recognises the development of 
conflicts over time. Selected case studies are then used to illustrate the possible outcomes of 
a dispute in a given range of circumstances. 
Hypothesis 3 
That the factors which lead to the resolution of conflicts between conservation and 
recreation by negotiation may be identified and used to assess the likelihood of 
resolution being achieved by consensus. 
To consider this Hypothesis a literature review of participation in decision-making and planning 
in Chapter 4 is used to identify an "evaluative framework of decision-making". Case studies are 
then evaluated to assess the likelihood of achieving stable decisions by the development of 
consensus. 
Hypothesis 4 
That a combined analysis of the processes of social conflict and negotiated decision-
making increases the likelihood of predicting the outcomes of conflicts between 
conservation and recreation. 
This Hypothesis is considered in Chapter 5, when elements of the dynamic framework developed 
in Chapter 3 are combined with the evaluative framework developed in Chapter 4. This Chapter 
considers the feasibility of integrating the two strands of analysis into a predictive model. 
The Hypotheses are formally reviewed in Chapter 6, where the general issues raised by the study 
are discussed. 
Initial Working Assumptions 
The distinction between biological impact and sociological conflict. 
Underlying this analysis is a basic distinction between impacts and conflicts as the terms are 
often used synonymously, particularly in the planning literature. In this study, the term "impact" 
is used to denote the effect of one phenomenon or set of phenomena on another. Recreation 
activities can produce impacts on wildlife (biological impacts) or on people (social impacts). 
This study is largely concerned with the former as a potential source of conflict, particularly 
those biological impacts which have consequences for the conservation of species or habitats. 
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Definitions of conflict and co-operation. 
A further distinction is made between the terms 'dispute' and 'conflict'. Both are considered to 
be sociological phenomena, reflecting different levels of disagreement between people. Here, 
the term dispute is used to refer to a basic level of argument. This may escalate into a conflict 
which is then defined as: 
- an unresolved dispute between competing interest groups which has reached the public 
arena, is controversial and may have political consequences, i.e., one interest group is 
attempting to control the action of another or their access to a semi-natural resource. 
This definition contains most of the features identified in other definitions of conflict given in 
Annex 1. 
The reference to interest groups in this definition carries with it the assumption that there is a 
degree of social organisation evident in the type of conflict under investigation. Thus the 
concern is with relationships between groups rather than individuals, although individuals may 
play a prominent role, and that the conflict is structured around these relationships. It is feasible 
that environmental conflicts may be 'unstructured', that is, that there is controversy about 
competing social values which are not formally represented by interest groups (see Clark et at, 
1994). This phenomenon is not investigated in this study. 
A contrasting set of circumstances to conflict is considered, that of co-operation - in which there 
is agreement on goals between the interested parties, who take collective action to achieve their 
goals. 
Brown and Marnott (1993, 234) identify a number of characteristics of public policy disputes: 
- that the issues are often complex, many centred and involve value judgements; 
- that the nature, boundaries between, costs of numbers of participants are often 
unclear; 
- that there is often a variety of participants who each believe that they represent the 
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public interest or a section of it, many ofiiom [believe they] act in principle rather than 
their own self-interest; 
- that there are many possible outcomes to the dispute; 
- that the standards adopted by society may change as understanding, values or 
technology develop; and 
- the ability to implement the agreement over a period of time is likely to be as important 
as the agreement itself [This latter characteristic highlights the importance of the 
decision-making structure and its contribution to the outcome to the dispute.] 
Mernitz (1980) has also listed the characteristics of environmental disputes. In general the 
essential components are less clearly defined than in labour and community disputes. He 
suggests that the setting of environmental disputes is not well defined because of varying scales 
of conflict, settlement and influence; he also suggests that it may not be easy to identify the 
representatives of certain groups. The issues may be complex, involving externalities, economic 
factors and varying geographical areas. He considers that the outcome of environmental disputes 
may produce confusing results with a redistribution of resources, income and power. 
Outcomes are described in various ways, usually with the assumption that some steady state can 
be reached which is then termed 'conflict resolution'. Scimmeca (1993) suggests that it is 
necessary to draw distinctions between 'resolution': which addresses the root causes of the 
conflict; 'conflict management': which may not; and 'settlement' which implies coercion by a 
stronger party. These issues are addressed in Chapters 3 and 4. 
Organising frameworks, explanatory theories and predictive models. 
This thesis follows the convention that theories provide explanation and understanding, that 
frameworks are used to organise concepts as part of the development of theory and that models 
may be used to predict the fliture course of events. This study is largely concerned with theory 
and its representation in organising frameworks. 
TILE SELECTION OF CASE STUDIES 
As mentioned earlier, the author has conducted a series of approximately 22 case studies during 
the last eight years which contain an underlying or potential conflict concerning the allocation 
of (or access to) natural resources. However the level of documentation of these studies varies 
considerably. For ease of presentation, twelve studies have been selected which have the most 
detailed documentation. 
Ten cases are covered in the introductory analysis in Chapter 2, three cases of co-operation: 
-participatory plsrnnmg in the Bob Marshall Wilderness Area in Montana, U.S A; 
- the management plan for Rutland Water in Leicestershire; and 
- the voluntary restrictions on cliff-climbing at South Stack, Anglesey, North Wales; 
seven conflicts over: 
- possible loss of public access for recreation to privately owned forests in the State of 
Maine, U.SA; 
- motor sports events in England; and 
- moorland access in the Peak District National Park 
and four conflicts over the potential designation of 
- the inter-tidal areas of the Oosterschelde estuary in Zeeland, Netherlands as a State 
Nature Reserve; 
- the inter-tidal areas off Skomer Island in Dyfed, South Wales as a Marine Nature 
Reserve; 
- areas of National Forests in North West Montana as Wilderness Areas; and 
- the Pentland Hills in Lothian, Scotland as a Regional Park 
The detailed analysis of the dynamic process of conflict in Chapter 3 concentrates on three of 
these cases: 
- moorland access in the Peak District National Park, 
- motor sports events in England; and 
- the designation of the Pentland Hills in Lothian, Scotland as a Regional Park 
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The evaluation of decision-making in Chapter 4 is illustrated by one conflict - the changing 
approach to policy planning in the estuaries of the Rhine Delta in Zeeland, Netherlands; and an 
examination of the designation process for Dutch National Parks. 
The concluding analysis in Chapter 5 utilises a core of five case studies 
- moorland access in the Peak District National Park, 
- motor sports events in England; 
- the designations of the Pentland Hills as a Regional Park,. 
- the inter-tidal areas off Skomer Island as a Marine Nature Reserve; and 
- policy planning in the Rhine Delta. 
An outline of each case study and its principal documentary sources is given in Figure 1.1. 
Synopses of the case studies considered in Chapter 2 are included in Annex 3. More detailed 
narrative accounts of the conflicts under consideration in Chapters 3 and 4 are given in those 
chapters. 
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FIGURE 1.1: CASE STUDIES USED IN THE ANALYSIS 
COOPERATION: non-contentious potential conflicts, impact managed  
LOCATION TOPIC PRINCIPAL DOCUMENTARY 
SOURCES 
Bob Marshall Wilderness Area, Preventative planning to reduce Sidaway (1994a), Stoakes (1987), 
Montana potential impact of hiking, (1990) 
camping, and horse riding within 
designated wilderness area. 
Dutch National Park designation Consultative procedures Sidaway and van der Voet (1993) 
Rutland Water, Leicestershire Preventative planning to reduce Knights (1982), Sidaway (1988), 
potential impact of water sports on (1991a) 
wintering birds. 
South Stack, Anglesey Management of impact of cliff Sidawáy (1988) (1991a) 
climbing to reduce potential 
disturbance to nesting birds 
CONFLICTS: contentious. 
LOCATION NATURE OF THE DISPUTE DOCUMENTARY SOURCES 
Oosterschelde, Zeeland Method of restricting access Sidaway (1992b) 
following designation of state 
nature reserve. 
Skomer Island, Dyfed Method of restricting access Countryside Council for Wales 
following designation of Marine (1993), Nature Conservancy 
Nature Reserve. Council (1986) (1987), Sidaway 
(1988) 
Various locations in England Potential impact of motor sports Elson et al (1986), LARA (1993), 
events on local communities and Stevens (1995) 
wildlife. 
Northern Woods Maine Potential restriction of public Kellert (1989), USFS and 
access on sale of private forests for Governors' Task Force (1990). 
sub-division and development  
North West Montana Possible designation of Wilderness Montana Wilderness Association 
Areas. (1990b), interviews conducted by 
author in 1990. 
Peak District National Park, Public access to private land and Peak Park Joint Planning Board 
Derbyshire potential recreational disturbance (undated), Sidaway (1988). 
to ground nesting birds 
Pentland Hills, Lothian Designation of Regional Park Pentland Hills Technical Group 
(1972), Sidaway (1991b)(1992c) 
Voordelta of the Rhine, Zeeland Method of restricting access Sidaway and van des Voet (1993) 
following designation of state 
nature reserve. 
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INFRODUCHON 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate empirically the nature of conflicts between interest 
groups competing for access to semi-natural resources. The starting point for considering the 
possible factors which contribute to conflict and co-operation was a series of empirical 
observations made in an earlier study (Sidaway, 1988). However, an initial review of the 
literature on social conflicts suggested that a wider range of factors could be involved, although 
few writers ground their theories in much empirical evidence. The focus of this writing varies 
but it is generally recognised that conflicts differ in scale, from interpersonal disputes, through 
those involving groups in the community, communities within the nation, to international 
disputes. Such is the appeal of universal theory that some writers move happily from individual 
to international relations apparently assuming that theories which explain the origins of conflict 
are generally applicable at all levels (e.g., Deutsch, 1973). 
Whether this generalisation across different levels of conflict is justified is rarely critically 
examined although Coser (1956, 1967) has written separately on inter- and intra-group conflict 
(between and within groups). Beals and Siegal (1966) draw on the first of these works and 
provide an anthropological perspective on conflicts in rural communities in India. At one point 
they use the term "scope" to describe the size of social unit involved in a conflict and also the 
term "pervasiveness" to cover the number and kinds of relationships disrupted by a conflict. The 
latter term in particular is useflul as it recognises that a local dispute may have national 
implications or alternatively that the course of the local dispute may be influenced by, for 
example, developments in the national political scene. 
Yet Deutsch (1973) is also amongst those writers (e.g., Mack and Snyder, 1957) who identify 
different dimensions of conflict including the scale, level, nature or type, motivation of parties 
(e.g. beliefs and interests), communication between them, focus of decision-making, historical 
context, politicisation and intensity. More significantly, generalised theories tend to ignore 
fundamental features of conflicts such as the role of power within a social structure. This is a 
frequent sociological criticism of psychologically-based theories. For example, Scimecca (1993) 
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faulted the human needs theory of conflict resolution propounded by Burton (1990) for this 
reason, for its emphasis on genetic determinism and its failure to consider the contextual role 
of culture and social institutions. Brown and Marriot (1993) also criticise Burton's theory on the 
grounds that it is based on the needs of the individual and ignores the role of organisations in 
fulfilling human needs of co-operation and association. 
Within the preliminiy analysis provided in this chapter, the contributory factors of such conflicts 
were considered to fall within a somewhat narrower range of dimensions. This analysis 
considers the subject or basic issue of contention; the motivations or interests of the competing 
parties and their inter-relationships which might be structured by the institutional setting in 
which the conflicts occur. Different aspects of these groups of factors are briefly considered 
before they are examined empirically in a series of case studies. 
CONSIDERATION OF DIAGNOSTIC FACTORS 
Substantive issues 
Deutsch (1973) suggests that the issue in contention not only lies at the heart of each conflict 
but is also an important factor which affects the course of a conflict. However, he suggests: 
"The issue or issues in conflict between nations, groups or individuals may be diffuse and 
generalised, as in ideological conflict, or specific and limited, as in the conflict over 
possession of a certain property. The issue may be important or trivial to the parties 
involved; it may permit compromise or require submission of one side to the other" 
(Deutsch, 1973, 5). 
He later lists five basic types of issues, namely, control over resources, preferences and 
nuisances, values (over what "should be"), beliefs (about what "is") and the nature of the 
relationship between the parties. Although access to and control of scarce goods or resources 
are widely recognised as an important sources of conflicts (for example, Coser, 1956, 201) these 
issues are not invariably in dispute. As Beals and Siegal (1966) point out, most societies develop 
mechanisms for allocating resources. 
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• .before we can offer our own definition of conflict, however, we must determine what 
is meant by scarce goods in each society, and we must somehow explain how scarce 
goods can be responsible on one occasion for the development of co-operation and on 
another for the development of conflict. From some viewpoints, it appears probable that 
conflict is least likely to occur over the allocation of scarce goods, the allocation of 
scarce goods is considered a principal function of society (Beals and Siegal, 1966, 18). 
Their observation is illustrated by the case studies considered in this thesis. All concern access 
to or control of biological resources, but in many cases mechanisms have been adopted which 
prevent potential conflicts. But although access is a common element in these cases, it may not 
be the stated issue. Indeed the biological impacts of outdoor recreation appear to be the 
common problem and ostensible cause of the conflicts and potential conflicts alike. In which 
case, it may be that one particular aspect of the impact may be more likely to be a substantive 
issue and at the heart of the conflict than others and that this should be subjected to further 
analysis. Beals and Siegal go on to suggest that important aspects of conflicts may be "... the 
nature of the activity, an exchange of opposition, and the effect of that activity on the 
organisation." (Beals and Siegal, 1966, 20). 
Mack and Snyder (1957) in a lengthy literature review identify a number of factors which may 
be among the underlying sources of or may accompany or intensify conflicts. They do not 
attempt to define conflict but suggest that it has the following essential properties: 
"1. Conflict requires at least two parties or two analytically distinct units or entities. 
Conflicts arise from position scarcity and resource scarcity. 
Conflict behaviours are those designed to destroy, injure, thwart, or otherwise 
control another party or other parties, and a conflict relationship is one in which the 
parties can gain (relatively) only at each other's expense. 
Conflict requires interaction among parties in which action and counteractions are 
mutually opposed. 
Conflict relations always involve attempts to gain control of scarce resources and 
positions or to influence behaviour in certain directions; hence a conflict relationship 
always involves the attempt to acquire or exercise power or the actual acquisition or 
exercise of power. 
Conflict relations constitute a fundamental social-interaction process having 
important consequences. 
A conflict process or relation represents a temporary tendency towards disjunction. 
in the interaction flow between parties. 
Conflict relations do not represent a breakdown in regulated conduct but rather a 
shift in the governing norms and expectations." (Mack and Snyder, 1957, 35-37). 
They later identify conditions of conflict: 
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• 	" . . certain elements inherent in the nature of the parties to conflict, in the interaction 
relationships between partners, and in the social context will often account for the origin, 
form, intensity, duration, limits and resolution of conflict." (Mack and Snyder, 1957, 46) 
to which they add two other important conditioning factors - power relationships and the 
availability of information. 
These suggestions confirm that in addition to assessing the contribution of recreational impacts, 
as the ostensible matters in dispute, further analysis of the origins of conflict might concentrate 
on the nature or interest of the parties, the interactions between them and the social or 
institutional context within which the dispute occurs. 
Motivations of Interested Parties 
People organise around a "cause", which might be their material interests, their principles or 
their political agenda. Mack and Snyder (1957) suggest that conflicts can be about rights and 
issues or that they may be ideological and cultural in nature. Deutsch (1973), Van Doom (1966) 
and Baumgartner et al (1978) emphasise therole of ideology, principles or viewpoints. The main 
distinctions within such motivations are between beliefs, i.e., values or concerns about future 
goals, and interests which are the economic concerns which may be threatened or advanced by 
conflict. 
Lowe and Goyder (1983) suggest a basic distinction between principle and interest groups. 
Principle groups advance broad altruistic aims, while interest groups are concerned with 
immediate short-term material benefits. While the principlelmterest distinction has its attractions, 
it is also difficult to use in practice. It may be that interest groups tend to move towards more 
principled arguments as a conflict escalates, meanwhile different factions within an interest 
group may argue from different standpoints. Typically, the national headquarters of an 
organisation will argue from a position of principle, which may help to legitimise the 
advancement of its interests or to serve the function of communicating with a wider reference 
group in a statement of common identity. Meanwhile some of its local members are more willing 
to concede principles to obtain the more tangible benefits of negotiation. 
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This clash of principle seems likely to occur within the conflicts between outdoor recreation and 
nature conservation that are the subject of this study. Outdoor recreation epitomises changing 
(and possibly rising) demands of a consumer society while conservationists are motivated by the 
advancement ofprinciples that seek to regulate and control the rise of consumerism. 
Interest groups seek to secure or control access to resources through the market or the political 
arena. Within the recreation sphere these access mechanisms have been fWly described in a study 
of the topic in England and Wales (Centre for Leisure Research, 1986). However an interest 
group may elevate its concerns into a matter of principle (a public interest) and seek broader 
support to legitimate its case. If successful, legitimation comes in the form of legislation. To 
secure these goals the level of political organisation of interests may be important. Those 
interests which are politically well-organised may be better able to advance their interests than 
those that are not. This study also suggested that challenges to the status quo by competing 
interests and their responses to change may be significant in many disputes. 
Although conflicting ideologies are a common feature of disputes, in resolved cases ideological 
differences are often suppressed in the bid for consensus, suggesting that interest groups with 
differing ideologies can reach settlements. This would require that the ideologies or underlying 
beliefs of interest groups remain unchanged, while their interest in a resource may be negotiable. 
Indeed environmental mediators make much of this point, stressing the need to differentiate 
between "position" and "interest". Fisher and Ury (1981), for example, use the latter term in 
a different sense from some other authors. One environmental mediator described the value of 
not challenging an interest group's ideological position, for example, the right of the National 
Rifle Association to use firearms within Los Angeles National Forest, California. In this way he 
was able to identify a negotiable goal (interest), the gain of a target practice site in a safe isolated 
gully (Tice, 1990, pers. comm). 
Sidaway (1991b), in an analysis of public objections to the designation of the Pentland Hills 
Regional Park, suggested that it is possible to identify interests from their public expressions of 
concern and categorise these into, for example, material interests (having a commercial or 
proprietorial interest in the resource); and altruistic interests: (e.g., seeking public access to or 
conservation of the resource). 
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Inter-relationships 
It has already been noted that Deutsch (1973) considers the nature of the relationship between 
the parties could be a contributory factor; conflict arising when the relationship is poor, co-
operation when it is good. A variety of other authors, including Mack and Snyder (1957), think 
on similar lines. Both Amy (1987) and Druckman (1993) present typologies which categorise 
conflicts of interests, of misunderstanding and clashes of fundamental belief as alternative 
contributory factors to the initiation of conflicts, In this context, misunderstandings would arise 
from poor communication between the parties or a lack of information on the subject at issue. 
Organisational and Institutional Factors 
The way in which decisions are made and, in particular, whether the process of decision-making 
leaves the affected parties questioning whether justice has been done, could be another 
important aspect of conflicts. Along with Beals and Seigal's (1966) allocation mechanisms, 
Baumgartner et al (1978) suggest that there need to be "appropriate arrangements" for dealing 
with disputes. Whilst Mack and Snyder in their literature review (1957) identify the social and 
institutional context as one of the pre-conditions of conflicts, Deutsch (1973) identifies the social 
norms which regulate disputes as important factors in the social environment of conflicts. 
Within such contexts, individuals rarely act alone. More characteristically they organise 
themselves into local groups, which may or may not have links into a wider political network. 
Other characteristics which may be significant could be the numbers of such groups operating 
in a given situation, the relationships between the membership or constituency and the 
individuals who are acting as representatives and whether organisations employ professionals 
to perform this role. 
PROPOSiTIONS RELATED TO GROUPS OF FACTORS 
Thus substantive issues, interests as motivating factors, interactions between the disputing 
parties and the institutional settings, with their associated forms of decision-making, provide 
convenient groupings of factors for the subsequent analyses. The selection of these factors has 
been linked to four propositions based on an initial inspection of the case studies, namely that: 
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a 	Conflicts are largely issue-driven. More exactly, the damaging effects of recreational 
impacts on ecosystems are in themselves the major cause of conflicts between outdoor 
recreation and nature conservation. 
b 	Conflicts stem from the nature of the interests involved in the dispute. 
c 	Interest group interactions (such as misunderstandings and poor communication) 
contribute to the escalation of a dispute into a conflict. 
d 	Management and decision-making processes (the institutional setting) can either 
exacerbate conflicts or contribute to their resolution. 
Impacts 
Proposition (a) suggests that the probability of conflicts arising might be increased by 
- the (perceived) severity of the impacts that particular recreation activities have on 
species or habitats; 
- the special conservation status of areas which might increase sensitivity of 
conservation organisations to their use for recreation (irrespective of any previous 
history of use); 
- the frequency or extensiveness [incidence] of particular recreational impacts; 
- high levels of use; and 
- as was suggested earlier a lack of understanding of these impacts. 
These five factors are described as factors 1-5 in Figure 2.1. 
Interests 
Proposition (b) suggests that the probability of conflict might increase or decrease according 
to 
- the nature of the competing interests (a material interest in the resource might be 
ownership, commercial or management, alternatively there may be more altruistic 
interests such as conservation); 
- the numbers of interest groups involved in the dispute, larger numbers leading to 
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increased complexity in relationships; 
- clashes of beliefs or ideology; 
- the advancement of interest as matters of principle by competing interests; and 
- the awareness or sensitivity of groups to the interests of others (particularly the 
sensitivity of recreation groups to conservation issues) are other aspects of interest 
groups that might be material in conflicts. 
These five factors are described as factors 6- 10 in Figure 2.1. 
Interactions 
Proposition (c) suggests that the probability of conflict might increase 
- when value judgements are made about the compatibility of activities with the 
management aims or sustainability of the resource (frequently referred to as 
appropriateness), 
if there is a lack of communication between the interested parties; 
- from reactions (particularly in the part of long-established interests) to new claims on 
the resource; 
- the tactics or negotiation strategies used by interest groups during the course of the 
dispute; and 
- the involvement of the news media. 
These five factors are described as factors 11 -15 in Figure 2.4. 
Institutional Settings 
Proposition (d) suggests that the probability of conflict might be increased 
- by the level ofpolitical organisation of the interest groups; 
- whether or not management aims and the authority of the decision makers are 
accepted by all of the disputing parties; 
- by the extent ofpublic involvement in decision-making; 
- by the type of decision-making ( for example adversarial situations may be less 
conducive to co-operation between the parties than negotiations); 
- by the existence of mechanisms to deal with changing circumstances; and 
- the distribution ofpower. 
These seven factors are described as factors 16 -22 in Figure 2.1. 
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METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
The propositions are examined in turn using the set of case studies outlined in Chapter 1. Each 
of the four propositions is examined by considering the possible contributory factors that have 
been listed. When a factor appears as a consistent feature of each of the conflict case studies 
or each of the co-operation case studies, and shows consistent differences between them, it is 
considered to be a discriminatory factor. Each group of factors is considered in turn and the 
analysis is summarised in the following matrices: 
the nature of biological impacts are presented in Figure 2.2; 
the characteristics of interests are presented in Figure 2.3; 
interest group interactions. during a dispute are considered in Figure 2.4; and 
institutional settings are considered in Figure 2.5. 
Full details of the factors and how they were assessed are given in Annex 2, while synopses of 
each case study, showing the documentary sources from which the assessment is based, are 
given in Annex 3. 
21 
FIGURE 2.1: FULL LISTING OF FACTORS 
FACTOR I CATEGORISATION 
NATURE OF BIOLOGICAL IMPACT 
Type of recreational activity Activities listed 
Nature conservation status of area Protected designations and notifications or impacts on 
charismatic or threatened species 
Incidence of impact Extent, timing and/or frequency of impact 
Level of visitor pressure Quantity of visitor use 
Understanding of impact Understood or uncertain. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERESTS 
Nature of interests Material: (commercial or proprietorial); altruistic; 
managerial and/or professional. 
Number of interests Number of interest groups. 
Conflicting ideologies Opposed or shared by interest groups. 
Advancement of principles by interest groups Motive presented as broad altruistic aim or material 
interest. 
Environmental awareness of interest groups Response to impact is sensitive or insensitive. 
INTEREST GROUP INTERACTIONS DURING DISPUTE 
Appropriateness of resource use Whether the appropriateness of (recreational) use of 
the resource is an issue in the dispute. 
Communication networks Well established or poorly established; effective or 
ineffective. 
Reaction to new claim on resource Adverse or tolerant when status quo is challenged. 
Negotiating strategies of interest groups Confrontational or conciliatory. 
Involvement of media High or low. 
INSTITUTIONAL SETTING 
Level of political organisation Unorganised, organised or highly organised. 
Acceptance of management aims Accepted or challenged. 
Public involvement in decision-making No public involvement, limited or wide involvement 
Type of decision-making Adversarial or negotiative. 
Mechanisms to deal with change Exist or absent 
Authority of decision maker Accepted or challenged. 
Distribution of power Balance between interests is equal or unequal. 
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THE NATURE OF BIOLOGICAL IMPACTS 
FIGURE 2.2: ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS 
CASES FACTORS 
1. Type of 2. Nature 3. Type and 4. Level of 5. 
recreation conservation incidence of visitor Understanding 
activity status of area impact pressure of impact 
CO-OPERATION: non-contentious potential conflicts, impact managed 
Bob Marshall Hiking, horse Designated Vegetation 250,000 visits Understood 
Wilderness trails, primitive damage localised p.a. to 607,500 
Area camping ha. 
Rutland Non-motorised Designated Disturbance to 500,000 visits, Understood 
Water water sports birds reduced by water area of 
zoning, 1254 ha. 
South Stack Climbing, bird Undesignated but Disturbance to Not recorded Understood 
watching protected species birds. Time and (very low) 
space specific  
CONFLICTS; contentious 
Closter- Water sports Designated Disturbance to Use not Uncertain, 
schelde birds and seals. recorded, 2400 contentious 
Time/location boats on 
specific 35,000 ha. 
Skomer Sub-aqua, Designated Disturbance to 1500 divers Uncertain, 
Marine canoeing, birds and seals. p. a. MNR contentious 
Nature fishing. Time/location covers 1500 ha 
Reserve specific of sea bed 
Motor Sports 19 types of Designated and Disturbance and Not recorded Uncertain, 
motor sports undesignated site erosion. contentious 
Location specific 
Peak District Hill walking Designated Path erosion and 22 million Disturbance 
Moorlands climbing disturbance to visits p.a. to uncertain, 
birds. Location NP of contentious 
specific 144,000ha.  
Commentary on Impact Factors 
Activities (Factor 1) A wide range of activities were represented in both the conflict and factor 
case studies but there was no consistent relationship between them. For example, the impacts 
associated with motorised sports were almost invariably contentious but the biological impacts 
of this activity were only one minor aspect of a social conflict between motor sport organisations 
and neighbouring communities in which the image of the sport, based on noise, nuisance and 
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other disturbance, feature prominently (Elson et al, 1986). Meanwhile the impacts of other more 
traditional countryside recreation activities may be the subject of conflicts in some areas. For 
example, the alleged impacts of walking on moorland breeding birds in the Peak District 
National Park are considered potentially damaging, although more obviously damaging impacts 
of this activity, such as the trampling of moorland vegetation along the Pennine Way, are not. 
Water sports provide an example of two areas (admittedly in different countries) where the same 
activity can feature in an example of conflict or co-operation (e.g., Rutland Water and the 
Oosterschelde). 
Conclusion No consistent pattern can be ascribed to the activity alone, this factor does not 
discriminate between conflicts and co-operation. 
Nature conservation status ofarea (Factor 2) Although most of case studies were in designated 
areas, recreational impacts were managed without conflict in both designated and undesignated 
areas suggesting that this is not a critical factor. Further cases of conflicts and co-operation 
concerning the same activities but occurring in both types of area can be found (e.g. orienteering 
- see Sidaway, 1988). Nevertheless the decision to designate an area may initiate a conflict (e.g. 
Skomer, Oosterschelde). 
Conclusion No consistent pattern can be ascribed to the conservation status of the area, this 
factor does not discriminate between conflicts and co-operation. 
Incidence of impact (Factor 3) The extent of a recreational impact did not appear to be an 
important factor compared to its specific location, which may be very small (e.g. a nesting 
territory) and its timing (e.g. the nesting season). However while such localised impacts may be 
the subject of a dispute, the case studies illustrated that these impacts can a' .90 be successfully 
managed. 
Conclusion No consistent pattern can be ascribed to the incidence of the impact, this factor does 
not discriminate between conflicts and co-operation. 
Level of visitor pressure (Factor 4) As most of these impacts were highly localised, absolute 
levels of use were not an important factor. Impacts may be managed in very popular locations 
thus avoiding conflict ( e.g., Rutland Water, Leicestershire and Precipice Path, Acadia National 
Park Maine), whilst conflicts have occurred over very low levels of use in critically located sites 
24 
(e.g. sub-aqua diving near cliff nesting birds at Skonier Island). What differentiates between 
these situations may be the different perceptions of risk by the interested parties, a characteristic 
of the interest group and not the impact itself It is also worth noting that reliable statistics on 
levels of use are rarely available so that the relative levels of use of different areas could only be 
compared subjectively in the case studies. 
Conclusion No consistent pattern can be ascribed to the level of visitor pressure, this factor does 
not discriminate between conflicts and co-operation. 
Understanding of impact (Factor 5) The understanding of the biological impact of an activity 
has two components, whether information or research on the impact exists and how any 
information is interpreted. As almost invariably little specific research has been carried out on 
recreational impacts (Sidaway, 1994b), uncertainty contributes to misunderstanding and the 
significance of the impact in conservation terms is often contentious. The case studies 
demonstrate a marked difference between conflicts and co-operation in this respect. Interestingly 
in the two British co-operation cases, although relatively little specific research has been done 
on the impacts, their management is uncontentious as the risk of serious damage is accepted by 
recreation organisations. In the Bob Marshall Wilderness Area research has been limited to very 
few impacts but here also management is uncontenious. In the conflict cases, the impacts are 
contentious, for example, because the validity of one specific local study (Yalden & Yalden, 
1989) has been challenged on behalf of the principal recreation interest (Watson, 1991), or the 
evidence of disturbance to cliff-nesting birds is based on occasional observation and its validity 
and relevance to the management of the underwater reserve was challenged by the diving 
organisations and the Sports Council for Wales (Sidaway, 1988). 
Conclusion This factor does discriminate between conflicts and co-operation as there is a 
consistent pattern in the level of understanding of the impact and the differing interpretations 
made by the competing interest groups so that these become a controversial feature of the 
conflicts studied. 
25 
Overall conclusions on impacts 
Four of the factors which featured in this analysis - type of recreation activity (Factor 1), 
conservation status of site (Factor 2), incidence of impact (Factor 3) and level of visitor pressure 
(Factor 4) - were not consistent features of conflict or co-operation cases. Thus the existence 
of a recreational impact did not invariably lead to conflict and where such impacts featured in 
conflicts they were not the sole cause. In these examples, conflicts could be resolved or avoided 
by sensitive impact management. In the co-operation cases, the understanding of the impact 
(Factor 5) was not in contention even when little was known about the impact. While this could 
also be true in some conflicts, there were cases where much was known about the impact but 
its effects were in dispute. This factor did discriminate between conflict and co-operation cases 
and can contribute to the later analysis. Nevertheless the general conclusion is that it is how the 
issue is handled, not the issue itself that determines whether a dispute will escalate into a 
conflict. 
This analysis lends little support to Proposition (a) - that the deleterious effects of 
recreational impacts on ecosystems are in themselves the major cause of conflicts 
between outdoor recreation and nature conservation 
W. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERESTS 
FIGURE 2.3: ANALYSIS OF INTERESTS 
CASES FACTORS 
6. Nature of 7. Number of 8. Conflicting 9. Advancement 10. 
interests interests ideologies of principles by Environmental 
interest groups awareness of 
interest groups 
CO-OPERATION: non-contentious potential conflicts, impact managed  
Bob Marshall Proprietorial Four groups, Shared beliefs Issues not Sensitive 
Wilderness /professional, 35 member in wilderness elevated to matters response 
Area commercial task force. designation of principle 
altruistic/self 
Rutland Proprietorial Three Differences Issues not Sensitive 
Water /professional groupings respected and elevated to matters response 
altruistic and ignored of principle 
self 
South Stack Proprietorial, Two Shared beliefs Issues not Sensitive 
altruistic, self in conservation elevated to matters response. 
and of principle 
professional  
CONFLICTS; contentious 
Closter- Commercial, Many: three Opposed Issues elevated to Insensitive 
schelde altruistic, self groupings matters of response 
and principle 
professional  
Skomer Proprietorial Two Opposed Issues elevated to Insensitive 
Marine /professional groupings matters of response. 
Nature altruistic and principle 
Reserve self 
Motor Sports Proprietorial, Many: four Opposed Issues elevated to Both sensitive 
altruistic, self groupings matters of and insensitive 
and principle responses 
professional  
Peak District Propnetorial Many: four Opposed Issues elevated to Insensitive 
/professional groupings matters of response. 
altruistic/self  principle  
Commentary on interests 
Nature of interests (Factor 6) Various combinations of interest were represented throughout the 
cases studies and there was no consistent pattern conforming to conflict or co-operation cases. 
Certain interests were difficult to categorise, notably for recreation activities which could be said 
to contain both altruistic and self-interested elements. Public land managers typically operate to 
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multiple aims and can therefore be inferred to be advancing both their own professional 
(material) interests as well as more altruistic goals which stem from their mandate. Yet 
apparently benevolent combinations of proprietorial/altruistic interest involving resource 
ownership by public or non-governmental organisations do not necessarily reduce the likelihood 
of conflict; for example, public ownership of Skomer Island or the Oosterschelde inter-tidal 
areas. Furthermore the professional/altruistic combination of interests provided by planners did 
not necessarily prevent conflicts as was seen in the case of motorsports in England and Wales. 
Conclusion As no consistent pattern can be ascribed to the nature of interests, including 
resource ownership, this factor does not discriminate between conflicts and co-operation. 
Number of interests (Factor 7) The numbers of interested parties differed markedly from case 
to case with no consistent pattern between conflict and co-operation cases. Although a large 
number of interests might be thought to lead to complexity and therefore conflict, this was not 
necessarily the case. Most situations were simplified by the creation of informal coalitions of 
interest, which resulted ina small number of groupings. 
Conclusion No consistent pattern can be ascribed to the number of interests, this factor does not 
discriminate between conflicts and co-operation. 
Conflicting ideologies (Factor 8) The cases of co-operation demonstrate that a shared belief (in 
conservation) may contribute to co-operation or that interests with deep-seated differences of 
belief can co-exist when those differences are set aside in the mutual interest of impact 
management. The opposite is true in conflicts where ideological differences are highlighted. 
Conclusion This factor does discriminate between conflicts and co-operation as there is a 
consistent pattern in the extent to which conflicting ideologies are advanced by competing 
interest groups in the conflicts studied and the extent to which they are suppressed in the cases 
of co-operation. 
Advancement ofprinciple (Factor 9) 
The manner in which interest groups may advance a broad altruistic aim (such as freedom to 
roam or the conservation of nature) as a matter of over-riding principle is associated with the 
underlying clashes of ideology (Factor 8), which has been previously identified as a feature of 
conflicts. 
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Conclusion This factor does discriminate between conflicts and co-operation as there is a 
consistent pattern in the two types of case study. In conflicts, differences of ideology are 
elevated to matters of non-negotiable principle, whilst this does not occur in the cases of co-
operation. 
Environmental awareness of interest groups (Factor 10) An insensitivity of recreational users 
or interest groups towards the biological impacts that their activities may cause was a consistent 
feature of the conflict case studies. This does not occur in the co-operation cases. 
Conclusion This factor does discriminate between conflicts and co-operation as there is a 
consistent pattern in the two types of cases. 
Overall conclusions on interests 
The number of interest groups and the nature of their material interests do not discriminate 
between cases of conflict and co-operation in this analysis, whereas conflicting ideologies, the 
advancement of arguments of principle by interest groups and their environmental awareness do. 
This analysis lends supportfor Proposition () - that conflicts stem at least in part from 
the certain aspects of interest groups, notably their beliefs and the extent to which 
competing groups advance them during the course of a dispute. 
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INTEREST GROUP INTERACTIONS DURING A DISPUTE 
FIGURE 2.4: ANALYSIS OF INTERACTIONS 
CASES FACTORS 
11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 
Appropriate- Communication Reaction to new Negotiating Involvement of 
ness of networks claim on strategies of the media 
resource use resource interest groups 
CO-OPERATION: non-contentious potential conflicts, impact managed  
Bob Marshall Appropriate- Well No new claims Conciliatory Not known 
Wilderness ness not established 
Area disputed  
Rutland Water Appropriate- Well Adverse Conciliatory Not known 
ness not established response to 
disputed tourism 
development  
South Stack Appropriate- Well No external Conciliatory Not known 
ness not established claims 
disputed  
CONFLICTS; contentious 
Oosterschelde Appropriate- Poorly Adverse to new Confrontational High 
ness disputed established regulations 
Skomer Marine Appropriate- Well Adverse to new Confrontational Not known 
Nature Reserve ness disputed established, regulations 
ineffective 
Motor Sports Appropriate- Poorly Adverse to Confrontational Locally high 
ness disputed established existing and 
new motor sport 
venues 
Peak District Appropriate- Poorly Adverse to new Confrontational High 
ness disputed established recreation 
activities 
Appropriateness of resource use (Factor 11) Certain recreational activities may be considered 
generally compatible with the sustainability of the resource by its managers and other users, 
although these activities may be restricted on a seasonal and/or spatial basis. In these (co-
operation) cases "appropriateness" (i.e. the principle of recreational use) was not an issue 
whereas it was a marked feature of conflicts. But the definition of "appropriate" use of a natural 
or semi-natural resource is subjective and is based as much on the values of the dominant 
interest group as it is on the harmful impacts of the. activity. Thus appropriateness of use may 
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be used as an exclusionary device, legitimating and reinforcing the position of the controlling 
group with assertions about the harmfiul effects on wildlife of other users being used to legitimise 
their case (see particularly the discussion of motorsports in Harrison, 1991). 
Conclusion This factor does discriminate between conflicts and co-operation as there is a 
consistent pattern in the two types of case study. In conflicts, the appropriateness of a recreation 
activity is likely to be questioned by other interests, although this labelling may be based on the 
perceived impacts on the resource or its social acceptability to existing users. This does not 
occur in co-operative situations. 
Communication (Factor 12) Well established and effective communication is a feature of the co-
operative cases, whereas the reverse is true of conflicts. In the latter cases, the channels of 
communication, whether these are formalised into consultative or advisory management 
committees or informal networks, are unlikely to exist. Where they do there may be other 
failures, such as representatives establishing good personal contacts with other interests but 
failing to liaise with their own organisations, e.g., Skomer where local communication was good 
but communication between national organisations was ineffective. 
Conclusion This factor does discriminate between conflicts and co-operation as there is a 
consistent pattern in the two types of case study. In the cases of co-operation, good channels 
of communication are established, whilst this does not occur in conflicts. 
Reaction to new claims on the resource (Factor 13) Resistance from established interests to new 
claims, whether these are new recreational activities or proposed new environmental regulations 
is a common feature of conflicts. The reverse would appear to be the case in the co-operation 
cases, although as no new claims were observed in most cases, it is not certain whether they 
would or would not be resisted. At Rutland Water the external threat of new development came 
from outside the co-operating body of water users. 
Conclusion Due to the lack of evidence on the response to new claims in co-operation cases, 
this factor cannot be used to discriminate between conflicts and co-operation. 
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Negotiating strategies of the interest groups (Factor 14). There is a consistent relationship 
between the confrontational tactics adopted by interest groups in conflicts and the conciliatory 
stance of co-operating interests. 
Conclusion This factor does discriminate between conflicts and co-operation as there is a 
consistent pattern in the two types of case study. 
Media involvement (Factor 15) The lack of data particularly on co-operation cases precludes 
firm conclusions being drawn on the contribution of this factor. However as media interest in 
controversy is often encouraged by campaigning interest groups ( e.g., the Oosterschelde and 
the Peak District) it seems more likely that media involvement may contribute to the escalation, 
rather than the initiation of a conflict, i.e., high media interest is a symptom and not a cause of 
conflict. 
Conclusion Due to the lack of evidence on media involvement in co-operation cases, this factor 
cannot be used to discriminate between conflicts and co-operation. 
Overall conclusions on interactions 
On close examination it is unlikely that several of these factors are independent, they may be 
closely related or even measuring the same thing. For example, part of the confrontational 
strategy adopted by a campaigning organisation will be to develop close relations with the media 
and engage their interest in controversy. Co-operating parties have little interest in such tactics, 
and co-operation is of less interest to the media than conflict. Part of the 'resistance of an 
established interest to a new claim may be to challenge the credentials of that claim by 
suggesting that it is inappropriate and damaging to the sustainability of the resource. Thus 
Factors 11 and 13 may well be measuring the same thing. 
Proposition (c), that interest group interactions (such as misunderstandings and poor 
communication) contribute to the escalation of a dispute into a conflict, is largely 
substantiated by these case studies. 
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THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE INSTITUTIONAL SETTING TO A DISPUTE 
FIGURE 2.5: ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONAL SE1TLNGS 
CASES FACTOR 
16Levelct 17. 18 Public 19. 20. 21. 22. 
Political AcoqAmce of involvaneat Type of Mcthaiinn Authcuity of Di1n1,uti 
wgnicticn migpinmt in dn&ai- dec.iixi- to deal with decisicn 
aims —king making thige: maker  
Co-operation: non-contentious potential conflicts, impact managed 
Bob Organised Accepted Wide Negotiative Exists Accepted Evenly 
Marshall involve- balanced 
Wilderness ment 
Area 
Rutland Organised Accepted Wide Negotiative Exists Accepted Evenly 
Water balanced 
South Highly Accepted No public Negotiative Exists Shared Evenly 
Stack organised involve- responsibil balanced 
ment ity  
CONFLICTS; contentious 
00sdie1dc Disparity: Challenged Limited Adversarial Absent Accepted Unequal 
highly/ 
organised  
Skomer Highly Challenged Limited to Committee Exists Accepted Evenly 
Marine organised wide negotiative, balanced 
Nature Designation 
Reserve adversarial 
Motor Disparity Challenged Limited Adversarial Absent Accepted Unequal 
sports highly! 
organised  
Peak Highly Challenged Limited Adversarial Exists Challenged Evenly 
District organised balanced 
Commentary on Institutional Settings 
Level of political organisation (Factor 16) In most of the case studies a basic degree of 
organisation was evident and few individuals who were not members of organisation made direct 
representations or made a significant contribution to the debate. Moreover casual participation 
in some popular recreational activities, such as sightseeing and walking, cannot be formally 
represented by interest groups and these interests may be considered in a paternalistic way by 
the professional managers. In the conflict case studies, interest groups were highly organised, 
usually employing professional officers, but as there were also examples of professionals co-
operating, for example in the agreements over voluntary restrictions on climbing at South Stack, 
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professionalism, per se, is not a consistent factor which discriminates between the two types of 
case study. 
Conclusion This factor does not discriminate between conflicts and co-operation as there is no 
consistent pattern in the two types of case study. 
Acceptance of management aims (Factor 17) There is a consistent pattern in which management 
aims were accepted in the co-operation cases but challenged in the conflicts. 
Conclusion This factor does discriminate between conflict and co-operation cases as there is 
a consistent pattern in the two types of case study. 
Public involvement in decision-making (Factor 18) Public consultation was almost invariably 
limited to the immediate stakeholders and although there were examples of wider consultation 
in planning exercises, there were virtually no examples of full public involvement from the 
initiation of a project throughout all stages into its management. The possible exception was the 
Bob Marshall Wilderness Area "Limits of Acceptable Change" exercise. However, in the case 
studies as a whole, there did not appear to be a consistent relationship between public 
involvement in decision-making and the prevention of conflict. 
Conclusion As no consistent pattern can be ascribed to the extent of public involvement of 
interest groups in planning or decision-making, this factor does not discriminate between 
conflicts and co-operation. 
Type of decision-making (Factor 19) In this analysis, adversarial decision-making was a major 
feature of the institutional setting of conflicts, whilst negotiative decision-making was a feature 
of the co-operation cases. 
Conclusion This factor does discriminate between conflicts and co-operation as there is a 
consistent pattern in the two types of case study. 
Mechanisms to deal with change: (Factor 20) A range of mechanisms to deal with changing 
circumstances can be found in both the conflict and co-operation case studies. The mechanisms 
include management or advisory committees and/or management plans which may be brokered 
with interested parties. This form of analysis does not allow the effectiveness of these 
mechanisms to be assessed but there is also the problem of ensuring that new external factors 
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are considered and formally represented in decision-making. Frequently existing interest groups 
exclude new interests from representation by erecting the barrier of "appropriateness" (see also 
Emme1s (1975) discussion of social filters in recreation and Centre for Leisure Research, 1986). 
Conclusion As no consistent pattern can be ascribed to the nature of interests, including 
resource ownership, this factor does not discriminate between conflicts and co-operation. 
Authority of decision maker (Factor 21) The acceptance of the authority of the decision-maker 
is a consistent feature of almost all the case studies suggesting that the type of conflict being 
studied is likely to be resolved "within the system" (see Coser, 1956). Indeed in almost all public 
policy decisions of this kind, aggrieved parties can appeal to a superior body which has 
jurisdiction over the resource manager and whose authority is accepted. Thus in most of the 
conflicts studied the authority of the resource manager might be challenged but not that of 
his/her superior. 
Conclusion As the authority of the ultimate decision maker was unchallenged in almost all of 
the cases studied, this factor cannot be used to discriminate between conflicts and co-operation. 
Distribution ofperiver (Factor 22) Although the distribution of power may be markedly uneven 
in certain conflict cases, this factor does not appear to feature in the conflict or co-operation 
cases in a consistent way. The balance of power portrayed in these case studies suggests some 
interesting principles. An unequal distribution of power at all political levels is illustrated by 
one-sided disputes favouring the stronger party, e.g., motor sports in Britain, (and in the 
recreational use of off-road vehicles in the United States) and the designation of the 
Oosterschelde Nature Reserve. 
Conclusion As no consistent pattern can be identified in the distribution of power, this factor 
does not discriminate between conflicts and co-operation. 
Overall Conclusions on institutional settings 
In this analysis, only two factors discriminate between cases of conflict and co-operation: the 
acceptance of management aims and the type of decision-making. 
There is limited support from the case studies for Proposition (d) - that management 
and decision-making processes (the institutional setting) can exacerbate conflicts or 
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contribute to their resolution 
This analysis lends support to the validity of the initial distinction that was made between 
impacts and conflicts, so that while an impacts may be the issue around which a conflict may 
form, many impacts are managed in a mutually beneficial co-operative manner. Thus it is the 
relationship between the interested parties that is crucial Certain aspects of their competing 
interests, ther interactions, and the institutional setting are characteristic of the way in which 
they attempt to broker a reallocation of resources. Two formulations can now be outlined, one 
is typical of conflict, the other of co-operation. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A DIAGNOSTIC FRAMEWORK TO DISTINGUISH 
CONFLICTS 
Discriminating Factors 
From the foregoing analysis it can be seen that the factors fall into one of two categories: 
those that do not discriminate conflict from co-operation; and 
those that clearly discriminate conflict from co-operation. 
Factors in the first of these categories are listed in Figure 2.6. This list includes factors which 
do not discriminate because: 
a 	they are common to the conflict and co-operation case studies (Factors 2, 3, 7, and 21); 
b 	they are not a consistent feature of either conflict or co-operation case studies (Factors 
1, 4, 6, 16, 20 and 22); or 
c 	there is insufficient data from the case studies to provide a strict examination of the role 
of the factor (Factors 15 and 18). 
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FIGURE 2.6: FACTORS WHICH DO NOT DISCRIMINATE BETWEEN CONFLICTS 
AND CO-OPERATION  
FACTOR FEATURES 
Type of recreation activity No consistency -wide range of activities feature in 
conflict and co-operation cases. 
Nature conservation status of the area Conflicts occur in both designated and non-designated 
sites but changes in status can be at issue (see factor 
13). 
Incidence of recreational impact Similar impacts may be the subject of dispute or be 
successfully managed. 
Level of visitor pressure No consistency - wide range of pressures feature in 
conflict and co-operation cases. 
Nature of competing interests No consistency - various combinations of interests 
feature in conflict and co-operation cases. 
Number of interests Although the number of interests varies, coalitions 
into smaller groupings are common and feature in 
conflict and co-operation cases. 
Involvement of the media Media attention is attracted to conflicts but there is 
insufficient evidence from the case studies to draw a 
firm conclusion on this factor. 
Level of political organisation No consistency - varying levels of organisation exist 
in conflict and co-operation cases. 
18. Public involvement in decision-making No examples of full involvement were observed. 
Mechanisms to deal with change No consistency - mechanisms exist in conflict and co- 
operation cases. 
Authority of decision maker Although often challenged at a local level, even in 
conflicts the authority of ultimate decision makers is 
accepted, as is the case in co-operation cases.. 
Distribution of power No consistency - power may be evenly or unevenly 
distributed in conflicts, although it appears to be 
evenly balanced in the co-operation cases. 
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ThOse factors that can be used to distinguish conflicts from co-operation are set out in Figure 
2.7. 
FIGURE 2.7: A DIAGNOSTIC FRAMEWORK TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN 
CONFLICT AND CO-OPERATION 
DISCRIMINATING DISTINGUISHING DISTINGUISHING 
FACTORS FEATURES OF FEATURES OF 
CONFLICT CO-OPERATION 
IMPACT 
5 Understanding of impact Uncertainty and contention about Impact understood and 
impact uncontentious 
INTEREST 
8 Opposing Ideologies Competing ideologies much in Ideology shared or differences 
evidence respected and ignored 
9 Advancement of principle Issue elevated to a matter of Not an issue 
principle  
10 Environmental awareness Interest groups insensitive to Interest groups sensitive to impacts 
environmental impact and agree preventative action 
INTERACTIONS 
12 Communication networks Poorly established Well established and effective 
13 Reaction to new claim on Adverse reaction on the part of [uncertain from cases how a new 
resource existing interests. For example, claim would affect the situation] 
[11 Appropriateness of resource recreational use may be considered 
use] inappropriate Appropriateness is not an issue 
14 Negotiation strategies of Confrontational Conciliatory 
interests 
INSTITUTIONAL SETTINGS 
17 Acceptance of management Challenged Accepted 
aims 
19 Type of decision-making Adversarial Negotiative 
Factors in italics featured in an earlier analysis (Sidaway, 1988) - see Chapter 1. 
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AN APPLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK 
An attempt at validating the framework set out in Figure 2.7 has been undertaken using a further 
set of case studies in which the major issue in dispute is land use allocation. Thus recreational 
impacts on ecosystems are not the central issue in these cases, whereas the type of recreational 
access permitted and the future management of the area is. In two cases, areas of federally 
owned National Forest in the States of Montana and Wyoming proposed as Wilderness Areas 
and privately owned land in the Pentland Hills, Scotland proposed as a Regional Park, the 
conflict concerned whether the areas in question should receive protected status by being 
designated under a relevant statute. In the case of large tracts of privately owned forest land in 
Northern Maine, local recreational access has been long established by custom, occasionally on 
a fee paying basis. However this arrangement was threatened by a change of ownership of 
timber companies, the new owners seeking to realise the development value of prime lakeside 
sites within the forest. 
These cases are briefly described in Figure 2.8. In each of these cases, the conflict was studied 
for a limited period and while it has been possible to follow subsequent events in the Pentland 
Hills Regional Park, this has not proved possible in the North American examples. 
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FIGURE 2.8: CASE STUDIES INCLUDED IN VALIDATION OF THE DIAGNOSTIC 
FRAMEWORK 
AREA RECREATIONAL CONSERVATION SUBJECT OF SIGNIFICANCE 
ACTIVITIES STATUS OF SITE [POTENTIAL] OF 
DISPUTE RECREATIONAL 
IMPACT 
CONFLICTS: contentious, unresolved 
North West Hiking, riding, National Logging versus Not an issue 
Montana hunting (i.e. Forests Wilderness 
(1989-90) shooting), off- containing designation 
road vehicle use endangered 
species  
Northern Hiking, riding, Mainly private Residential and Not an issue 
Woods, Maine fishing, hunting forests recreational 
(1989-90) (shooting), off- containing development of 
road vehicle use endangered lakeside areas 
species versus local 
access for 
recreation 
Pentland Hills, Hill walking, Grazed upland Designation as Minor aspect of 
Lothian (1972- game shooting, containing small regional park multi-issue 
86) protected areas dispute. 
(SSSIs)  
These three cases are examined by each of the nine factors suggested in the diagnostic 
framework (Figure 2.7) and this analysis is set out in Figure 2.9. 
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FIGURE 2.9: A VALIDATION OF THE INITIAL DIAGNOSTIC FRAMEWORK USING LAND USE ALLOCATION DISPUTES 
FACTORS 
5 Understanding of impact 
8 Opposing ideologies 
9 Advancement of principles 
10 Environmental awareness 
12 Communication networks 
PROPOSED WILDERNESS 
AREAS, MONTANA AND 
WYOMING 
Potentially harmful impacts of 
logging on endangered species 
contested by timber companies 
and hunters 
Wilderness designation lobby 
opposed to economic 
development 
Each party taking a principled 
stand in the dispute 
•Logging interests insensitive to 
conservation values 
Little direct communication 
between the parties, unilateral 
statements made to the media 
NORTHERN WOODS, MAINE 
Impacts of lakeside development 
on existing recreation and 
conservation were understood 
Traditional recreational access 
and forest conservation opposed 
to property and development 
rights 
Each party taking a principled 
stand in the dispute 
Development interests insensitive 
to conservation values 
Little direct communication 
between the parties, unilateral 
statements made to the media 
PROPOSED PENTLANI) 
HILLS REGIONAL PARK, 
SCOTLAND 
Impacts of recreational 
development on existing owners 
and users were uncertain 
Public welfare (recreational 
development) opposed by 
property rights, conservation and 
informal recreation 
Each party taking a principled 
stand in the dispute 
Development interests insensitive 
to existing interests 
Little direct communication 
between the parties, advisory 
committee ineffective in building 
trust, unilateral statements made 
to the media 
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FIGURE 2.9 (continued) 
PROPOSED WILDERNESS NORTHERN WOODS, MAINE PROPOSED PENTLAND 
FACTORS AREAS, MONTANA AND HILLS REGIONAL PARK, 
WYOMING SCOTLAND 
13/11 Reaction to new claim on Adverse reactions: Wilderness Adverse reactions: Existing Adverse reactions: Existing 
resource (appropriateness) designation lobby to recreation users and forest interests united in opposition to 
inappropriate road and logging conservationists to inappropriate inappropriate designation 
proposals; Timber lobby to development proposals; State proposals and consequent 
designation adverse to Federal involvement recreational development 
14 Negotiation strategies of Confrontational tactics used by all Confrontational tactics used by all Confrontational tactics used by all 
interests parties parties parties 
17 Acceptance of management Forest management aims in Timber companies plans for Regional Council's plans for 
aims dispute development in dispute designation in dispute 
19 Type of decision-making Adversarial: rival legislative [Unclear at that stage how Adversarial via public inquiry 
proposals, considerable media decision would be made.] with legal representation 
attention 
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The conflicts considered in these case studies show almost identical patterns to those described 
earlier in the chapter. The understanding of impacts (Factor 5) is either uncertain or contested, 
each has sets of opposing ideologies (Factor 8) and one or more parties are using arguments 
of principle to defend or advance their interests (Factor 9). Environmental awareness (Factor 
10) can be said to be low in each case as development interests, in particular, appear to be 
insensitive to environmental concerns. Good communication networks (Factor 12) have not 
been established and most contact between the parties has been limited to responding publicly 
to statements of others given to and reported by the media as part of a confrontational style of 
"negotiating" (Factor 14). In each case, existing interests have reacted adversely to the 
proposals of others (Factor 13), often depicting these proposals as inappropriate use of the 
resource (Factor 11) and challenging management aims (Factor 17) where they run counter to 
their interest. The confrontational style of negotiating is encouraged by an adversarial method 
of decision-making (Factor 19). Thus with one exception (the form of decision-making to be 
used regarding the Northern Woods, Maine) each of the three cases corresponds to the 
distinguishing features of conflict identified in the earlier case studies. This suggests that the 
framework may have more general application to other types of environmental conflicts, 
particularly those where recreational access is an issue. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has examined Hypothesis 1 
That it is possible to identify a series of characteristic factors which distinguish between 
conflicts and co-operation concerning conservation and recreation. These may be 
described using a conceptual framework, irrespective of their institutional, cultural and 
geographical settings. 
This has been done by analysing four propositions on the nature of conflicts using seven case 
studies concerning the impacts of outdoor recreation on conservation in Britain and the 
Netherlands, two land use allocation disputes in the USA and one in Britain. The analysis leads 
to the overall conclusion that the hypothesis is confirmed. 
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The conclusions relating to each proposition are: 
Proposition (a) - that the damaging effects of recreational impacts on ecosystems are in 
themselves the major cause of conflicts between outdoor recreation and nature 
conservation -gained little support in that the existence of a recreational impact did not 
invariably lead to conflict and where such impacts featured in conflicts they were not the 
sole cause. Indeed there was evidence from the cases of co-operation that potential 
conflicts could be resolved or avoided by sensitive impact management. This suggests 
that it is how the issue is handled, not the issue itself, that determines whether a dispute 
will escalate into a conflict Only one factor concerned with impacts (the understanding 
of the impact) discriminated between conflict and co-operation. 
Propositions 
- that conflicts stem from the nature of the interests involved in the dispute; 
- that interest group interactions (such as misunderstandings and poor 
communication) contribute to the escalation of a dispute into a conflict; and 
- that management and decision-making processes (the institutional setting) can 
either exacerbate conflicts or contribute to their resolution 
were supported to the extent that three factors out of the five interest factors, three 
factors out of the five interaction and two of the seven institutional factors examined in 
the analysis discriminated between conflict and co-operation. 
The analysis lends support to 
- the validity of the initial distinction that was made between impacts and conflicts; and 
- the general thesis that conflicts are a sociological phenomenon depending largely on 
the interactions of the interest groups, their competing interests and the institutional 
setting in which they attempt to broker a reallocation of resources. 
Thus conflicts per se are not the sole cause of conflicts, indeed conflicts do not appear to stem 
from a single cause but from a combination of interests, inter-relationships and institutional 
factors, which appear to be closely interrelated. These factors might be reclassified into other 
groupings but the search for causality on these lines is likely to remain inconclusive. The 
44 
limitations of this analysis, and the utility of the diagnostic framework, are that relationships 
between factors and the extent to which they may change during the course of the dispute 
cannot be handled within an essentially cross-sectional and static analysis. It is the responses to 
change, whether initiated internally or externally to the dispute, that appear to be the key factors 
in triggering conflict. 
Triggers of conflict 
A common feature of the case studies examined in this chapter has been the disruption of an 
apparent state of equilibrium when a challenging interest group attempts to redefine (or gain 
some say in the ontrol of) the use of the resource. The challenge to the status quo might be a 
formal process whereby the primary land use is changed, ownership transferred or perhaps the 
area receives an enhanced conservation status from its designation by an official agency. The 
disputes over the designation of the Pentland Hills as a regional park and the off-shore area 
around the island of Skomer as a marine nature reserve are cases in point. The latter case in 
particular demonstrates how a high level of co-operation over the management of a voluntary 
reserve was disrupted by official moves to designate it as a statutory reserve. 
Alternatively; change may occur less formally: the area could be "invaded" by a new group of 
users (e.g., mountain bikers) or colonised by a new bird species or a conservation group may 
intervene, claiming that the resource is deteriorating as a result of recreational use. Established 
interest groups almost invariably react negatively to change. The only exception is where 
environmentally-aware recreation groups have been willing to consider and implement 
restrictions on their activity to mitigate their environmental impacts. This is well illustrated by 
the agreement of voluntary restrictions on cliff climbing to protect nesting birds at South Stack, 
which is one of many examples of this kind covering climbing areas in England and Wales. 
In each of the case studies there is an underlying formal decision, for example, about land use. 
allocation, which concentrates attention on possible challenges to the status quo, i.e., the present 
distribution of interests in a natural resource. Uncertainty about the future and ambiguity of 
public aims are also contributory factors. Once primary land allocation decisions have been 
made, and particularly when the land is in public ownership and designated as a national park 
or wilderness area, its status is unambiguous as far as recreation interests are concerned. Hence 
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the resistance to change based on fears that current activity will be curtailed. 
These observations emphasise the dynamic nature of conflict and the analytical limits of the 
conflict/co-operation dichotomy. They suggest that thither analysis of the processes of conflicts 
in their institutional setting is likely to be a more profitable way of learning more about the 
nature of conflict which could offer opportunities to predict the outcomes of environmental 
disputes. This is the subject of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3: CONFLICT AS A DYNAMIC PROCESS 
THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS 
The empirical analysis in Chapter 2 categorised the factors which discriminated between 
situations of conflict or co-operation in four groups, namely: biological impacts, conflicting 
interests, inter-relationships and social institutions. This grouping is only one of many that have 
been adopted by various writers in classifying conflicts. Most classifications have been diagnostic 
in purpose, attempting to identify the causes of conflict using the paradigm of cause and effect 
in which, like clinical medicine, diagnosis of cause suggests a remedy.' 
Most typologies are usually based on classifications of 
- motives or interests of the disputing parties; and/or 
- their interrelationships or the processes of decision-making; or occasionally 
- the outcome of the dispute. 
However, Deutsch (1973) commented that the substantive issue may or may not be important 
to the disputing parties. Conflicts are only partly about the nature of the dispute and are as much 
about the relationships between the parties in the broader context within which they are situated. 
Classifications and typologies are based as much on effects of conflicts as the ostensible causes 
and commonly combine a number of factors. 
Classifications based on Motives or Interests of the Disputing Parties and/or their Inter-
relationships 
Most typologies combine causes (issues and motives) with the process of conflict 
(interrelationships and outcomes) to categorise conflicts. Thus, Deutsch (1973) lists in his 
typology the characteristics of the parties; their prior relationships; the nature of the issue; the 
social environment; the interested audience; and the strategy and tactics followed by the parties. 
Coser (1956, 22-23) analyses Talcott Parsons' use of the medical analogy and 
terms like "tension", "strain", "endemic" and "deviant behaviour" within a "sick 
society'. He prefers to draw an analogy with adjustments in the earth's crust and 
to use the terms of tectonics like "earth tremor" and "earthquake" to register the 
intensity of conflicts. 
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Baumgartner et al (1978), considering industrial disputes; distinguish between the focus of the 
conflict (issues or procedures for reaching settlement) and the level of conflict (involving few 
or more actors) within a two-dimensional matrix. Meanwhile Van Doom (1966) considers some 
of the same elements by differentiating between conflicts of interest, based on economic 
concerns; ideology, based on principles; and the distribution of power within organisations. 
However, he does suggest many conflicts present combinations of these situations. Variations 
on this classification are suggested by Amy (1987) and Dnickman (1993) distinguishing between 
three types of conflicts: conflicts of interest, misunderstanding or beliefs. The purpose of Amy's 
typology is to identify those conflicts in which mediation may be an appropriate form of conflict 
resolution. The classification suggests that mediation is feasible in the first two of his categories 
but not in the third, as fundamental beliefs are non-negotiable. However, he recognises that 
these three categories are not mutually exclusive and elements of each may apply in combination 
within a single conflict. 
Classifications based on the Outcome of the Dispute 
Some classifications attempt to take into account the effects of conflict as well as their 
characteristics. Thus Biels and Siegal (1966) distinguish between conflicts and 
"pseudo-conflicts". In their terminology a conflict which is non-disruptive and can be regarded 
as beneficial to society is termed a pseudo-conflict whereas a conflict proper results in social 
disruption. Deutsch uses similar concepts but different terms when referring to constructive and 
destructive conflicts. Mack and Snyder (1957) are working on similar lines when they refer to 
realistic conflicts based on genuine incompatibilities and non-realistic conflicts, which serve the 
function of releasing tension. These categories stem from the work of Coser (1956). 
The range of classifications are summarised in Figure 3.1. 
Conclusions on Classifications 
Conflict has been recognised as multi-dimensional, various writers giving differing emphasis to 
particular characteristics of conflicts. Although certain relatively consistent patterns have been 
identified, no typology of conflicts has been generally accepted. But the purposes of these 
typologies has not always been made clear and given the complexities of variable relationships 
they tend to be generalised across a very broad canvas and have a weak empirical base. None 
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appear to cover the full range of factors and no one typology appears therefore to offer any 
practical advantage over any other. 
Moreover, it is clear that a simple typology of the A.my/Druckman form does not discriminate 
between cases of the type studied in this research. There are elements of conflict of interest, 
belief and misunderstanding in each case study, along with influences from the decision-making 
process, which suggest multiple rather than single causality. In other words, it is not possible to 
identify mutually exclusive categories of conflict which might be used for identi1ing appropriate 
forms of conflict resolution, for example. 
Bearing in mind the conclusion drawn in the previous chapter - that the conflict/co-operation 
framework cannot be used to predict the outcome of changed circumstances, when a new claim 
interrupts co-operation - typologies have a similar limitation. They are based on static 
categories which are not easily applied to dynamic situations. A more profitable approach is 
likely to be that of studying the processes of conflict. If future research is to concentrate on the 
processes of conflict and how disputes escalate rather than searching for root causes, it needs 
to consider the immediate events which trigger conflict, the processes of politicisation, the 
distribution of power and the possible forms of outcome to an environmental dispute. To 
advance this aim the next section considers the contribution of alternative forms of conflict 
theory which address the dynamic aspects of conflict. 
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FIGURE 3.1 ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO CLASSIFYING CONFLICTS 
AUTHOR! Previous Deutsch Van Doom Amy (1987) Baumgartner Bids and Mack and 
GROUPING Chapter (1973) (1966) Druckman et al (1978) Siegal Snyder 
(1993)  (1966) (1957) 
MOTIVE Issue Nature of (Focus) 
issue Issues 
Beliefs Beliefs 
Interest Character- Interests Interests 
istics of 
parties  
INTER- Interrelation Prior Power Misunder- 
RELATION ship relationship standings 
SHIP Strategy and 
tactics 




OUTCOME Destructive Conflict Realistic 
Constructive Pseudo- Non-realistic 
conflict 
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ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON CONFLICT-THEORY 
The alternative perspectives that have been taken by other social scientists have been classified 
using an analysis by Friedmann (1987), whose primary concern was to investigate, amongst 
other things, social theories of planning in the public domain. His full scheme covered a 
spectrum that extends from "managerial" approaches of systems engineering, policy science, 
public administration and scientific management into sociology and economics including 
institutional economics, historical materialism, neo-Marxism, the utopians, social anarchists and 
other radicals. He covered in outline the period from the beginning of the 19th century to the 
time. of writing. Within this broad canvas he recognised a number of perspectives and aims. 
Broadly speaking, perspectives of social mobilisation and social learning aim to change the 
political and social system and they differ as much in means as in ends. According to social 
mobilisation theorists, change comes about by political struggle at a macro level. Social learning 
is concerned with change within the system by politicisation and changes in the balance of 
power. As will be seen in the next chapter, some attempts at conflict resolution follow this 
approach. The political goals of social action or social reform are less explicit. What is attempted 
is an "impartial" scientific analysis of the social functions of conflict leading to a greater 
understanding of its role in the social system. The managerial approach is more concerned with 
goals of efficiency in which conflicts are to be resolved by policy analysis and problem solving. 
Thus, underlying the attempts at theoretical development is a tension between sociologists 
looking for explanation and management scientists looking for prediction. 
The classification has been set out in simplified form in Figure 3.2. 
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FIGURE 3.2 ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL CONFLICT 
PERSPECTIVE AIM METHOD 
Social Mobilisation Social change "of the 
System"  
Political Struggle 
Social Learning Social change "within the 
system" 
Empowerment to achieve a 
balance of power 
Social Action or reform Analysis of the social 
function of conflict 
Explanation and 
understanding 
Policy Analysis Conflict management Problem solving, conflict 
resolution 
Based on Friedmann (1987). 
The two main perspectives that will be considered in this chapter are those of social action and 
policy analysis. The primary concern of social action theorists (typified by Weber (1948), Coser 
(1956) and others) is to relate theories of conflict to theories of social change and to suggest 
that conflict has a useful social function. The other broad approach could be termed 
"managerial", taken by policy analysts whose main aim is to resolve conflicts, if not to eliminate 
them altogether. The following sections consider these two alternative perspectives which shed 
light on the "function" and "processes" of conflict. 
Does Conflict Serve A Useful Social Function? - A Sociological Analysis 
There is a source of potential confusion in the use of the terms functional and "functionalism". 
Within sociology, "fimctionilism" can be traced back to Durkheim whose general thesis was that 
society is normally in a state of equilibrium based on moral consensus. Society is held together 
by the values that people in that society share. From this perspective, "functionalists" believe that 
"disequilibrium" or conflict is abnormal. (New Society, 1984, iii). The "structural functionalism" 
of Talcott Parsons also considered that conflict in society was "dysfunctional" and therefore an 
abnormal condition of society. 
2  For further discussion of this perspective see Coser (1956, 21-23). 
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An alternative perspective on conflicts was put forward by Karl Marx (trans. Bottomore, 1964) 
who emphasised the constant conflict between the two basic economic classes of people, the 
bourgeoisie who own the means of production and the proletariat who sell their labour. This 
theme was developed by Dahrendorf (1959) who argued that social organisations typically 
contain two groups whose interests are inherently opposed, those who rule and those who are 
ruled. Thus conflict is not limited to a class struggle over economic resources but can be a 
power struggle between interest groups. In Scimecca's view (1993), the Marxist analysis over-
emphasises an economically determined system of social relationships and places greater 
emphasis on conflict than co-operation, which he considered to be more frequent in society. For 
this reason, many conflict analysts have turned to the social action theories of Max Weber 
which suggest that society varies between conditions of equilibrium and conflict. From this 
standpoint conflict is endemic in social life but tends to operate in favour of the powerful, that 
is, those with a vested interest in the status quo. 
Scimecca (1993) assessed Weber's main contribution to conflict theory to be the explanation it 
provides of how power is legitimised and stabilised in society. He summarised the argument as 
follows: 
- Coercion proves to be an ineffective basis for maintaining power as it is seen to be 
illegitimate. 
- Powerful elements in society (or indeed the government) continually seek to convince 
others (the electorate) that their use of power is legitimate even though the distribution 
of power (power structure) favours the interests of the more powerful. 
- Order is maintained by co-opting political challengers into the power structure or 
suppressing underlying conflicts. 
- It is the legitimate use of power that holds societies together. 
Thus Weber's conflict theory has four major components: the role of power; the emphasis on 
organised systems; legitimacy, and the individual who acts in his or her self-interest and marshals 
resources to achieve his/her own ends. 
Duke (quoted in Scimecca, 1993) has also summarised the essential elements of Weber's conflict 
theory as follows: 
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Conflicts are endemic in social life. 
Power is differentially distributed among groups and individuals in society. 
Social order is achieved in any society through rules and commands issued by more 
powerful persons to less powerful persons and enforced through sanctions. 
Both the social structure and the normative system of a society are more extensively 
influenced by powerful persons than by weaker persons (true by definition), and come 
to represent the interests of these more powerful persons. 
Social changes are often more disruptive to powerful persons than less powerful 
persons. Powerful persons therefore generally support the status quo and oppose 
changes that would reduce their power. 
However, changes in a society occur as a result of action by persons who stand to 
benefit from these changes and who accumulate power to bring them to pass. Powerful 
persons see that they can benefit from a particular change (e.g., industrialisation of a 
"backward" society), and they will usually not hesitate to foster such things (quoted in 
Scimecca, 1993, 216). 
Although Lewis Coser's book is entitled "The Functions of Social Conflict" (1956), its 
underlying perspective was closer to Weber's social action than the structural functionalism of 
Talcott Parsons. Coser related conflict to social change which he suggested only comes from 
threats to social equilibrium. He therefore saw conflict as a stabilising process in social groups 
as it serves the functional purpose of allowing adjustments to be made in social norms or power, 
under certain circumstances. Thus what he called "flexible" social structures tolerate conflict and 
may even institutionalise it so that it can be used to eliminate dissatisfaction. The problems occur 
in "rigid" social structures which lack toleration or the institutional mechanisms for dealing with 
conflict and in those circumstances hostilities can accumulate. Conflict then becomes 
"dysfunctional" as it tears apart the system (Coser, 1956, 151-157). 
Some ten years later, reviewing the reception that his theories had, he noted that he had been 
criticised from opposite directions from those arguing for theories of integration and social 
stability and those arguing for theories of conflict and social change (Coser, 1967, 5). He then 
argued that this is a false dichotomy and that there is a constant process balancing between 
stability and change. He noted that, as his earlier work concentrated on conflict and change 
within social groups or social systems, his critics had assumed that he was in favour of the status 
quo (and in that sense, identified with functionalism). In this later work, he continued to argue 
that social systems need flexibility to adjust - his "safety valve" thesis - and therefore argued for 
social change to relieve the tensions in society. The essential elements of Coser's propositions 
are summarised in Figure 3.3 
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FIGURE 3.3: COSER'S ANALYSIS OF THE FUNCTION OF SOCIAL CONFLICT 
CONFLICTS WITHIN THE GROUP 
LOOSE KNIT GROUPS CLOSE KNIT GROUPS 
"Broad Churches", segmentally involved. "Sects", showing a high degree of 
interaction and personality involvement. 
which have multiple small conflicts of low which suppress conflict so that grievances 
intensity which act as ways of relieving build up until a very intense conflict occurs 
tension. Any dissent is contained, with traumatic results. Any dissent is 
expelled. 
Metaphor: earth tremor Metaphor: earthquake 
Conflicts are about goals and interests which Conflicts are about basic values and 
allow readjustment of norms and power assumptions about relationships, i.e., the 
relations, As they benefit the social group, legitimacy of the social group. They disrupt 
they are FUNCTIONAL the group and are DYSFUNCTIONAL. 
CONFLICTS BETWEEN GROUPS 
FLEXIBLE SOCIAL STRUCTURES RIGID SOCIAL STRUCTURES 
Allow multiple small conflicts so that the As conflicts are suppressed and no 
social structure adjusts to new claims adjustment is possible, there is a risk of 
without a major line of cleavage developing, catastrophe. 
They provide continuity as norms and the 
balance of power are adjusted. 
Associations and coalitions may form during 
the conflict which shape the future power Diversionary "non-realistic" conflicts may be 
structure. created in an attempt to maintain the 
structure. 
Source: Coser, 1956, 151-157. 
Van Doom (1966) elaborated on Coser's distinction between loose and tight knit groups by 
describing 'coalitions' centred on (economic) interests, whose heterogeneity neutralises the 
differences between them but can (particularly in a business setting) form stable organisations 
by adjusting through internal conflict. His second category - 'sects' - strive to preserve their 
homogeneity which is ideologically based. As in Coser's description of a close knit group, they 
are intolerant of dissent and are always in danger of splitting following an internal power 
struggle. 
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Beales and Siegal (1966) addressed social conflict from an anthropological perspective and were 
impatient with the functional approach. They strongly criticised functionalism (and appear to 
assume that Coser is a "functionalist") on the grounds that it deals with static and not dynamic 
situations. They considered that it gave undue emphasis to the constructive and beneficial effects 
of conflict rather than the destructive and detrimental ones. They suggested that "Conflict that 
is non-disruptive and is regarded as beneficial is perhaps best termed pseudo-conflict" (ibid, 20). 
More pertinently they suggested that "any given conflict has functional and dysfunctional 
aspects; nothing is gamed by debating whether or not conflict in the abstract is functional" (ibid. 
24). 
Although Coseis analysis is (in effect) dynamic, his theory may lack predictive power (but that 
was not its purpose) in that it did not consider the possible outcomes of close or loose knit 
groups in flexible or rigid social structures. His important insight was that group or social 
structure determine whether groups or social systems can tolerate internal dissent or cope with 
external threats and can therefore adjust to change without major disruption. 
Nevertheless the influence of Cosefs analysis has been considerable. For example, Deutsch 
(1973) used the terms constructive and destructive processes in the subtitle of his book and 
recognises the debts to Coser in his detailed analysis. Mack and Snyder (1957) considered the 
institutionalisation of conflict in some detail, suggesting that it requires a combination of conflict 
and co-operation to achieve social change. Indeed they suggested that social strategies designed 
to keep conflict functional and to prevent violent or aggressive conflict ought to be based in part 
on deliberate attempts to capitalise on natural limits. This may involve giving up notions of 
"abolishing" conflict, of "final" resolutions, and may direct attention to less obvious control 
devices (ibid, 83). Thus, they were also arguing that conflict can be made functional or used 
constructively. Similarly, Pondy (1972), concerned with conflicts within industrial organisations, 
took a dispassionate managerial approach to the functions or dysfunctions that conflict might 
serve in relation to organisational efficiency. 
Cosefs interpretation of the potentially constructive function of conflict may have been 
controversial at the time, it now appears common place in a variety of settings. For example, 
Douglas writing on groupwork practice suggests that: 
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'Conflict is an essential ingredient of human existence. Frequently this basic fact is 
overlooked because excessive conflict is seen to create hardship, promote aggressors 
and produce great hurt.....Northen also comments on the fact that conflict within a 
group can lead to increased understanding and an increase in trust, largely because 
differences are brought out into the open and cease to be a source of hidden irritation.' 
(Douglas, 1976, 117). 
While some recent writing on conflict resolution in schools asserts that: 
'Conflict is destructive when it diverts energy from more important activities/issues, 
destroys morale, causes stress, reinforces poor self image, polarizes groups, deepens 
differences in values, produces irresponsible behaviour or violence. Conflict is 
constructive when it opens up issues of importance, results in encountering real 
problems and increases the involvement of individuals in problem solving, causes 
authentic communication to occur, releases pent-up emotion and anxiety, helps 
recognition of interdependence and builds cohesiveness while helping individuals to 
grow personally and apply what has been learnt.' (Leimdorfer, 1990,56). 
Coser's perspective that conflict might be functional has been widely accepted even amongst 
those whose main concern is conflict management. However, the limitations of confining 
analysis to the function of social conflict soon become apparent. There is a need to consider the 
essentially dynamic nature of conflict, to explore the predictive ability of this approach, and 
develop a more operational theory. The following sections address these issues. 
Interaction and Process: the Contribution of Managerial Theory 
Many writers have recognised the dynamic nature of conflict and the limitations of a static 
analysis. Deutsch viewed conflict from a social psychological perspective in which the 
participants are influenced by their perceptions, cognitions, expectations and reactions of others 
within a social environment. He attempted to develop a consensual framework that would enable 
him to view interpersonal, intergroup and international conflict in the same terms, in which 
"Social interaction takes place in a social environment - in a family, a group, a 
community, a nation, a civilisation - that has developed techniques, symbols, categories, 
rules and values that are relevant to human interaction. Hence, to understand the events 
that occur in social interactions, one must comprehend the interplay of these events in 
the broader social context in which they occur" (Deutsch,, 1973, 8). 
Mack and Snyder (1957) also recognised that "social conflict is, by definition, an interaction 
relationship between two or more parties" (ibid, 35). Among those considering the managerial 
perspective, Baumgartner et al (1978) used game theory to model industrial disputes. They 
were among those writers who analyse social conflict as a "social interaction process" in 
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considering: 
"The interdependence between, on the one hand, social interaction processes and events, 
and on the other, the material, social structural, and cultural context in which they 
occur" (Baumgartner et al, 1978, 105-106). 
But they placed particular emphasis on the "institutional order", Le., the conditions and rules in 
which interactions take place. They described the institutional order as: 
"... the definition of relevant issues and problems, membership or participation in 
institutional activities, permissable or acceptable activities, relationships of actors or 
categories of actors to one another and to forms of property or resources, and the 
distribution of benefits and costs for different actors or categories of actors involved in 
process-level activities" (Baumgartner et al, 1978, 106). 
Interestingly their definition of conflict was taken from Weber's perspective of social action: 
"social action where each actor in a conflict relationship attempts to carry out his or her 
own will over the opposition or resistance of others" (Baumgartner et al, 1978, 109). 
This formulation of a 'social-interaction process' avoids the criticisms of the utility of game 
theory in studying conflicts put forward by Simon (1974). He suggested that game theorists 
tended to ignore communication between the parties to simplify relationships and their 
development over time. Simon also argued for a social-interaction approach and by stressing the 
importance of communication, he assumed that conflicts mainly arise from misunderstandings, 
which may be true in organisations. 
Scimecca (1993) also questioned the general applicability of game theory, with its assumption 
of perfect information. He criticised its naivety for assuming that competing parties will 
invariably end up co-operating and for ignoring many important aspects of conflicts, such as 
irrational motives, culture, social structure and power. 
Another managerial approach, systems analysis, has been criticised on sociological grounds by 
Rhoos as a theory that can apply to the controlled systems of the engineer but not within the 
complexities of social systems: 
'Although the term "system' can be applied to both space hardware and social problems, 
the inputs are vastly different, as are the controls and variables. In the engineered system, 
the components are tangible, the variables controlled and the outputs identifiable. In the 
social sphere, the crucial elements often defy definition and control and do not behave 
according to a set of rules.' (Rhoos, 1969, 24). 
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Phases of Conflict -_An Analysis of Pondy's Conceptual Framework 
In his analysis of conflict in organisations, Pondy (1972) took the concepts of social interaction 
one stage further by considering the processes of conflict and how they develop. He noted that 
alternative conceptual definitions have been suggested which maybe based on antecedent 
conditions, affective states, cognitive states or conflict behaviour, but rather than choose 
between them he argued that each may be a relevant stage in the development of a conflict 
episode and that it is more important to clarify the relationships between each component. 
"Conflict may be more readily understood if it is considered a dynamic process. A 
conflict relationship between two or more individuals in an organisation can be analysed 
as a sequence of conflict episodes. .... Each episode or encounter leaves an aftermath 
that affects the course of succeeding episodes. The entire relationship can be 
characterised by certain stable aspects of conditions, effect, perception and behaviour. 
It can also be characterised by trends in any of these characteristics" (Pondy, 1972, 359). 
The focus of Pondy's analysis was on conflict within industrial organisations in which he 
identified five phases of a conflict episode. These he labelled aftermath, latent, felt or perceived, 
manifest (to be followed by aftermath). He set out a scheme (entitled the Dynamics of a Conflict 
Episode - ibid, 367) in which he attempted to relate antecedent conditions, affective and 
cognitive states and conflictual behaviour. 
Other authors who have recognised phases of conflict include Sandole (1993) who wrote of 
initiation, escalation, controlled maintenance, abatement, and termination resolution; and Fisher 
(1990) who recognised antecedents, orientations, processes, and outcomes. Both agree that a 
conflict passes through phases, however described, but assume that it necessarily follows a linear 
path. The various phases recognised by different authors and the terms adopted in this study are 
set out in Figure 3.4 
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FIGURE 3.4: PHASES OF CONFLICT 
Pondy (1972) Sandole (1993) Fisher (1990) Phases recognised in 
this study 
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Pondy concluded that a conflict was "... not necessarily bad or good, but must be evaluated in 
terms of its individual and organisational functions and dysilinctions. In general, conflicts 
generate pressures to reduce conflict, but chronic conflict persists and is endured under certain 
conditions, and [is] consciously created and managed by the political astute administrator" 
(Pondy, 1972, 378-379). He suggested that conflicts are dysfunctional in organisations when 
they affect their productivity, their stability or their adaptability. He also presented three means 
of resolving conflicts within organisations: 
a bargaining model, which deals with interest groups in competition for resources; 
a bureaucratic model, which deals with authority relations and the need to control; 
and, 
a systems model, which deals with functional relations and the need to coordinate" 
(Pondy, 1972, 379). 
It is the first two of these - the bargaining and the bureaucratic models - which are of particular 
relevance to this study. 
Certain of the elements set out in his scheme were not described or analysed in any detail in his 
text and their exact purpose is therefore unclear. The scheme is helpful in that it recognises the 
contribution that certain components may make at different stages of the conflict episode, e.g., 
strategic considerations [not explained in the text but assumed here to include power play 
between different participants] and that the availability of conflict resolution mechanisms can 
influence the outcome during the manifest (conflictual behaviour) phase. However, in practice, 
it may not be particularly easy to recognise a distinct sequence of events particularly in the 
earlier stages or between the latent and manifest stages. Indeed Mitchell (1993) suggested that 
international conflicts may pass through as many as ten stages and when negotiations break 
down the course of the conflict may double back to an earlier stage (see his Figure 6. 1, p.  88). 
Perhaps because the conflicts which Pondy had in mind occur within organisations, he did not 
recognise a significant external stimulus or trigger which initiated the manifest phase. 
Within the remainder of this chapter, the analysis assumes that a conflict is a dynamic process 
which passes through a series of phases. Each phase is conditioned by the one that proceeds it 
but particularly by the social institutions that have developed to handle disputes of this kind. The 
outcome may be a settlement, or stalemate or a continuation of the conflict (resolution, 
termination and development are the terms used by Baumgartner, Burns and Dc Vile). The 
outcome may have positive or negative results for the participants, the regulating social 
institution or the wider social system. 
Thurlings' Dynamic Analysis 
A similar approach was summarised by Thurlings (1962) in a study entitled "The Dynamic 
Function of Conflict". He suggested that: 
"Social conflict then emerges as a process of interaction, begun with the purposes of 
creating a legitimate order. Conflict may then be termed a mechanism of 
institutionalisation" (ibid, 146). 
Thurlings was concerned with attempts by interested parties to create a legitimate order of social 
institutions. Building on the work of Rex (1961), he focused on the motives of groups rather 
than individual actors. Like Coser (1956), he suggested that conflict may form a constructive 
role in society in that groups are motivated to "institute a new order which embodies their: 
aspirations". Using this sociological perspective, behaviour is considered to be controlled by 
norms - "a social order, of institutionalising social relations". Thurlings drew a distinction 
between conflictual and deviant behaviour in that organised deviant [criminal] behaviour is 
concerned with the acquisition of commodities whilst conflict behaviour is aimed at establishing 
a new order. 
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Following Vercruijsse (1961), Thurlings used the distinction (made by Parsons) between role 
and position. Parsons defined role as the obligations members of society take upon themselves 
or have thrust upon them, while position (status) is the rights accorded to that role. Vercruijsse 
argued that these are culturally defined, that social structures are the differential distribution of 
the rights to those commodities among the roles which exist in a culture while social position 
is a specific combination of rights to scarce commodities which are accorded to each role 
(Thurlings, 1962, 147). There may be competition between cultural groups for these rights and 
conflicts may be defined in terms of social structures and social position, both of which are 
conditioned by norms or cultural standards which form part of the existing or proposed new 
order. 
Thurlings identified the interests of a cultural group as its rights (i.e., its social position), but he 
made a further distinction between the ability of the group to use these rights as it so wishes 
(autonomy) and whether it also has authority, i.e., some say in the process whereby rights are 
allocated by society. In summary: 
the interest or social position of a cultural group is a combination of rights to 
resource that go with its role, comprising 
- autonomy the ability to exercise rights as wished, and 
- authority a say in the process of allocating rights. 
He argued that the outcome of a conflict will be durable where it is based on consensus and 
transitory where it is based on the exercise of power. Even though A's power may greatly 
exceed B's and there may be no conflict in the short-term, their interests are irreconcilable and 
conflict is inevitable. B may work to counterbalance A's power by establishing the legitimacy of 
its claim to resources and gaining support from other groups on the grounds of social injustice. 
Any enlargement of the field of conflict draws in other groups and presents a potential risk to 
them. In these circumstances, he suggested that organisations or individuals may attempt to 
mediate these claims. 
Thurlings presented a more detailed analysis of the competition for access to resources (which 
is a common feature of environmental conflicts), how claims for access to resources may be 
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rejected or substantiated either by the exercise of power or through a legitimating social 
institution. The relationship of the interested parties will be concerned with factors such as the 
level and ease of communication but also the balance of power between the respective parties. 
Power was also identified as an important variable by Pondy and Van Doom. Thurlings 
recognises (as do other analyses, e.g., those of Baumgartner, Burns & De Vile) that conflicts 
may be about the procedures whereby a social system or community allocates scarce resources 
as well as the issue of how those resources are distributed and who gains access to them. 
In Thurlings description of conflicts between interest groups, his old or existing social order is 
equivalent to Ponds aftermath of the previous phase of conflict. During the struggle between 
established and new interest groups their positions may converge to reach consensus and a 
durable outcome or diverge to perpetuate the conflict. Various logical outcomes are possible 
ranging from: 
- existing groups being able to resist the claims of new groups and thereby maintain the 
old order; 
- existing groups making concessions to new groups resulting in a transitory outcome; 
- existing and new groups reaching consensus and a durable outcome; and 
- the new order superseding the old. 
Triggers of Conflict 
Conflicts do not appear to arise spontaneously. Deutsch (1973) suggested that there is a history 
of events which may include the prior relationships of the parties and which may also condition 
their relationships in future. Mack and Snyder (1957) argued on similar lines in terms of an 
"instability which results from the ineffectiveness of previous norms and regulations". But added 
to any motivation which stems from the previous relationship between the parties, each will have 
relationships with a wider network and they may see the conflict as a vehicle to attain wider 
goals. Deutsch (ibid) suggested that the course a conflict takes may be influenced by the strategy 
and tactics adopted by the opposing parties. Thus the general proposition advanced by these 
authors was that whether a dispute escalates into a conflict will depend on the standpoints of the 
interested parties and their relationships, which are in part conditioned by the aftermath of a 
previous conflict episode. However none of them recognised that a particular tactical action 
taken by one of the parties or some other external event can escalate a dispute into a conflict. 
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SYNTHESIS: A DYNAMIC FRAMEWORK OF CONFLICT 
It is now possible to synthesise the key elements of previous theories and to relate these to the 
findings of Chapter 2 in a second framework depicting the phases through which conflicts pass. 
The key concepts from various authors cited in this review are set out in Figure 3.5. The 
essential concepts on which this dynamic framework is based are: 
that each conflict consists of an episode which has an aftermath (Pondy), the 
aftermath conditions the following episode of conflict. This process of 
aftermath/episode/aftermath continues in a repeating pattern; and 
that interest groups attempt to achieve social position which consists of autonomy: 
the ability to exercise rights; and authority: being able to influence the process of 
allocation of rights - which together form the social structure (Thurlings based on 
Vercruijsse and Parsons); 
Following this line of reasoning, conflicts concerning the access to resources are attempts to 
redistribute and/or ascribe a social position between interest groups. 
in essence conflicts are resolved by the exercise ofpower or by negotiation (Coser, 
Pondy, Thurlings and others). Conflicts may or may not be resolved in that the outcome 
of each episode may be either a durable or transitory one (Thurlings); 
to be effective, any decision-making process which attempts to resolve conflicts has 
to be perceived as legitimate by the recipients of that decision (Weber, Coser and 
Scimecca); 
the outcome of any conflict will be influenced (if not dictated) by the balance of 
power between the competing interest groups (Thurlings, Amy, Scimecca); and 
the active phase of conflict is triggered by the arrival of a new interest group with a 
claim for social position (Thurlings). 
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The conditions in which such a dynamic framework might apply are likely to be: 
Conflicts concerned with competition for access to resources in which access is 
broadly defined as not only the ability to exercise socially defined rights in the use of 
those resources but also a controlling influence on how they are used by others; 
The interested parties are concerned to exercise those rights within a plural society, 
ie., they are working within a broad structure of social institutions which are perceived 
as legitimate by all parties (in Coser's terms "within the system"); 
Although conflicts can occur at different levels from the interpersonal to the 
international, the concern here is with an intermediate level of environmental conflict 
which may be local and/or site based; and/or may have broader dimensions concerning 
a number of sites or larger areas. There may be some combination of local, 
regional and national issues contained within the dispute. 
Although some of the interested parties may be highly organised and bureaucratic 
agencies may be involved, the framework is unlikely to apply either to disputes within 
hierarchically organised organisations or to unstructured conflicts in which there is no 
representative framework within which organisations can operate. 
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FIGURE 3.5: CONCEPTS RECOGNISED BY VARIOUS AUTHORS ALLOCATED TO 
PHASES OF CONFLICT 
PHASE Coser Thurlings Van Pondy 1972 Deutsch Concepts 
1956 1962 Doom 1973 used in 
1966 this 
synthesis 
Aftermath Established Aftermath Established 
order [social social 
position]  positions 
Latent Loose/ Role/ Relations Environment1 Characteristics Internal 
close knit obligations of within the antecedent of parties. relations 
groups cultural group group conditions Nature of within the 
[schisms/ issue. group. 
coalitions] Information 
Initiation! Competition Suppression/ Interested External 
Escalation for social attention audience relations 
position mechanisms. Claims for 
Claims for Values and legitimacy. 
legitimacy anxieties. Triggers. 




Active Rigid/ Claims Conflict Strategy and Responsive 
flexible rejected or behaviour, tactics tactics 
social substantiated Availability of Rigid or 
structures by exercise of conflict responsive 
power or resolution decision- 
legitimating mechanisms. making 
social Strategic Claims 
institution considerations determined 
by exercise 
of power or 
negotiation 
Outcome/ Transitory Constructive/ Probable 	• Transitory 
Aftermath and durable destructive consequences and durable 
outcomes outcomes Constructive/ outcomes 
destructive 
outcomes 
These elements are now set out in the dynamic framework which can be used to analyse the 
relationships between competing groups and the power balance between them. Any such model 
has to: 
allow for the characteristics and action of interest groups operating in a broader 
political context. In other words local environmental conflicts frequently have 
national political dimensions. 
incorporate a succession of phases 
incorporate an analysis of the distribution of power. 
allow for different methods of conflict resolution which may produce alternative 
outcomes. 
- The action that groups take may be functional in relation to their own identity and survival. For 
example, during the latent and subsequent phases messages conveyed to the outside world, such 
as adherence to principle, may serve a more important function in emphasising the adherence 
of the group's representative to the ideology of the group than the ostensible purpose of external 
communication; thus reinforcing group solidarity (Coser, 1956). 
A marked feature of the initiation/escalation phase will be the claims made for legitimacy in the 
eyes of an external interested audience (Coser, 1956; Deutsch, 1973). Interest groups advancing 
chums for enhanced social position will be proactive and agenda setting and use the media for 
this purpose. These aggressive tactics will be matched by the defensive ploys of those with an 
established position. Either side may form coalitions to strengthen their power base. 
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FIGURE 3.6: A DYNAMIC FRAMEWORK OF CONFLICT 
Phase of Conflict Concepts used in this Factors identified in 
synthesis Chapter 2 
Aftermath of previous Established social positions Aims of interest groups: 
episode seeking to gain, share or 
maintain interest - f6 
Initial balance of power - 
f 22 
Latent phase Internal relations within the Role of ideology - f8 
group. Type of organisation -f 16 
Information Understanding of impact -f 5 
Episode - Initiation/ Potential triggers. Challenge to management 
Escalation phase aims - f 17 
Proposed designation 
(conservation status of site - 
f2) 
External relations: Proactive National or local audience 
tactics /Claims for Adherence to principle - f9 
legitimacy. Negotiation strategies -f 14 
Use made of media -f 15 
Coalition formation. Coalition formation. 
Episode - Active phase Responsive tactics Reaction to new claim -f 13 
Appropriateness of resource 
use - f 11 
Conservation status of site - 
f2 
Environmental awareness - 
f 10 
Rigid or responsive Communication -f 12 
decision-making Public participation - f 18 
Type of decision-making - 
f 19 
Mechanism for adjusting to 
change -f 20 
Authority of decision maker 
-f 21 
Claims determined by Resulting balance of power - 
exercise of power or f 22 
negotiation  
Outcome! Aftermath of Transitory and durable [Conflict or co-operation] 
episode outcomes 
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Thus a conflict is triggered by a claim to redistribute the social positions of the interest groups. 
Their behaviour during the manifest phase of the conflict will be in part governed by their 
internal and external relationships and the adequacy of the resolution mechanism [institutional 
setting] within which they are operating. The motivations and aspirations of the participating 
parties will influence how they act strategically and whether they seek to use existing methods 
of conflict resolution, either in a conciliatory way within the confines of this particular dispute 
or to meet wider political goals. 
In Figure 3.6, the concepts incorporated in this synthesis are ordered into five phases 
aflermath>>latent>>initiation/escalation>> active>>outcome/aftermath 
At the same time 18 of the 22 factors originally identified in Chapter 2 are reallocated from the 
earlier classification into the dynamic framework. Certain factors which were not components 
of the earlier framework are now seen to play an important role, particularly if they are 
reformulated (e.g., role of ideology rather than competing ideologies; and use made of media 
by campaigning organisations rather than level of media involvementlmterest in a conflict). Some 
additional factors have been identified which were not explicitly examined in Chapter 2, such as 
the national and local audiences to which interest groups address their claims for legitimacy; and 
the formation of coalitions to gain power. 
The dynamic aspects of the framework are shown diagrammatically in Figure 3.7 where three 
possible outcomes of conflict (schemes A and B) and a co-operative negotiation (scheme C) are 
depicted'. For simplicity of presentation it is assumed that the outcome of power struggles 
within rigid social structures (as defined by Coser) can only result in the maintenance or transfer 
of power and not negotiation. Similarly, the only outcome of a power struggle within flexible 
social structures, that is depicted in the figure, is a concession of power whereas other logical 
This scheme has some affinities with the 'eclectic model' formulated by Fisher 
(1990) which presents the relationships between individuals and groups over time 
in a systems framework. Although he contrasted the circumstances of high and 
low intensity 'system states', the context in which these occur and the power 
relationships between them are not set out. 
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FIGURE 3.7 ALTERNATIVE OUTCOMES OF CONFLICT 
AFTERMATW 	 INITIATION/ 	 ACTIVE PHASE 	 OUTCOME/ 
LATENT PHASE ESCALATION AFTERMATH 
CONFLICT 
Interest groups with 	 react with 	Defensive responses and/or 	 Maintenance of status quo 
established social position 	 Possible coalition forming resulting in 
Power struggle within 	Exercise of power by 
RIGID social structure 	established groups 
Proactive tactics 	 resulting in either 	 or 
Possible coalition forming 	 Transfer of power 
using 	 leading to 
Interest groups challenging 	 New order in favour of 
for social position 	 claimant 
CONFLICT 
Interest groups with 	 react with 	Defensive responses and/or 
established social position 	 Possible coalition forming 
Power struggle within FLEXIBLE 
social structure resulting in 	Concession by established groups 
Interest groups challenging 	 using 	Proactive tactics and/or 	 leading to 
for social position 	 Possible coalition forming New order but 
(Transitory outcome) 
CO-OPERATION 
Interest groups with 	 react with 	Conciliatory responses 
established social position 
Negotiation within FLEXIBLE 
social structure resulting in 	Consensus about 	New order 
and (Durable outcome) 
Interest groups challenging 	 using 	Negotiative tactics 
for social position 
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possibilities, such as the exercise of superior power, are possible. 
The figure attempts to portray the manoeuvring of interest groups as they seek power and 
legitimacy to maintain or gain social position. Each (coalition of) interest group(s) may be 
sufficiently powerful to dominate the other. Alternatively they may reach a durable outcome via 
consensus, a transitory one by concession or one other logical possibility - no outcome at all, 
ie. stalemate. The adequacy of conflict resolution mechanisms within the social structure is of 
particular interest, whether they may be used expediently and effectively when the initial 
relationships are positive but are inadequate to deal with negative relationships. This is the 
subject of the next chapter. The final section of this chapter illustrates the utility of the dynamic 
framework by further examining selected case studies. 
ASSESSING THE UTILITY OF THE DYNAMIC FRAMEWORK 
The earlier analysis of three of the earlier British case studies is now re-presented to test the 
utility of the dynamic framework. [The course of events in each of these case studies is set out 
in the synopsis in Annex 3]. 
The Designation of the Pentland Hills Regional Park 
The dynamic analysis of the designation of the Pentland Hills Regional Park is summarised in 
Figure 3.8. The analysis demonstrates that the interest groups were united in purpose to defend 
the status quo, whilst Lothian Regional Council attempted, in effect, to redistribute access to 
the resource by the designation of the Regional Park. This was opposed in principle by the 
landowners, whilst the other interests suppressed any differences in principle between them to 
form a united front. The key players in the power struggle proved to be the landowners and the 
Regional Council, while the Council's natural allies, the recreation and conservation interests, 
supported park designation in principle. But the support of these organisations was so qualified, 
that they were in effect opponents of the scheme. They were highly critical of the Regional 
Council for not setting out the implications of designation in the form of a master plan. 
In this dispute the ideologies of the conflicting interest groups did not appear as a strong factor. 
The existing pattern of land use was defended by a loose coalition of landowners, conservation 
and recreation groups and local community associations who did not act in concert. Although 
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individual interests were affiliated to organisations, the pattern of political activity would be 
defined, in Cosefs terms, as 'loose-knit'. The Regional Council played a dual role, with one 
department (Leisure Services) acting as proponent of the scheme while the Planning Department 
acted as arbiter on development control decisions. Latterly, both functions were the 
responsibility of the Planning Department. 
The conflict was triggered by the publication of the designation order and although a 
consultative committee with representatives from each interest had been formed, this proved to 
be an ineffective means of communication. Many of the interests were formally represented at 
the subsequent public inquiry by their membership of organisations, but without a formal 
coalition or umbrella group to lead the opposition, no individual leader emerged. The Regional 
Council failed to build a coalition with the recreation and conservation organisations but it did 
have the support of the Countryside Commission for Scotland. Each side took a confrontational 
stance and the local press was much used by the conservation interests, who challenged the 
legitimacy of designation by questioning the appropriateness of recreation development. 
Meanwhile the Regional Council's authority and management aims were challenged by the 
landowners. This episode of the conflict was resolved by a public inquiry conducted in the 
traditional adversarial fashion. Although the Reporter adjudicated in favour of designation, and 
this was confirmed by the Secretary of State, the unsatisfactory nature of the outcome was 
recognised. Confirmation of designation was made conditional on the preparation of a 
management plan during which all interests would be consulted. 
The preparation of the plan should have resolved the issue. Indeed, it was hailed by the planning 
profession as a model of its kind, because of the detailed consultations that took place. This 
satisfied the recreation and conservation interests, yet by consulting but not fully involving the 
interest groups, the Regional Council was unable to convince the landowners that their interests 
had been fully considered and they continued their opposition in principle. Successive attempts 
to reform the committee structure were seen to be tokemstic as they failed to give the local 
interests, particularly the landowners, an effective say in the running of the park. The landowners 
were still opposed to the park in principle and their tactics remained confrontational. There is 
a latent issue concerning the use of the park by active recreation (e.g., mountain bikes and water 
sports) whose interests are not effectively organised nor are they indirectly represented, as even 
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an umbrella body such as the Scottish Sports Council is not a member of the Park Advisory 
Committee. 
Comparing this course of events with the alternative outcomes contained in Figure 3.7, the 
Pentlands case conforms in part with type B, the local interest groups being challenging by 
regional park designation. Because the Regional Council holds power legitimated in general 
terms by the electorate yet is both protagonist and decision maker, this case illustrates a variant 
not allowed for in Figure 3.7 The decision-making social structure has elements of rigidity and 
flexibility. Outwardly there are signs of flexibility in the appointment of advisory committees to 
aid communication, and in consultation procedures used during plan preparation. But it can be 
argued that the social structure of decision-making contains considerable rigidity as the Council 
relinquishes little real power. The conflict occurs 'within the system' as the authority of the 
ultimate decision maker, the Secretary of State, is unchallenged. 
In one sense, designation can be interpreted as a concession by the established landowning 
groups. But as designation confers few executive powers on the Regional Council, the 
landowning lobby has continued to fight an effective rearguard action. As the Council had failed 
to build an effective coalition and incorporate the recreation and conservation organisations into 
its power base, the situation is basically unstable. The changes in the advisory committee 
structure, most recently by establishing a farmers' and landowners' panel, plus disagreements 
over development control decisions suggests that the "solutions" devised so far (i.e., 
designation, the preparation of a management plan., minor changes to committees) had produced 
no more than a transitory outcome. Although the informal recreation and nature conservation 
interests are pacified, the Regional Council still lacks support. The situation has not been helped 
by the abolition of the Regional Council in the 1996 local government reorganisation. The 
outcome of this episode may be the establishment of a New Order but it is likely to prove to be 
a transitory stage before a new episode of conflict occurs. 
This analysis, based on the dynamic framework, leads to the prediction that a new episode of 
conflict is virtually inevitable. 
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FIGURE 3.8: A DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT OVER THE DESIGNATION 
OF THE PENTLAND HILLS REGIONAL PARK 
PHASE OF CONFLICT RELEVANT FACTORS ANALYSIS 	- 
AFTERMATH OF PREVIOUS 
EPISODE 
- Established social positions Interest groups: seeking to Land owning, recreation and 
maintain interest conservation groups 
LATENT PHASE Communication Regional Council develops 
proposals with consultative 
committee but failed to establish 
• effective communication with 
wider interests 
Initial balance of power Diffuse, Council does not depend 
on rural support 
INITIATION! ESCALATION 
PHASE 
- Potential triggers. Challenge to established order Regional Council seeking to 
designate park 
- External relations: Proactive National or local audience Regional Council bases its case on 
tactics of protagonist !Claims for Adherence to principle national legislation, uses 
legitimacy. Negotiation strategies confrontational tactics, fails to 
Use made of media form supporting coalition. 
Coalition formation. 
-Information Lack of information on Council's 
plans leads to uncertainty 
ACTIVE PHASE 
- Responsive tactics of established Reaction to new claim Established interests united in 
interests Appropriateness of resource use opposition in principle to park 
Negotiation strategies status, Inappropriateness cited to 
Use made of media prevent recreational development, 
Press used to escalate conflict 
-Internal relations within the Role of ideology Basic differences in ideology 
group. Type of organisation suppressed by opponents, but no 
Coalition formation. unifying leadership or 
organisation. 
-Rigid or flexible decision-making Public participation 	 • Consultation by Council at late 
Type of decision-making stage leads to formal objections 
Mechanism for adjusting to change and public inquiry. 
Determination of Claim Authority of decision maker Authority of Secretary of State as 
arbiter accepted who exercises 
power to designate but insists on 
plan to clarify aims thereby 
gaining support of conservation 
and recreation groups. 
Resulting balance of power Lack of involvement in park 
management leaves Council with 
limited political support and 
vulnerable to landowner pressure. 
OUTCOME! AFTERMATH OF Transitory or durable outcome Transitory 
EPISODE 
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Motor Sports in England 
The second example is that of use of the countryside by motor sports in England and Wales (see 
Figure 3.9). The conflict is a diffuse one running over several years, conducted at a local level 
by the opposition of local communities to existing or proposed planning proposals to stage 
motor sports events, coupled with a national campaign by nature conservation organisations 
(lead by the Royal Society for Nature Conservation, representing county wildlife trusts) which 
has culminated in more restrictive planning regulations being imposed by the Department of the 
Environment The amenity lobby opposes motor sports taking place in national parks in England 
and Wales and their efforts led to policy recommendations to further restrict recreational use of 
motor vehicles in these areas (Edwards, 1991). Subsequent attempts to change the second aim 
of national parks to "promoting quiet enjoyment" have been rejected by the Government. Given 
the dispersed nature of the dispute, with many local episodes, this analysis is conducted at a 
general level. 
The interests and power bases of the two respective lobbies are in marked contrast. The 
conservation interests have a unifying ideology, are well organised and their power base extends 
through various informal coalitions within the national parks and informal recreation movement; 
for example, they gain support from recreation organisations committed to quiet use of the 
countryside, such as the Ramblers' Association and the British Horse Society. The designated 
status of nature conservation areas, which nevertheless are sometimes used for casual motor 
sports, is legitimated through the legislation and popular support for conservation. The local 
impacts of the sport are generally perceived to be severe although their incidence nationally is 
unknown. This contributes to the adverse public image of motor sports which leads to their 
participants being considered illegitimate and inappropriate users of the countryside (Elson et 
al, 1986). 
In ideological terms the conservation lobby is 'close-knit' using arguments of appropriateness 
and principle to advance their claims and the lobby is more highly politically organised. The 
tactics of this lobby are confrontational using the media effectively to present their case, while 
motor sports organisations are left to counterattack. In comparison, motor sports are weakly 
organised into a 'loose-knit' coalition which attempts to defend the present degree of access. 
The major competitive commercial events are well represented by the Royal Automobile Club 
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and the Auto-Cycle Union but these organisations give little support to small local events and 
to recreational motoring in the countryside (e.g., trail riding on motor cycles). The ideological 
base of motor sports is weak, their umbrella organisation (LARA) being unable to marshal 
arguments ofpiinciple to assert a social position in the countryside. Motor sports are perceived 
to be environmentally insensitive and there is no established and effective means of 
communication to address the problem nationally, regionally or locally. Nature conservation 
interests have in effect annexed the established order, effectively lobbying with some informal 
recreation organisations and local communities to extend control over motor sports. Motor 
sports have no effective lobby and the Sports Council proves to be a weak partner as it 
concentrates on providing for politically more popular activities. There is no effective arena for 
the negotiation of policy at national level nor for planning at a local level, which might attempt 
to reconcile the competing interests of motor sports and conservation. 
The social systems within which these conflicts occur show more signs of rigidity than flexibility. 
Although the Department of the Environment (DOE) has consulted motor sports as well as 
conservation organisations on proposed changes to the planning regulations, it appears to be 
generally accepted that motor sports in the countryside are a problem to be controlled rather 
than a genuine recreational need which requires some basic provision, albeit on a limited and 
appropriate scale. Indeed local planning authorities have paid lip service to requests in DOE 
planning guidance to make provision for motor sports and have not made effective plans in the 
face of local political opposition. Thus local community and conservation interests support the 
decisions of the local planning authorities as legitimate. 
In terms of the dynamic framework, the case of motor sports conforms closely to Type B 
(Figure 3.7). Motor sport organisations are ineffectively defending their tenuous position making 
successive concessions which further weaken their position overall. Each new order is transitory 
and short lived. Faced with superior and effectively organised power, and with no forum for 
strategic planning to broker their needs, the demise of motor sports in the countryside seems 
inevitable. 
The analysis, based on the dynamic framework, predicts the continuing demise of motor sports 
in the English countryside. 
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FIGURE 3.9: A DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT OVER MOTOR SPORTS IN 
ENGLAND 
PHASE OF CONFLICT 
	
RELEVANT FACTORS 	 I ANALYSIS 
AFTERMATH OF PREVIOUS 
EPISODE 
- Established social positions 
	





- Potential triggers. 
-Internal relations within the 
group. 
- External relations: Proactive 
tactics /Claims for legitimacy. 
- Coalition formation. 
ACTIVE PHASE 
-Internal relations within the 
group- 
- Responsive tactics 
-Rigid or flexible decision-making 
Determination of claim 
OUTCOME! AFTERMATH OF 
EPISODE 
mterest 
Initial balance of power 
Communication 
Understanding of impact 
Challenge to established order 
Role of ideology 
Type of organisation 
National or local audience 
Adherence to principle 
Appropriateness of resource use 
Negotiation strategies 
Use made of media 
Coalition formation. 
Role of ideology 
Type of organisation 




Type of decision-making 
Mechanism for adjusting to change 
Authority of decision maker 
Resulting balance of power 
Transitory or durable outcome 
In favour of local communities 
No formal channel of 
communication 
Understanding rests on adverse 
image of sport rather than specific 
information on impacts. 
Local community and conservation 
organisations seek to restrict 
existing motor sports activity. 
Conservation ideology strong, well 
established network of national 
contacts. 
Conservation organisations use 
conservation status of site as 
legitimating argument. 
Inappropriateness and other 
principles advanced in 
confrontational campaign making 
effective use of local press. No 
formal coalition but network and 
local contacts used to good effect. 
Motor sports lack unifying 
ideology and effective organisation 
Motor sports counterattack but 
perceived to be insensitive to local 
communities and environment. 
No effective channel of 
communication. Limited 
consultation by decision makers. 
Public inquiries adversarial. No 
strategic plans to consider sports 
need. DOE accepted as arbiter and 
exercises power in favour of more 
effective lobby. 
In favour of local communities and 
conservation organisations 
Each incremental decision is 
transitory leading to next phase in 
another location 
77 
Moorland Access in the Peak District National Park 
The third example analysed in this way is that of moorland access in the Peak District National 
Park (see Figure 3.10). The present episode of the conflict has its antecedents in earlier disputes 
between landowners, principally concerned about the use of their moorland for grouse shooting, 
and rambling organisations from the Yorkshire and Lancashire conurbations. An earlier episode, 
the Mass Trespass of Kinder Scout in 1932 which led to the imprisonment of some ramblers, 
is of continuing symbolic importance. It led in effect to the provisions to identify open land and 
to secure access agreements to private land, using the provisions of the National Parks and 
Access to the Countryside Act, 1949. This legislation and its instruments provided the first phase 
of the resolution. Open access to just over half of the moorlands in the national park has been 
secured by voluntary agreements between the landowners and the national park authority - the 
Peak Park Joint Planning Board (the Board). The agreements have legitimised the case of the 
Ramblers' Association as it continues to apply political pressure on the Board to enter into 
formal access agreements with the owners of the remaining moorland areas. 
Meanwhile the preparation and revision at five year intervals of a National Park Plan provides 
a method for responding to new claims on the moorland as the plan is reviewed. The most recent 
of these claims has been to give greater consideration to the nature conservation interests of the 
moors. The present episode of the dispute has been triggered by two events: 
- the expiry of the existing access agreements and their renegotiation between the 
landowners' organisation and the National Park; and 
- the designation of the Dark Peak Moorlands as a Special Protection Area under EU 
Environmental Directives. 
Although each interest is pressing to extend its claim, each is also part of an established order 
resisting the changes demanded by the others. There is in fact a range of conflicts between the 
ramblers seeking access to privately owned land, nature conservationists seeking to restrict 
public access and each of these three groups (ramblers, conservationists and landowners) 
seeking to restrict the activities of active sports. The landowning and nature conservation 
interests want to maintain the present distribution of open access on the moors (i.e., their social 
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-CONFLICT OVER  MOORLAND 




ACCESS 114 THE PEAK DISTRICT 
NA1 
PHASE OF CONFLICT 
AFTERMATH OF PREVIOUS 
EPISODE 
- Established social positions 
LATENT PHASE 




- Potential triggers. 
- 
External relations: Proactive 
tactics /Clainis for legitimacy. 
- 
Coalition formation.  
RELEVANT FACTORS 
Interest groups seeking to maintain 
interest 
Initial balance of power 
Role of ideology 
Type of organisation 
Understanding of impact 
Challenge to established order 
Conservation status of site 
National or local audience 
Adherence to principle 
Negotiation strategies 
Use made of media 
Coalition formation.  
ANALYSIS 
Landowners resisting further 
access while access organisations 
(RA) seek to maintain open access 
areas. 
Probably evenly balanced 
Strong ideological and 
organisational base to each group. 
Considerable uncertainty about 
impact of access on important 
populations of ground nesting 
birds. 
RA seeking access to remaining 
open areas and national legislation. 
Proposed conservation designation 
of moorland under European 
directive. 
Each party effective in lobbying 
especially at national level; using 
confrontational tactics elevating 
issues to matters of principle and 
using media. 
Potential coalition between 
landowners and conservationists. 
ACTIVE PHASE 
- Responsive tactics 
-Rigid or flexible decision-making 
Determination of claims  
Reaction to new claim 
Environmental awareness 




Authority of decision maker 
Resulting balance of power  
Each adversely reacting to claims 
of others. 
RA committed on policy but 
sceptical in practice. 
National Park Plan provides 
vehicle for change but balance of 
policies in contention. 
Little direct contact between 
parties until recent formation of 
Access Consultative Group (ACG) 
Consultation replaced by 
involvement in ACG. 
Negotiation within ACG 
Authority of National Park Board 
in question. 
Evenly balanced each party 
holding vetoing sanction. 
transitory, but could move 
OIU~TTCE/ AFTERMATH OF 	 to durable negotiated settlement. 
EPISODE 
position) while the Ramblers' Association, in seeking an extension of public access locally while 
also pressing for national legislation for public access to 'open country', is attempting to 
redistribute the social structure of access. Ultimately the three interests are incompatible, 
particularly when their interests are expressed in ideological terms; as principles of "freedom to 
roam" (ramblers); "the precautionary principle" (nature conservation); and "privacy and 
autonomy" (landowners). 
Thus the competing interests of nature conservation and rambling have many of the 
characteristics of ideologically close-knit groups. Although the landowners might be said to form 
a loose coalition, they have a unifying ideology and hold a considerable degree of power. 
Certainly these groups use the advancement of principles or arguments for appropriateness to 
advance their respective claims or use adversarial tactics and respond adversely to new claims, 
although, depending on the conflict, each group may be seeking to maintain or advance its 
power base. 
Although there are significant differences in the level of organisation between the three interest 
groups, each is highly organised with well-established contacts at the national level. With the 
high degree of politicisation of this issue, each party operates both tactically and strategically 
whereby the national situation influences local action, while local action sets a national 
precedent. The Ramblers' Association in particular has acted in a confrontational way by 
including the Peak District in a national campaign of deliberate mass trespass which attracts 
considerable media coverage. Conservation interests have counter-attacked proposing sanctuary 
areas to exclude "inappropriate" use of breeding bird territories by walkers (although the 
principle of inappropriateness is probably used to greater effect by both parties to exclude active 
sports from the moorland areas). 
Until recently there has been little direct communication between the interests and power is 
evenly balanced between them as each has strong political allies. But each has certain 
weaknesses in the eyes of the others (elitism on the part of landowners; the uncompromising 
aims of conservation; and the militancy of ramblers). Nevertheless, the claims of the three 
interests are legitimated within national park policy and the National Park Plan. The lack of 
information on the impacts of recreation on wildlife leads to uncertainty which all parties 
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probably use to their advantage. In this situation the Ramblers' Association can afford to appear 
environmentally sensitive by accepting conservation policies in principle while requiring proof 
that recreational disturbance is causing serious damage. 
Each interest group is attempting to influence the policies (management aims) of the Board. 
Although the National Park Plan was prepared using a consultative process and its main 
provisions have been agreed, the Board's Access Strategy, which forms part of that plan, is 
under challenge from conservation interests. This highlights the need to get an agreement on 
both strategy and detailed management plans which would involve the interests directly rather 
than consult on firm proposals. The National Park Plan is subject to periodic review and can 
therefore provide a vehicle for responding to change. 
With power being evenly distributed between the parties and none willing to make concessions 
to the other side, the outcome would appear to be one of stalemate. However faced with 
uncompromising advice on the threat to conservation from English Nature, and the need to 
renegotiate with landowners while hopefully extending the access agreements, the Board had 
to take an initiative. It proposed the establishment of an Access Consultative Group (ACG) and 
engaged a consultant to devise arrangements acceptable to the interested parties (Sidaway, 
1993). As the workings of such a group could affect the social positions of each party it was in 
their interest to be represented to ensure that they were party to the decision (authority) and 
could influence the outcome - the redistribution of access (autonomy) (Thurlings, 1962). 
Arguments of principle have been submerged (at least temporarily) in the interests of direct 
negotiation as each group wants to be seen to be reasonable to its national audience. Lack of 
communication hitherto has been rectified by the establishment of the ACG and its workings 
increase direct involvement of the interest groups in the preparation of local access management 
plans. The manner of decision-making has been changed from adversarial to negotiative and the 
Group provides a mechanism for brokering change (although it may become institutionalised 
around the present interests and resist any claim for new recreational uses of the moorland 
resource). By accepting the Group's advice, the Board can increase the legitimacy of its 
decisions. 
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Although it is a more complex case, possible outcomes to the conflict over moorland access in 
the Peak District can be analysed using the dynamic framework set out in Figure 3.2. In effect, 
the conflict has run through several iterations in which the early episodes of trespass and the 
campaigning for national parks can be said to follow the pattern of a Type A power struggle. 
Legislation and the designation of the Peak District as a national park denoted a transfer of 
power to a new order from the established order of private landownership. Subsequently, the 
continual political pressure of the Ramblers' Association has led to further concessions from 
private landowners in the form of access agreements (Type B). But as nature conservation has 
built up a stronger power base, legitimised by European directives, a state of political stalemate 
has been reached; no one lobby is able to amass superior power. 
Central to this struggle is the Board, which has certain of the characteristics of a flexible social 
structure. It has recently increased the degree of communication and public involvement in 
decision-making by the establishment of the ACG which serves useful local and national political 
aims. The Ramblers' Association benefits if local agreement is reached as this would set a 
precedent to be inserted in national legislation. A failure to reach agreement would further 
demonstrate the need for national legislation to override the local power of private landowners. 
Thus this conflict may be moving towards Type C, negotiation and co-operation. If continued 
working within the Access Consultative Group can maintain trust and establish a precedent for 
co-operation between the rival interests and, as importantly, the process is seen to be legitimate 
by other players who are not directly represented at the table, then this initiative may move 
beyond a transitory outcome'. 
The 'tentative prediction from this analysis is that one possible outcome of the conflict over 
moorland access in the Peak District is the establishment of a new and durable order. 
Figure 3.11 summarises each of the three cases studies and their possible outcomes. 
At the time of writing (July 1995) the outcome of these negotiations was 
uncertain. Although preliminary agreement has been reached on a system of access 
management planning which would mitigate the possibly damaging effects of 
public access, these negotiations were overshadowed by the failure of the national 
park authority and the landowners to reach agreement on the levels of 
compensatory payment to be made to owners for public access on their land. 
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FIGURE 3.11(a ) PREDICTED OUTCOME OF CONFLICT IN THE PENTLAND BILLS REGIONAL PARK 
AFTERMATH! 	 INITIATION! 	 ACTIVE PHASE 	 OUTCOME! 
LATENT PHASE ESCALATION 	 AFTERMATH 
TYPE (B) CONFLICT 
Landowning, conservation 	react with 	Defensive responses but 
and recreation interests with do not form formal coalition 
established social position 
Power struggle within FLEXIBLE 
social structure resulting in a minor Concession by established groups 
i.e., Designation with limited executive power 
Lothian Regional Council challenges 	using 	Proactive tactics 	but fails to 	leading to 
by proposing Regional Park designation build effective political support New order but Transitory Outcome 
FIGURE 3.11(b) PREDICTED OUTCOME OF CONFLICT OVER MOTOR SPORTS IN ENGLAND 
AFTERMATH! 	 INITIATION! 	 ACTIVE PHASE 	 OUTCOME! 
LATENT PHASE ESCALATION 	 AFTERMATH 
TYPE (B) CONFLICT 
Motor sports organisations with react with 	Defensive responses and/or 
weakly established social position 	 weak ideological base lack effective coalition 
Power struggle within FLEXIBLE 
social structure resulting in additional Concessions by Motor sports organisations 
leading to 
Local community and conservation 	using 	Proactive tactics 	and effective 
interest groups challenging 	 political organisation 	 New order but Transitory Outcome 
for social position by proposing 
further restrictions on motor sports 
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FIGURE 3.11 (continued)(c) PREDICTED OUTCOME OF CONFLICT OVER MOORLAND ACCESS IN THE PEAK DISTRICT 
AFTERMATH/ 	 INITIATION! 	 ACTIVE PHASE 	 OUTCOME! 
LATENT PHASE ESCALATION AFTERMATH 
(PHASE 1) CONFLICT 
Landowners with 	 react with 	Defensive responses 
established social position 
Access groups challenging 	 using 	Proactive tactics 
for social position 
Power struggle within 
RIGID social structure 
resulting in 	Transfer of power leading to 
New order in favour of claimant 
(National Park and access agreements) 
(PHASE 2) CONFLICT 
Landowning and Access groups with 	react with 
established social position 
Conservation and access groups 	using 
challenging for social position 
Defensive responses 
Power struggle within FLEXIBLE 
social structure resulting in 
Proactive tactics 
Stalemate because of 
equal distribution of power 
(PHASE 3) POSSIBLE CO-OPERATION 
Landowners and access groups with 	react with 
established social position 
Conservation groups challenging 	using 
for social position 
Conciliatory responses 
Negotiation within FLEXIBLE 
social structure (Access Consultative 
Group) resulting in 	Consensus about 
Negotiative tactics 
New order 
and (Durable outcome) 
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CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has examined Hypothesis 2: 
That it is possible to identify the underlying theoretical concepts and social processes 
which govern the development of conflicts, and which may be used to predict their 
outcomes. These relationships may also be expressed within a conceptual framework. 
To consider this Hypothesis, the relevant theoretical concepts were identified in a review of the 
literature on social conflict. This enabled the diagnostic factors identified in Chapter 2 to be 
organised within a second "dynamic" framework which describes the social processes of 
conflicts. Selected case studies were then used to illustrate the possible outcomes of a dispute 
in a given range of circumstances. Thus the first and third parts of the hypothesis were 
confirmed but there are major limitations on prediction which are discussed below. 
The Utility of the Dynamic Framework 
Using this framework, it is possible to prepare a more detailed and clearer analysis of each of 
the three conflicts. Compared to the diagnostic framework developed in chapter 2, the re-
allocation of the influential factors into phases within the dynamic framework provides a more 
logical grouping as it demonstrates their inter-relationships during the course of a conflict 
episode. Certain factors which appear to have no role in diagnosis are now seen to have a place, 
several have been redefined and others identified. However, the separation of conflict episodes 
into phases may often be more easily accomplished in a theoretical analysis than in practice as 
phases may overlap considerably. 
This analysis has clarified the nature of this type of dispute and the motives of each interest 
group. It demonstrates more clearly that these conflicts are intrinsically about attempts to 
redistribute the social structure of access and to maintain or improve the social position of 
individual competing parties. 
A particular advantage of this analysis comes from the insights that it provides into the 
understanding of the role of ideology and arguments of principle in emphasising group solidarity 
and tactics during the course of a dispute. Coser's insight into 'close' and 'loose' knit 
organisations suggests the importance that ideology plays in motivating interest groups and 
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maintaining their solidarity. In which case, basic beliefs cannot be negotiable. This was in part 
demonstrated in the case studies but warrants more detailed investigation in further research 
The close examination of the respective goals of each interest group, whether they are seeking 
to maintain or improve their social position, enables the tactics of each group to be better 
understood during the escalation and active phases of a conflict. Tactics are chosen to improve 
legitimacy in the eyes of interested audiences. Thus the elevation of interests to matters of 
principle enables competing parties to give legitimacy to their claims. Inappropriateness of the 
activities of others acts as a mirror image to arguments of principle, which can either be used 
proactively or defensively to de-legitimise the claims of opposing parties. Thus arguments of 
principle can also be seen to be about social position. 
The distribution of power and how this changes during the course of the dispute is a crucial part 
of the analysis. It appears to be the dominant factor in determining the outcome of a dispute and 
whether it will be resolved by the exercise or transfer of power or by negotiation. 
The analysis gives some insights into decision-making structures, their rigidity or flexibility in 
influencing the outcome of a dispute. However, the concepts of rigidity and flexibility were 
identified by Coser in relation to the total system of decision-making in society. These concepts 
are not easily related to the limited local scale of many of the disputes studied and therefore 
proved unsatisfactory operational concepts. 
The Dynamic Framework as a Predictive Model 
The more extended analysis afforded by the use of this framework has led to tentative 
predictions on the outcomes of the case studies under analysis. The analysis predicts with some 
confidence the continuing instability of the situation in the Pentland Hills Regional Park and the 
hopeless political position of motor sports in the countryside. However, the eventual outcome 
in the Peak District National Park is less clear. 
As has already been noted the analysis highlights distribution of power as the key factor in 
determining the outcome of a conflict episode. While this appears to offer the possibility of 
developing a predictive model, it also identifies the main stumbling block to prediction - the 
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inability to predict changes in the distribution of power. Factors which influence the balance of 
power, such as ideological motivation, tactics and the political organisation of disputing parties,' 
might improve prediction and this proposition is further analysed in Chapter 5. 
The review of social theory has suggested that resolution of conflict, in terms of a stable or 
durable outcome, may depend on voluntary negotiation rather than political struggle. The 
characteristics of voluntary negotiation and whether these are influenced by different forms of 





The previous chapter emphasised the role negotiation and/or the development of consensus can 
play in the resolution of conflict and in reaching more stable outcomes to episodes of conflict. 
This chapter reviews methods of decision-making and the arguments for increasing public 
participation to resolve conflicts by reaching consensus. It focuses on the circumstances in 
which consensus is reached by negotiation, particularly where a neutral third party intervenes 
to facilitate agreement between competing interests. This approach to dispute resolution is 
analysed in some detail to identify criteria which might then be used to evaluate the 
effectiveness of decision-making and planning in resolving conflicts between nature conservation 
and outdoor recreation. An evaluative framework, developed in this way, is then used to 
examine one detailed case study, of successive episodes of planning in the Rhine Delta in the 
Dutch Province of Zeeland, which is followed by a brief review of the designation procedures 
for national parks in the Netherlands'. 
A REVIEW OF PARTICIPATION IN DECISION-MAKING 
Decision-making to Resolve Disputes 
Ury et a! (1988) distinguish three major ways to resolve disputes: 
- those which reconcile the disputants underlying interests; 
- those which determine who is right; 
- those which determine who is more powerful. 
They argue that in general the first approach (for example: problem-solving by negotiation) 
which identifies and recognises the interests of disputing parties is less costly and more rewar-
ding than the determination of rights (such as legal action in the courts), which in turn is less 
costly and more rewarding than the exercise of power (such as strikes or wars). 
An earlier version of this literature review and an analysis of Dutch case studies 
formed part of a study conducted by the author and Han van der Voet of the 
Agricultural University of Wageningen for the Dutch government (Sidaway and 
van der Voet, 1993). This review has been revised and extended for this study. 
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The range of techniques commonly used for settling disputes can be portrayed as a continuum 
that extends from informal discussion, through forms of negotiation and the legitimate use of 
power to extra-legal coercion or violent exchanges (see Figure 4.1). Slaikeu (1989) points out 
that the extremes of this continuum - avoiding the issue and unilateral power play - offer the 
greatest loss of control over the outcome and hence the greatest risk to the disputing parties. 
FIGURE 4.1: THE RANGE OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION TECHNIQUES 
Decision left Decision made by the Decision made by higher Decision by 
to chance disputing parties authority direct action 
or force 
AVOIDANCE NEGOTIATION MEDIATION ARBITRATION LITIGATION UNILATERAL 
OF THE I USE OF ISSUE POWER 
Coercion 
Based on Moore, 1986 and Slaikeu, 1989. 
Within the central range ofthis spectrum, 
- the disputing parties may negotiate without assistance; 
- they may be assisted by a neutral third party in the form of 
- facilitation (where the third party assists by suggesting procedures to establish and 
conduct the negotiations), 
- mediation (where the third party takes a more active role in brokering the 
negotiations) or 
- non-binding arbitration (where the third party suggests a solution); 
- the decision may be made by a third party in 
- binding arbitration or 
- a court of law. 
It is within the second category (assistance using a neutral third party) that the techniques of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) have been most recently applied to environmental 
disputes. The term "alternative" has been used to distinguish these methods from more 
traditional legal and administrative processes, but it should be recognised that even in the USA, 
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where ADR is currently popular, the vast majority of environmental disputes are resolved by 
administrative or legal procedures'. 
In this context, appeals against administrative decisions can be seen as a form of binding 
arbitration. The outcome of many environmental disputes in Britain is determined by the 
development control system in this way. If an application for development is refused by the local 
planning authority, the applicant may appeal against the decision. The outcome of the appeal is 
determined at a political level by the relevant Secretary of State acting on recommendations 
made by an independent inspector (or reporter in Scotland) who may have conducted a public 
inquiry into the case. Disputes within public organisations are typically resolved by appeal 
procedures. However, processes of arbitration or litigation tend to foster an adversarial 
approach, which tests evidence and witnesses' credibility, in contrast with the more conciliatory 
procedures of negotiation or mediation. Slaikeu argues that: 
"... when disputes are kicked "upstairs" to superiors, boards of governors, or grievance 
panels, the cost in administrative time is far greater than if the parties had negotiated the 
matter themselves or used mediation by a third party. 
As a corollary to [this] postulate, the greatest cost savings for organisations will occur in 
implementation of systems that move the majority of disputes to resolution .....early in the 
life of any conflict, with resolutions at the higher authority level used only when absolutely 
necessary and appropriate..." (Slaikeu, 1989, 397) 
The acceptability of any decision-making process to the disputing parties assumes that it is seen 
to be legitimate and just. For this to be the case, the social institution which administers justice 
has to be generally accepted by the community at large, usually because it is democratically 
accountable (albeit indirectly). Alternatively, the parties have to be directly involved in decision-
making. 
2 	Typically, of approximately 15,000 administrative decisions taken each year by a 
District Administrator in the US Federal Bureau of Transportation, 60-70 may be 
determined at a higher level on appeal and one or two of these might become 
cause celebre [in other words major conflicts] which might be eligible for ADR. 
(Kussey, 1992, personal, communication). Amy (1987) quotes a civil litigation 
research project in Wisconsin which found that only ten per cent of disputing 
parties go to a lawyer, of these half file a suit and 92 per cent of these settle out 
of court. 
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The Issues of Legitimacy of Decision-Making and Public Support 
Direct representation and openness of decision-making are crucial to ensuring that public policy 
decisions are accepted as legitimate. There are three arguments in their favour which are based 
on theory, practice or ideology. 
Thurling's(1962) sociological perspective on these issues was presented in chapter 3. He argued 
that the outcome of a conflict will be durable where it is based on consensus but only transitory 
where it is based on the exercise ofpower. He suggested that claims for access to resources may 
be rejected or substantiated either by the exercise of power or through a legitimating social 
institution. By distinguishing between the ability of an interest group to exercise its rights in 
using a resource (autonomy) and it having some say in the process whereby rights are allocated 
(authority), he further confirms the importance of participation in decision-making. This 
argument is supported by Creighton: 
"In every closely fought election, nearly half the voters "lose" - their candidate isn't elected - 
yet the outcome of the election is accepted because there is a consensus that the decision-
making process has been fair and legitimate. In effect, the decision-making procedure or 
process - the election - makes the outcome legitimate even if someone didn't like the 
outcome. One of the major functions of public involvement is to create sufficient visibility 
to the decision-making process so that decisions which result from it are perceived as fair 
and legitimate. While some of the people most directly impacted by a decision may not be 
impressed by the equity of the decision, their ability to undermine the credibility of the 
decision rests on their ability to convince the larger public that the decision was unfairly 
made. Effective public involvement can establish your credibility with a larger public, so that 
the claims of the special interests fall on deaf ears." 
(Creighton, 1978, quoted in Deli Priscoli, 1980, 9) 
At a more practical level, it is argued that environmental regulation, in the form of a nature 
conservation designation, requires a high degree of public acceptance Wit is to be successfully 
implemented (Sidaway and van der Voet, 1993). The rationale is that policies will only be fully 
accepted and implemented when interest groups understand and are involved in determining the 
solution to mutually perceived problems. If regulation is imposed on people, there may be a 
broad level of compliance in the short-term, but it may not be generally accepted and this could 
have serious long-term consequences. In other words, the effectiveness of regulations depends 
upon the strength of political support and if this is lacking the regulations may be unenforceable. 
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McCool(1986) notes that public consensus in favour of US Forest Service planning is critical 
to the agency obtaining financial support for and successfbl implementation of its policies. He 
thither argues that decision-making should be an open process with each stage easily traced and 
that an informed public can assist the service in reaching high-quality decisions. But participation 
goes beyond incorporating representatives of interest groups on management boards or 
commissions to a commitment in principle to open and collaborative decision-making. 
The ideological argument for public participation appears especially in the planning literature. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, considerable attention was paid to increasing public participation 
in planning. Burton (1976) recognised the following planning philosophies: 
planning ofpeople - based on strong ideological principles, legitimating the justification for 
certain measures; 
planningfor people - based on the rational planning model and the contribution of scientific 
research; 
planning with people - participatory planning; recognising the normative base of decision-
making, the uncertainty principle in future development and the limitations of scientific 
knowledge. 
Variations on planning with people, dating from the same era, are variously described as 
'transactive' planning (so-called because of the negotiations which take place between planners 
and interest groups) and participation through public involvement', in which many mediators are 
currently engaged in the USA. 
The Relationship between Planning Methods, the Participants and Phases of Planning 
Ter Haar (1979) suggested that the roles of different parties are quite different within different 
planning philosophies and during the different stages of the planning process. In a recent study, 
Van Keken, Lengkeek Sidaway and Van der Voet (1993) used Ter Haar's model and within the 
different parties they differentiated between: 
democratically chosen representatives on national, provincial and local levels (municipalities 
and water boards - twaterschappen'); 
officials and professionals; and 
inhabitants: the user and interest groups and their representatives. 
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Within planning methods it is possible to distinguish between the approaches of 
- ad hoc planning: based on political pressure of interest groups; 
- standards planning: where quality standards are used; 
- investigative phnrnng: using demand/supply models or the capacity approach; 
- participatory planning: with and by the interest groups. 
While these different planning approaches may not be mutually exclusive, certainly the first will 
reflect the power base of the powerflul, whilst the second and third depend on technical 
assessment and therefore will tend to put power into the hands of the professionals. 
Ter Haar also argues that it is not right to speak of 'the' professional. Complex problems need 
a multi-disciplinary approach and co-operation between disciplines, in which the choice of 
disciplines can influence the final result. He notes that the extent of the area and the complexity 
of the projects are important fictors in obtaining participation. Small scale, low profile projects 
are more likely to encourage participation, while the influence of professionals is extended in 
large-scale, more complex projects. 
Participatory planning aims to empower the relatively powerless and to redistribute power. Very 
similar discussions occur, both in the conflict resolution and planning literature, about the 
propriety of professional planners or mediators attempting to redistribute power or whether their 
role should be strictly neutral, leaving empowerment to political organisers (see for example, 
Forester, 1987). 
Sidaway (1992d) has pointed out that the purposes of most government agencies are to execute 
one or more aspects of public policy and that as a result few are politically neutral or exist to 
mediate change. As Deffi Priscoli observed 
"Agency missions embody values - packages of views on how the world ought to be. Since 
agencies exist in a public world, that package of "oughts" services some segment of 
society's values." (Deffi Priscoli, 1980, 12) 
He further argues that public involvement can affect the way an agency carries out its mission 
and adapts to changing social values by redefining problems and considering a broader range of 
alternatives. 
The Distinction between Consultation and Public Involvement 
Creighton (1978) suggests that public involvement ranges from knowing about, to having an 
influence on or being party to a decision. But the main distinctions that are being made here 
revolve around: 
- whether the public is an equal party in the planning exercise, i.e., the 'planning for people' 
(consultation) or 'planning with people' (involvement) distinctions; 
- the timing of public participation, i.e. whether the public is being consulted on a draft plan 
or whether it has been involved from the outset in the definition of problems and the 
formulation of options. 
Thus a key characteristic of public involvement is collective decision-making. Public 
consultation may be no more than the dissemination of information, good public relations or 
tokenism which aims at placating the public. The advocates of full-scale public involvement 
(e.g. Susskind, 1981) argue that traditional consultation does not contribute to conflict 
resolution. Ter Haar (1979) argued that limiting participation until a late stage of the planning 
process so that there can be very little real discussion is likely to lead to conflict. He 
distinguished between the preliminary, discussion and decision phases of planning and advocated 
public involvement in the preliminary phase when problems are identified and analysed, and 
when goals and objectives are defined. He accepted that politicians will set the financial 
constraints of a plan, will balance the representation of interests and attempt to represent the 
unrepresentable. However, he considered that the public should be involved in the consideration 
of alternative strategies in the discussion phase of a draft plan. 
This highlights one of the most important distinctions between public consultation and public 
involvement - the point at which discussions begin with interest groups and the public generally 
(see figure 4.2). Government agencies commonly invite discussion on a draft plan based largely 
on technical assessment and in which the future options are limited to perhaps one 'preferred 
solution'. Ter Haar pinpointed the dangers of this approach. Formal consultation procedures 
tend to polarise the interests and often the only possibility available to aggrieved members of the 
public is to form action or protest groups to appeal against administrative decisions and delay 
the process. This contrasts with more democratic systems of planning in which the preliminary 
phase is open to the public. 
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FIGURE 4.2: PARTICIPATION IN DECISION-MAKING 
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CONSULTATION PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT 
Public involvement is often criticised as a time-consuming process which reduces the efficiency 
of decision-making. For example, Brown and Marriott (1993), writing from a legal standpoint, 
argue that the mediation of complex issues is likely to take a long time and that the complexity 
of the issues to be addressed means that the resources of the mediators are likely to be 
substantial and therefore costly. Amy (1987) also challenges the view that ADR techniques are 
necessarily quicker and cheaper ways to settle disputes. 
However, Susskind and Cruikshanlc (1987) claim that quick decisions often prolong disputes 
and that consensus building and extensive fact finding are worthwhile investments. Menñtz 
(198 0) suggests that mediation is as speedy as the parties want it to be, while the settlement of 
disputes through the courts is often delayed because of a backlog of cases. He estimates legal 
fees to be twice the cost of mediation. Deli Priscoli (1980) compares the timescale of 
administrative decisions and ADR. He points out that criticism of public involvement may not 
be valid if the time taken to implement a decision is taken into account. Without public 
involvement the initial decision may be taken more rapidly, but if the outcome is unacceptable 
there may be a prolonged period in which the decision is contested and implementation is 
delayed. Public involvement may delay the initial decision but if that is acceptable to the interest 
groups, implementation should be assured and the total process will be shorter than under the 
original, non-participatory procedure. 
Mediation as a Participatory Technique 
In essence, mediation and allied techniques involve all the interested parties or interest groups 
in decision-making on a more or less equal basis and aim to produce a solution which is both 
more acceptable to all of them and is longer lasting than one imposed by a third party. The 
advantages over adversarial decision-making are that voluntary co-operation between the parties 
leads to better understanding of each other's positions and values and that a sense of ownership 
is gained by being party to a collective decision. Thus the common elements of mediated 
negotiation and many other forms of participatory decision-making are: 
Disputing parties are brought together to participate in face-to-face negotiations. 
A neutral mediator, facilitator, or go-between works to improve the communication 
between the disputing parties. 
Parties are encouraged to explore and understand each other's underlying interests, not just 
their bargaining positions. 
Negotiations are designed to be collaborative rather than adversarial 
Parties reach some form of voluntary agreement at the end of the process. (Madigan et al, 
1990) 
The role of the mediator, as an impartial third party, is to convene discussions and to help to 
design an acceptable negotiating process. As well as providing procedural assistance, mediators 
can help to improve communication between the parties and help them build a constructive 
relationship. This is done by facilitating contact, improving mutual respect, developing openness 
and trust,giving the parties equal status in the discussion, and getting them to work towards 
common goals (Fisher and Ury, 1981). The choice of mediator will depend on what assistance 
is required to develop appropriate procedures, whether technical knowledge of the issues or 
experience of similar previous negotiations is considered essential, and whether the parties can 
build up rapport and trust in the mediator (Moore, 1991). Typically the cost of the exercise is 
borne by all the parties to emphasise the mediator's neutrality. 
Ozawa and Susskind (1985) consider public policy disputes which revolve around ambiguous 
or contradictory scientific or technical information. They contrast the willingness of scientists 
to share new-found knowledge with adversarial approaches to dispute resolution which 
encourage the withholding of information that is helpful to an adversarys case. Within mediated 
negotiations, information is shared and attempts to suppress information can destroy a 
participants credibility. 
The rationale that led to the development of ADR techniques in the USA is the contentiousness 
and complexity of environmental problems in which large numbers of interests are involved, 
allied with the growing frustration over the delays and costs of administrative and legal 
processes of decision-making. Mediation may also be seen as an attractive alternative to 
conftontational politics which satisfies a yearning [in the USA at least] for peace, co-operation 
and reconciliation (Amy, 1987). These techniques have been applied to different levels of 
decision-making in the USA, for example, in the formation of public policy, such as getting 
agreement on the content of federal legislation or the detailed regulations which implement legis-
lation. Site-based disputes about development or contentious issues such as the disposal of 
hazardous waste have been settled in this way. The techniques have also been applied to longer-
term management of environmental impacts - as in the procedures for assessing and monitoring 
the 'Limits of Acceptable Change' developed for Wilderness Areas by the US Forest Service 
(Stankey et al, 1985). 
The Limitations of Mediation 
The most detailed critique of environmental mediation has been provided by Amy (1987) and 
many of his criticisms apply to other forms of participatory decision-making. His perspective is 
that of the political scientist concerned about power, equality and democracy, although he 
concentrates on power and says relatively little about democratic representation and 
accountability. His basic point is that power is rarely equally distributed in political institutions 
and that given the opportunity, the powerful will use mediation or any other participatory 
process to further their own ends. 
The critical issues within Amy's critique relate to: 
- 	the nature of the dispute; 
the political context within which it may be resolved; and 
the inherent characteristics of the decision-making process. 
These will be considered in turn, taking into account the extent to which mediators attempt to 
address these issues. 
Amy (1987) suggests that mediators recognise two types of dispute - those concerning 
misunderstandings and conflicting interests - and tend to ignore a third - disputes over basic 
principles which is an element in most environmental conflicts. 
Misunderstandings may arise because of the stereotypical perceptions that disputing parties may 
have of their rivals' positions or because of disagreements over the scientific and technical 
aspects of the dispute. Direct contact and negotiation may remove the stereotypes or 
misconceptions each party has of the other and clarify the technical issues. 
By working on conflicts of interest, mediators assume that the parties' bargaining positions are 
negotiable and that their underlying interests can be served by a hitherto unconsidered option 
or a straightforward compromise between the respective positions. In Amy's view, and he cites 
various statements from mediators that he interviewed, this type of negotiation cannot and 
should not compromise non-negotiable principles which are based on deeply held values or 
beliefs concerning the way society should function. In his view, environmental values are a case 
in point: 
"In any case, there is a real difference between seeing environmental disputes as conflicts 
of interest or as conflicts of principle. ...more activist organisations, such as (Ireenpeace, 
Earth First! and Friends of the Earth, ... tend to see themselves not so much as another 
interest group, but as part of a movement which is dedicated to creating an environmentally 
sane society ... ....... more like a campaign or crusade to get basic ethical and ecological 
principles embodied in law." (Amy, 1987, 175, 176) 
He considers environmental mediation to be an inappropriate method of settling such disputes: 
"It can be argued that issues involving principles are best dealt with in more traditional 
political institutions like the courts, administrative agencies, and legislatures. After all, it is 
the purpose of these political institutions to establish and enforce certain societal norms and 
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principles. But by obscuring the principled nature of environmental disputes, environmental 
mediation may divert participants from these institutions that may be more suited to their 
political struggle." (Amy, 1987, 185). 
Although Amy accepts that some environmental mediators recognise that they cannot mediate 
conflicts of principle', he points out that it is not always easy to distinguish between principle 
and interest and that "environmental disputes are often multi-faceted, involving a mixture of 
issues, some negotiable, some not." (Amy, 1987, 190). The limitations of trying to use his three 
categories of dispute as a diagnostic typology were recognised in Chapter 3. 
The Political Context of the Dispute: the issue of power 
The success of ADR depends mainly on the willingness of the parties to enter negotiations and 
this is unlikely to be the case where one party is markedly more powerful than the other'. As 
noted earlier, disputes may be resolved in a variety of ways. Before deciding whether or not to 
negotiate, the parties will make their own assessment of the risks involved, of the likely outcome 
if a solution is imposed by politicians or the courts, and of what the effects of such a decision 
might be on their interests. Amy sees a very limited role for environmental mediation, arguing 
that it assumes a pluralistic view of politics in which power is evenly distributed between the 
interested parties or that some at least of the many sources of power are available to the weaker 
parties. Citing some mediators, again he postulates that mediation is only a viable option when 
power is evenly distributed, when the parties have reached a political stalemate and a state of 
mutual frustration. There may also be the added risk of considerable uncertainty over, say, the 
outcome of legal proceedings. "Only when the politics of power have been exhausted can the 
politics of co-operation become a viable possibility." (Amy, 1987, 92). 
Fisher and Ury (198 1) argue that the only reason for negotiating is to obtain better results than 
can be obtained by other means and that both parties will and should assess the likely outcome 
of the negotiations against their 'Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement' (BATNA). 
Furthermore, they argue: "...the relative negotiating power of two parties depends primarily 
Many mediators do recognise the limits to voluntary negotiation, that beliefs are 
non-negotiable and that legal safeguards are necessary to protect an individual's 
rights, e.g., Lesnick, Tyce, 1992, Pers. Comm s. 
Again a point recognised by many mediators, e.g., Schippers, 1992, Pers. Comm- 
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upon how attractive to each is the option of not reaching agreement" (Fisher and thy, 1981, 
106). In other words: "the better your BATNA, the greater your power". They argue that the 
power of the weaker party increases when they have other options to pursue and that, once they 
realise this, their negotiating position is strengthened. 
From a sociological perspective this approach to rectifying imbalances of power would seem a 
somewhat simplistic view of a fundamental problem. Indeed the major criticisms of ADR arise 
from structural theories on the distribution of power and ADR's inability to effect change when 
confronted by the planning, administrative, legal and political systems which depend on the 
existing power structure of society. 
"Policy making processes are rarely politically neutral - procedures for making decisions 
invariably tend to favour certain kinds of policies and certain kinds of interests" (Amy, 
1987, 12). 
Scimecca (1993) also challenges ADR from a sociological standpoint and identifies its 
limitations as: 
ADR is based on the concept of individual responsibility. Therefore, dispute resolution 
concentrates on improving processes of communication and increasing understanding 
between disputants ("who may understand their opponents only too well"). 
The atheoretical approach of ADR ignores a main source of conflict, the unequal 
distribution of power, which is legitimated in established social institutions, such as the 
planning and legal systems. Thus by backing the status quo, ADR becomes a tool of social 
control. Scimecca considers it significant that ADR concentrates on inter-personal, 
organisational, industrial, and environmental disputes which do not challenge the political 
order5 . 
There are parallels in Britain, as evidenced by the activities within the Mediation 
UK network which are principally within the inter-personal fields of family, 
neighbour, community and criminal-victim disputes. There is some interest but 
little activity in the environmental field. 
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c) The neutrality of the third-party is likely to favour compromise, existing predominant values 
and the status quo. Mediators are unable to change the distribution of power or justice 
which is more properly the role of the political process. 
Furthermore it would seem unlikely that those who have gained power through political struggle 
will voluntarily relinquish it. Amy (1987) had also considered these points, particularly the 
danger that mediation will be used by powerful business interests or the government to co-opt 
environmental groups who lack the resources or the organisation to use the political process. 
Such groups may be disempowered by their lack of technical expertise or financial resources 
and cannot follow other options, such as litigation. In these circumstances, the powerful may 
restrict the political agenda and manage conflicts to their advantage. 
Inherent Characteristics of the Decision -making Proo's 
Amy (1987) suggested that the informality of mediation (when compared to litigation) may 
present inherent difficulties for weaker parties if the safeguards of more formal procedures are 
lacking. However cumbersome, legal procedures are often designed to protect individual rights. 
Apart from being seduced by the cordial atmosphere, weaker parties' inexperience of negotiation 
may leave them vulnerable. He also suggests informal procedures place heavy responsibilities 
on mediators who may set the agenda and reframe issues in possibly manipulative ways that 
could mislead innocent parties. The impracticalities of negotiation within very large groups may 
favour reducing the size of the group, with the effect that only the most powerful are included 
whilst the weak and unorganised are ignored. He concedes that the accountability of the 
representative to the constituent group is a partial safeguard (Amy, 1987). However, most 
mediators are conscious of these pitfalls and attempt to address them in "dispute systems 
design". 
Dispute Systems Design: The Issues of Representation and Accountability 
As mentioned earlier, Ury et al (1988) advocate problem solving negotiations as a preferable 
way of resolving disputes and suggest that decision-making procedures should be purpose-built 
to facilitate negotiation. They set out six basic principles of 'dispute systems design'. 
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Concentrate on matters of direct interest to the parties rather than abstract principles. 
Incorporate procedures that encourage disputants to keep negotiating. 
Provide low-cost legal (rights) and industrial action (power) procedures as fall back 
positions. 
Insist that representatives consult before and report back to their organisations after 
negotiation. 
Arrange procedures in a low-to-high-cost sequence. 
Provide the motivation, skills and resources necessary to make the procedures work 
In the USA, these design principles have been applied to disputes involving state government, 
flimilies, schools and the community, within hospitals and between businesses. Murray (1989) 
writing about schools subject to inter-racial disputes, elaborates on these principles, commenting 
that there is often We agreement in the community about the nature of the underlying problems. 
He found that the representatives of interest groups had to be involved in defining the problems; 
that problems had to be defined broadly so that their scope was correctly determined; that the 
responsible authorities had to be committed to a process controlled by the participants; that the 
process had to be linked to existing decision-making, and that all major interests had to be 
represented. Ertel (1991) suggests the most effective approach is to get agreement from the 
disputing parties on a desired model of decision-making before analysing their problem (see 
Figure 4.3). 
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FIGURE 43:ATTRIBUTES OF AN EFFECTIVE CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROCESS 
- 	Clarifies the underlying interests of participants. 
- Builds a good working relationship. 
- 	Brings forward a range of options for consideration. 
- Is perceived as legitimate. 
- 	Recognises the alternative procedures that are available to the parties. 
- Improves communication. 
- 	Leads to wise commitments. 
Source: Ertel, 1991. 
In practice, this means that any initial discussions have to cover the form the negotiations might 
take and who should be involved. This stage of negotiating about negotiating is often called 
'getting to the table'. The discussions may be assisted by a mediator who makes initial soundings 
of other organisations on their behalf but questions the likelihood of an eventual agreement. The 
mediator's initial assessment of the situation considers the relationships and power balances 
between the interested parties in which it is important to ensure that no powerful interests or 
stakeholders are isolated and ignored. Proposals are presented on the form negotiations might 
take, e.g., whether decision-making is to be a joint responsibility and who is to be represented. 
Thus the issues of recognising and representing interests, the distribution of power between 
them and ground rules for negotiation, including equal access to information, are considered at 
the outset (see, for example, Madigan et a!, 1990; Sidaway, 1993). 
The benefits of using ADR procedures to all parties are summarised in Figure 4.4. 
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FIGURE 4.4: ARGUMENTS FOR PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT IN DECISION-MAKING 
AND PLANNING 
Advantages to Resource Manager/Government Agency 
Resolves conflicts by building consensus. 
Plan/solution is based on a broad set of values, i.e., is not based on the technical/political 
values of the ruling elite. 
Decisions are seen to be legitimate. 
Increases credibility of government agency amongst interest groups. 
Decisions are based on a wider range of information, i.e., interest groups may have 
access to information that was not available to the resource manager. 
Advantages to Interest Groups 
Increases the accountability of the resource manager to the interest groups. 
Interest groups feel they have more control over the process of decision-making and may 
be more willing to accept the risks and trade-offs that result. 
Advantages to both Resource Managers and Interest Groups 
Builds trust between the parties. 
Ownership of the decision is shared between the parties. 
Uncertainty is reduced as different perceptions of risk become apparent to the parties 
who then develop a shared assessment of risk. 
Greater understanding of the interests of the negotiating parties and awareness of their 
procedural alternatives; bargaining positions are recognised as demands and not final 
statements of interest; greater understanding of salience of issues is developed. 
Generates a wider range of preferred options. 
6 Leads to wise commitments. 
Sources: Deffi Priscoli (1980, 1984, 1990); Susskind (1981); Ertel (1991) 
Conclusions of the Review of Participation in Decision-Making 
A number of themes have emerged in this review which concern the nature of the dispute, the 
distinction between conflicts of interest and conflicts of principle, the balance of power between 
interest groups and the processes and procedures of negotiation. 
Although advocates of mediation and other forms of ADR have been accused of following an 
atheoretical approach and ignoring imbalances in power, for their part they claim to have 
adopted a series of principles, based partly on negotiation theory (e.g., Raiffa, 1982) and partly 
on successiful practice, which take into account at least some of these issues. They argue that 
-- 
negotiations which involve all interested parties throughout the major phases of decision-making 
are more likely than other methods to result in agreed policies being implemented successfully. 
These negotiations enable the respective parties to gain greater benefits than are achievable by 
alternative forms of decision-making. The negotiations are more likely to be successfiul if they 
are assisted by a neutral third party. 
The critics of ADR argue that not all conflicts can be resolved by this form of negotiation; that 
while conflicts of interest and misunderstanding may be amenable to this form of intervention, 
conflicts over basic principles or values are not. Furthermore, most environmental conflicts 
contain all three of these elements. It is also argued that the willingness of partners to enter 
negotiations depends on power being evenly distributed between them or the weaker party 
holding a power of veto. Where this balance does not exist, weaker parties should not be 
coerced into negotiating and a neutral mediator is not, or arguably should not be, in a position 
to re-distribute power without compromising his or her neutrality. It has also been suggested 
that the combination of events whereby power is evenly distributed and the competing parties 
are frustrated by a political stalemate is relatively rare, severely limiting the opportunities for 
environmental mediation. 
Nevertheless, it is likely that the adoption of participatory decision-making creates a potential 
climate for conflict resolution as it facilitates contact between resource controllers, landowners, 
land users and authorities; the co-ordination of public sector initiatives; the involvement of 
interested parties; and the implementation of mutually beneficial policies. 
The key elements of participatory decision-making are concerned with ensuring that there is a 
balanced, open process which is seen to be legitimate in the eyes of each of the parties. Public 
involvement in the planning process may be semi-participatory or participatory. In a closed, non-
participatory process there is neither public consultation nor involvement. In a "semi-
participatory" process, policy is developed within an organisation without reference to the 
outside public and it is only when a number of options have been eliminated and a preferred 
proposal agreed that this is subject to consultation. In a fully open participatory process, interest 
groups or a wider public are involved at each successive stage of planning. Legitimacy is gained 
by involving the parties throughout the process, starting in the initial stages of problem 
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definition and analysis, to include the setting of objectives and the consideration of alternative 
strategies. This level of involvement does not necessarily delay the final agreement. 
In summary, for decision-making to be seen as legitimate, balanced. and open: 
- the interested parties must participate directly or decision makers must be accountable; 
- involvement must be early with all parties having a say in the terms of reference and 
agenda; 
- power must be balanced; 	- 
- information must be freely available to all parties. 
These key points form the basis of the following evaluative framework (set out in Figure 4.5) 
in which the principles of participatory decision-making have been re-formulated into a set of 
preconditions which can be used to evaluate whether the outcome of decisions is likely to be 
seen as fair and legitimate in the eyes of all interested parties. 
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FIGURE 4.5: AN EVALUATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION-MAKING 
CRITERIA PRECONDITIONS SOURCES 
Terms of reference Is the agenda balanced to cover the thu Susskind (1981), Ter 
and agenda range of issues or is it constrained by a Haar (1979), and 
pre-emptive policy or proposition made by Murray (1989). 
powerflul interests? 
Representation Is the representation of interests balanced Madigan et. al. (1990) 
at each level of decision-making? and Murray (1989). 
Power in decision- Who holds the power to determine and/or Amy (1987) and 
making and execute decisions, and is power evenly Scimecca (1993). 
accountability balanced between the parties? 
How accountable are the representatives Ertel (1991) 
to their interest groups?  
Information Is information freely available to all Ozawa and Susskind 
interests? (1985), Deli Priscoli 
How objective is the information, i.e. has (1980), Susskind 
it been gathered by independent sources? (1981), and Ertel 
Is the information coverage of issues (1991) 
evenly balanced? 
Openness of and Are all phases of the process open to all Ter Haar (1979), 
involvement in interest groups? Murray (1989) and 
decision-making What is their degree of involvement in Crieghton (1978). 
each phase? 
One method of identifying the degree of participation is to compare representation throughout 
the various stages of decision-making. In Figure 4.6 this form of analysis is shown as an 
evaluation matrix. In this, the representation of levels of government and interest groups is 
shown on one axis while the different phases of planning - from the identification of issues to 
the establishment of policy and its evaluation - are shown on the other. The entries on each axis 
of the matrix can be varied to cover representation in more detail or to consider the composition 
of decision-making bodies instead of the phases in the planning process. 
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FIGURE 4.6: MATRIX OF REPRESENTATION AND INVOLVEMENT 
PHASES OF PARTICIPATION: Who is represented at each stage?  
PLANNING National or State or Local Non- Commercial 
Federal Regional Government government organisations 













ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDIES 
Introduction 
In the remainder of this chapter, the evaluative framework and participation matrix are used to 
analyse a series of Dutch case studies, Planning in the Rhine Delta has been selected to illustrate 
how changes in decision-making procedures at different phases of the development have 
contributed to increasing levels of conflict. As different sections of the estuary have been 
enclosed, so planning has favoured different priorities, initially provision for water recreation on 
the Veeresemeer (which is not included in this analysis), then a balance between water recreation 
and nature conservation in the Grevelingen, and latterly nature conservation in the Oosterschelde 
and the Voordelta. The analysis considers decision-making in the CIrevelingen, the 
Oosterschelde and the Voordelta. The analysis concludes by considering the designation process 
currently used for national parks in the Netherlands to illustrate how consensus can be reached 
and how the commitment of landowners is obtained to the multiple purposes of national parks. 
However this example is not evaluated in a specific locality. 
Outline Description of the Rhine Delta Scheme 
Following the catastrophic floods in 1953, the Dutch government enacted the Delta Plan to 
protect communities in Zeeland and Zuid-Holland. This entailed building a series of dams across 
four of the six tributaries of the Delta, starting with the enclosure of the Veerse Meer which was 
completed in 1961. The chronological order of dam construction in the Deltaand subsequent 
events is set out in Table 4.7, which concentrates on the latest phase of planning in the 
Voordelta. Further information on the events in the Oosterschelde can be found in Annex 3. 
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FIGURE 4.7: SUMARY OFEVENTS IN THE RHINE DELTA 1953-1992 
1953 	Disastrous flooding of 150,000 ha. 72,000 people evacuated, 1,835 lost their lives. 
Establishment of Delta Commission to examine feasibility of closing the estuary by dams and/or raising and 
re-enforcing the sea dikes, which reported in 1955. 	 -. 
1958 	Delta Act 
1961 Enclosure of Veerse Meer by completion of Zandkreek Dam (1960) and Veerse Oat Dam (1961). 
1967 	Zeeland Society of Science conference initiated formal opposition to closure of Oosterschelde. 
1971 Enclosure of Grevelingen with completion of Grevelingen Dam (1965) and Brouwers Dam (1971). 
Enclosure of Haringvliet with completion of Volkerak Dam (1969) and Haringvliet Dam (1971). 
1976 	Agreement to build tidal barrier on the Oosterschelde. 
1982 Publication of policy plan by the Stuurgroep Oosterschelde (Oosterschelde Steering Group). 
1986 	Completion of Oosterschelde barrier, Philips Dam and Oesterdam. 
1988 Dutch Government announced its intention to develop a policy plan for the Voordelta according to the 
Fourth Note on Physical Planning. 
1989 	Minister of Traffic and Public Works invited interested authorities to participate in the Policy Develop- 
ment Group (BOy) responsible for formulating a policy plan for the Voordelta. 
Designation of inter-tidal areas of Oosterschelde as Ramsar reserve. Adoption of the Policy Note Oosterschelde 
as official extension to the Streekplan (Regional Plan) Zeeland. 
1990 	Designation of inter-tidal area of Oosterschelde as (State) Nature Reserve based on the Nature 
Conservation Law. Protest rally by Recreatie Overleg Oosterschelde (Actiongroup of Recreation 
Interests). 
Report on nature development by Bureau Duin en Kust, suggested as a basis for the policy plan for the 
Voordelta by nature conservation directorate of Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries 
(LNV). Recreation inventory and report for the Voordelta prepared by private consultant for the Provisional 
Outdoor Recreation Advisory Council (VAROR). 
1991 	Project Group preparing amendment to Fourth Note on Physical Planning, set out the main policy aims 
for the Voordelta. BOV initiated formal consultation on the Preliminary Policy Plan. Initial reaction 
to Preliminary Policy Plan by the Dutch Federation of Sport Fishing Clubs (NVVS) and Delta Fishing 
Federation agreed with main goals of nature development and the improvement of water quality but 
argued for maintenance of slipways and access to sailing water and fishing grounds. Reaction from 
environmental foundation (Stichting Natuur en Milieu) to Preliminary Policy Plan agreed with nature 
development goals but considered the plan a compromise. Project Group prepared a response to 
consultations which included new proposals to restrict recreational use of the Voordelta. 
4992 Publication of the draft report Evaluation Policy Plan Oosterschelde (Evaluatie Beleidsplan Ooster-
schelde) and approval by the Stuurgroep Oosterschelde. Zoning regulations introduced for the 
Oosterschelde nature reserve. 
Representatives of the recreation and tourism sector met the LNV representative on the BOV asking for the 
reinstatement of the original proposals for the Voordelta and refused to negotiate on amendments. BOV 
approved the amendments suggested by the Project Group whose report on consultation is then published. 
NVVS sent an open letter to the Minister of Traffic and Public Works, LNV and to the Standing Committee on 
Agriculture and Nature Management of the Lower Chamber of Parliament, stressing the importance of sport 
fishing in the coastal zone and complaining about the procedures followed by BOy. 
Informal consultation between Project Group and recreational interest groups. Director of Outdoor Recreation 
of LNV received an evaluation of the proposals by NVVS. This report criticised the consultation procedures. 
BOV decided to accept the amended plan for the Voordelta. NVVS made further representations to the 
Minister of Traffic and Public Works. The Director General of LNV requested the maintenance of a 
channel for fisherman from the Brouwersdam slipway along the coast of Goeree and out to the fishing 
grounds. However, the Executive Commissioner of the Province of Zuid-Holland vetoed LNV's 
proposal and the BOV ratified the amended plan with minor changes. The municipal council of 
Westvoome rejected the plan and withdrew its representatives from BOy. The sports fishing interests 
continued their lobbying with municipal and provincial councils against the plan and sought the co-
operation of other recreation and tourist organisations. 
Sources: Ministry of Transport and Public Works (1989); Provincie Zeeland (1988); Stuurgroep 
Oosterschelde (1992); P. (Masbergen (Ed) (1991); BOW Bulletin, 1992: 2(4); Bosma, 1992; and 
personal interviews by it Sidaway and H van der Voet (1991, 1992) 
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Evaluation of Planning and Management in the Grevelingen 
There have been three phases of planning for the Grevelingen. In the first, in the late- 1960s, it 
was intended that the lake formed by the closure of the estuary would provide a drinking water 
reservoir, which would be crossed by a railway and connected to the Haringvliet by a canal to 
the north. Major reclamation and afforestation was also intended, but that intensive recreation 
provision would be given priority over the creation of relatively small nature reserves. 
When in the mid-1970s, it was realised the major industrial needs for the canal, the railway 
crossing and for drinking water were no longer required, it was decided to concentrate major 
recreation provision near the two dams at each end of the lake. A small island was created for 
recreation, leaving other shoals undisturbed. These priorities were revised during the third 
phase, in the 1980s, when much of the central area was reserved for nature conservation and 
plans to create further islands solely for recreational use were modified. 
Despite an overall change in emphasis from concentrated to dispersed recreation with more 
areas being set aside for nature conservation in the Grevelingen, the approach has been to 
review patterns of recreational use and the risks they might pose to wildlife. In effect, risk asses-
sment has been used to decide, for example, whether it is necessary to close areas in the 
breeding season. There has been a deliberate strategy to create new recreational islands to divert 
popular activities, such as windsurfing, away from sensitive areas. The boundaries of reserve 
areas are considered 'permeable with a degree of tolerance afforded to minor infringements. 
Restrictions on access are only introduced where they are justified and these core areas are 
wardened at critical times. Given the extent of recreational access, it is worth noting that the 
nature reserves within the Grevelingen are approximately the same size as those of the Oostvaar-
derspiassen (a major Dutch nature reserve in Flevoland with restricted access), yet the conserva-
tion status of the two areas is very similar. 
Terms of Reference and Agenda 
Thus the terms of reference for management have not been preempted by taking nature 
conservation as an over-riding objective. This is reflected in the title of the joint management 
cotimittee - 'Natuur en Recreatieschap', the nature and recreation board. Zoning policies have 
been used to segregate activities away from sensitive environments, policy making has been 
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responsive to changing needs and the balance between recreation and conservation adjusted via 
several revisions of the management plan. 
Balance of Representation and Accountability of Interests 
As the Grevelingen forms the boundary between two provinces (Zuid-Holland and Zeeland) the 
need to form a joint management boardwas recognised from the outset. The Board comprises 
representatives from national government and the provinces as well as the ten municipalities and 
the regional water boards, but no non-governmental organisations, either user or other interest 
groups, are directly represented on the Board or its committees. The executive is supported by 
a technical group comprising the Director of the Board, advisors from national agencies, 
together with the representatives from the Provinces of Zeeland and Zuid-Holland. The 
Regional Director of the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries (LNV) for 
Zeeland represents the outdoor recreation interests as well as with the other interests of the 
Ministry. Representation of the Board, its executive committee and the technical group is 
shown in Figure 4.8. 
During the early planning phases, technical expertise was also provided by an independent 
national agency - the Development Authority of the IJssehneer Polders: Rijksdienst IJsselmeer 
Polders (RLJP) which had been responsible for the construction work. Its planning staff were 
able to act as impartial advisors and undertook considerable work on recreation impacts. With 
the abolition of RJJP, that role has now been performed by the Board's Director and his staff 
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FIGURE 4.8: ANALYSIS OF REPRESENTATION - PLANNING AND 
MANAGEMENT IN THE GRE VELINGEN 
PHASES OF PARTICIPATION: Who is represented at each stage?  
PLANNING  National Provincial Local Non- Commercial 
Government Government Government government organisations 
/Agencies  organisations  








LNV Zuid-holland, 10 
Zeeland municipalities 
ation  
Plan review and ECUWE 
revision 




............. .......................i... 	............................ 
Rijkswaterstaat Zuid-holland, 
NBLF, SBB, Zeeland 
RIJP. 
 
Monitoring and RIJP, 
Evaluation [Management 
Board staff]  
Power of Decision-making 
Ultimate power is held by the Management Board and the authorities which provide its financial 
support, but more significantly, detailed management functions have been delegated to the 
Director. He is responsible for both recreation and nature conservation management and he has 
to balance the needs of both interests. The provincial authorities, by their membership of the 
Board, are also able to exercise some influence on the management of the State Forest Service 
nature reserves within the area. 
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Availability. Independence and Coverage of Research and Information 
Research and monitoring work was formerly undertaken by a national agency (RLJP) and its 
findings were freely available to the Board. This information has been regarded as objective as 
it has been gathered independently and information coverage was balanced as the evaluation 
programme is determined by the Board. The need to make a long-term commitment to research 
and monitoring has been recognised and a research plan has been prepared. With the disbanding 
of RJJP, there may be problems in finding this programme now that the Board has to bear the 
full costs of evaluation directly (Lodders 1992, Pers.Comm.). 
Openness of and Involvement in Decision-making 
The recreation and nature conservation-groups were recognised as having legitimate interests, 
in the (irevelingen from the outset. This has resulted in a more open process of planning with 
full consultation so that recreation and conservation issues have not attracted the same level of 
controversy as they have in other parts of the Delta. Although the Board encourages 
involvement of interest groups by holding regular annual meetings for representatives of 
organisations and interested individuals, the interest groups are not directly involved in 
management. They are consulted on the periodic revisions of the management plan and are kept 
informed on management proposals by annual liaison meetings. In summary, decision-making 
is semi-participatory and does not follow the full model of public involvement. 
The evaluation of each aspect of decision-making in the Grevelingen is summarised in Figure 
4.9. 
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FIGURE 4.9: EVALUATION OF DECISION-MAKING - PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT IN THE GREVELINGEN 
CRITERIA PRECONDITIONS ASSESSMENT 
Terms of reference Is the agenda balanced to cover the full There has been a conscious attempt to balance the interests of recreation 
and agenda range of issues or is it constrained by a pre- and nature conservation in the planning and management of the 
emptive policy or proposition made by Grevelingen, despite a change in emphasis from intensive recreation to 
powerful interests? nature conservation. 
Representation Is the representation of interests balanced The Management Board has a broad representation of interests and 
at each level of decision-making? although non-governmental organisations are not directly represented, a 
balance has been achieved by taking impartial technical expertise. 
Power in decision- Who holds the power to determine and/or Ultimate power is held by the Management Board and the authorities 
making and execute decisions, and is power evenly which provide its financial support, but detailed management functions 
accountability balanced between the parties? have been delegated to the Director. 
How accountable are the representatives to 
their interest groups?  
Information Is information freely available to all Research and monitoring work was undertaken independently and the 
interests? findings were freely available to the Board. This information has been 
How objective is the information, i.e. has it regarded as objective and information coverage has been balanced as the 
been gathered by independent sources? evaluation programme is determined by the Board. 
Is the information coverage of issues 
evenly balanced?  
Openness of and Are all phases of the process open to all Participation in planning follows a consultation model although the Board 
involvement in interest groups? encourages some involvement of interest groups by holding regular annual 
decision-making What is their degree of involvement in each meetings for representatives of organisations and interested individuals. 
phase?  
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Evaluation of Planning in the Oosterschelde 
In the second half of the 1960s, as concerns about the environment grew, plans to dam the 
Oosterschelde were opposed by both conservation and commercial fishery interests. Their 
opposition eventually resulted in the construction of a tidal bather which allows tidal flows to 
pass through it so that it is only necessary to close the sluices about two or three times a year 
to prevent storm damage. Construction started on the bather in 1980 and was finished in 1986. 
(For a fill account of the Delta scheme, see Ministry of Transport and Public Works, 1989.) 
The nature conservation opposition to the building of the dams centred on the potential loss of 
inter-tidal habitats which are important to marine life and also to the large populations of 
migratory waders which are dependent on estuaries on the north-western European seaboard, 
notably in Britain, Denmark and the Netherlands. As a result of various reclamation schemes 
and the enclosure of other parts of the Delta, there are now relatively few tidal estuaries in the 
Netherlands. The inter-tidal areas of the Oosterschelde originally covered about 45,000 ha, since 
the building of the barrier, these have been reduced to about 35,000 ha (van Aiphen and 
Hoozemans, 1991). Nevertheless, in 1988 the Oosterschelde was designated as a wetland of 
international importance under the terms of the Ramsar Agreement. 
In September 1977, the Province of Zeeland established a Steering Group for the Oosterschelde 
(Stuurgroep Oosterschelde) whose terms of reference were initially very broad - to formulate 
strategic policy for the development and management of the area. It supervised the preparation 
of a policy plan which was published in 1982 and which was subsequently given legal status by 
the national, provincial and local authorities when they signed a declaration of intent and 
delegated their development control powers to the Steering Group. 
In 1990, the inter-tidal areas of the Oosterschelde and the salt marshes outwith the sea dikes 
were designated as state nature reserves so that permits are required for development, earth 
removal or reclamation; storage or dumping of materials or other acts which may affect water 
quality. Although certain forms of recreation are considered 'acceptable' within the nature 
reserve, a number of restrictions have proved controversial, namely: 
1. the definition and level of acceptable recreational development; 
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the limitation of the number of marinas, berths and moorings within the Oosterschelde; 
the access regulations to the water area and sandbanks which resulted from the nature 
designation procedure; 
the access regulations for the marshes and mudflats which limited bait-digging, because of 
the commercial scale of its operation. and the traditional gathering of sea food by the local 
inhabitants; 
the location and number of slipways for sport fishing. (A filler description of the 
controversy is given in Sidaway and van der Voet, 1993). 
The implementation of the Oosterschelde Policy Note has been evaluated and monitored on an 
annual basis. A more extended evaluation of the policies and revision of the Policy Plan was due 
to take place at the end of the planning period, originally 1990, but was delayed until 1992 to 
allow for ecological monitoring.' 
Terms of Reference and Agenda 
The main objective of the Oosterschelde Policy Plan was: 
"the conservation and if possible enhancement of the existing natural values (of the area), 
taking into account the basic conditions for the satisfactory social functioning of the area, 
in particular in regard to fishing" (Anon., 1989). 
The policy plan went on to establish a hierarchy of objectives with nature conservation as the 
main objective and thus, the agenda has inevitably been constrained with only a limited 
discussion of recreational issues. The priority given to nature was unchallenged during the 
evaluation of the plan (Stuurgroep Oosterschelde, 1992). 
Meanwhile, the focus has switched to nature 'management", that is the conservation of existing 
populations of migratory and breeding birds in the Oosterschelde, to protect the international 
status of the estuary for nature conservation. The plan also aims to develop the wildlife interest, 
particularly to establish a breeding population of seals on sandbanks in the estuary. The 
approach has been to eliminate the risk of disturbance by following the philosophy of the 
6  This was the position when the research was completed in 1992. 
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'precautionary principle'. Thus the terms of reference are not balanced by evaluating risks in 
different areas, as in the Grevelingen, and they demonstrate the primacy given to nature 
conservation. 
Balance of Representation and Accountability of Interests 
The Steering Group is chaired by an elected deputy of the Provincial Council and consists of 
representatives of government departments, the provinces of Zeeland and Noord-Brabant, the 
municipalities surrounding the Oosterschelde and the regional water boards. The membership 
of the Steering Group and its committees are shown in Figure 4.10. Although the Steering 
Group, which is responsible for preparing and implementing the policy plan, has twenty-eight 
members, these are drawn solely from official bodies. Five ministries (LNV; Finance; Housing, 
Physical Planning and Environment; Traffic and Public Works; Economic Affairs) are 
represented by eight officials. There are three representatives from the province of Zeeland and 
one from Noord-Brabant, thirteen representatives from the neighbouring municipalities and three 
from the regional water boards. The executive committee of the Steering Group has only seven 
members, two from the province of Zeeland; two officials from the Ministries LNV and Traffic 
and Public Works, two from the municipalities and one representative from the regional water 
boards. 
However, the Coordinating Committee and Project Group are particularly influential in 
formulating policy and these bodies are dominated by central government officials (ten out of 
twelve members and six out of eight members respectively). Non-governmental organisations 
or interest groups are not represented on these bodies. 
(Ilasbergen's evaluation of several policy plans, including that of the Oosterschelde also draws 
attention to the lack of representation of non-governmental organisations. He suggested that the 
rationale given at the time was that such organisations did not have executive or financial 
responsibilities for large water areas; that representatives would be difficult to select and that 
their conflicting interests would make policy difficult to formulate. However, he also pointed 
out that the omission of these groups led to delays in implementing the scheme and that their 
omission meant that interest groups, local residents and recreational users carried no 
responsibilities for any decisions made during the planning process (Glasbergen, 1991, 124). He 
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also noted that some attempt to get over this problem was made by regular consultation with 
some of the organisations and the holding of evening meetings for users. 
FIGURE 4.10: ANALYSIS OF REPRESENTATION - PLANNING IN THE 
OOSTERSCHELDE 
PHASES OF PARTICIPATION: Who is represented at each stage? 
PLANNING 	 . 
National 	Provincial 	Local 	Non- 	Commercial 
Government Government Government government organisations 
/Agencies 	 organisations 
Initial Planning I Rijkswaterstaat 
Plan 	 - 
LNV, 	Zeeland (6), 	1 member each preparation and 
Evaluation 	Financien, 	
Noord Brabant from 13 




LNV, VW 	I Zeeland (5) 	13 municipalities 





LNV (2) 	Zeeland (2) 
Rijkswaterstaat 
RIJP(2).  
In drawing up the nature reserve regulations, there was no attempt to involve interest groups 
in any formal way, even though the municipalities had advised against the closure of a crucial 
channel to vessels and the Steering Group was divided, on the issue. No separate forum has been 
established to involve or consult the interest groups. However, it has been suggested that 
advisory members should be appointed to the Steering Group to represent each of the three 
sectors: recreational users, fisheries and nature conservation (Stuurgroep Oosterschelde, 1992). 
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Power of Decision-making 
The Regional Director of LNV has limited delegated powers from the Ministry and has to 
balance the conflicting interests of nature, recreation, fisheries and agriculture that are contained 
within his own organisation. Glasbergen comments that this official's possibilities for external 
negotiation, given these terms of reference, are limited (Glasbergen, 1991). 
Evidently, the weaknesses of a non-statutory plan were recognised at the outset, because in 
1983 the participating government bodies within the Steering Group signed a declaration of 
intent undertaking that developments which might damage the Oosterschelde would not be 
implemented without consulting the Steering Group. Generally municipalities resist binding 
agreements of this kind as they wish to protect their freedom to undertake developments which 
will benefit their community. 
Meanwhile the power of the Steering Group has increased. By incorporating the Oosterschelde 
policy plan within its Regional Plan, the province of Zeeland has in effect delegated plinning 
powers to the Steering Group which in effect means its executive board (Glasbergen 1991). 
Following the designation of the State Nature Reserve all development and land use permits 
have to be decided at the national level by LNV. 
Availability Independence and Coverage of Research and Information 
The information coverage of the impacts of various recreational and commercial activities on 
wildlife does not appear to be evenly balanced. Glasbergen comments that the initial policy plan 
was dominated by the conflict between recreation and nature conservation (Glasbergen, 1991). 
When examining the use made of information during the earlier stages of plan preparation, van 
Amstel et al (1988) commented on the role information played in decision-making. They 
concluded that decisions were based as much on political considerations as on the objective use 
of scientific information and that data on impacts were used to legitimate the introduction of 
regulations. 
This emphasis is maintained in the formal evaluation of the original plan. The analysis 
concentrated on increasing recreational pressures and highlights the potential risks of 
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recreational disturbance to birds. However, the seriousness of these effects was contested by 
recreational interests (e.g. Vaessen, 1992, Pers. Comm.) because of the possibly restricting 
effects on their interests, Rightly or wrongly, they questioned the objectivity of such information 
because of the close association, in their eyes, between conservation interests and biological 
scientists, including the most involved Steering Group members and their advisors. However 
the most recent data (1989/90, unpublished) show that the levels of recreational use have 
declined, yet these were not included in the evaluation note. Meanwhile, the effects of 
commercial fishing on food supplies were not evaluated, when it is clearly critical to the 
argument to evaluate the respective contributions of each of these factors to any changes in the 
bird populations and not to concentrate solely on the possible effects of recreational disturbance. 
Openness of and Involvement in Decision-Making 
Glasbergen analyses the preparation of the Oosterschelde policy plan which took place over a 
period of two years. He suggests that the procedures were characterised by an open approach, 
attempting to gain public support for the proposals. 
The consultation took the following form: 
- preliminary report prepared by Steering Group; 
- consultation phase; 
- analysis of responses; 
- publication of a draft consultation report; 
- another consultation phase; 
- final decision on the plan made by the Provincial Council of Zeeland on the recommendation 
of the Steering Group following the analysis of the second consultation. 
However, using the criteria established for this analysis, the procedures would be judged to be 
semi-participatory. The consultations in the preparation of the Evaluation Plan have been more 
limited. The Steering Group approved the Evaluation Note and the revision of the draft plan in 
a plenary session in June 1992. The report was written by officers of the Rijkswaterstaat, NBLF 
and the Province of Zeeland. 
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The access regulations on bait digging on the Oosterschelde have been handled in a different 
way. Many traditional areas used by bait diggers were to have been closed under the nature 
reserve regulations, Following an initiative by the sport fishing organisations, a working group 
was established to advise the LNV on the supply of fishing bait and the access regulations. Both 
sport fishing organisations and nature conservation officers are represented on the working 
group, which has devised acceptable arrangements for bait digging. 
The evaluation of Policy Planning and its Implementation in the Oosterschelde is summarised 
in Figure 4.11. 
122 
FIGURE 4.11: EVALUATION OF DECISION-MAKING - PLANNING IN THE OOSTERSCHELDE 
CRITERIA PRECONDITIONS ASSESSMENT 
Terms of reference Is the agenda balanced to cover the fill The terms of reference and agenda for policy development in the 
and agenda range of issues or is it constrained by a pre- Oosterschelde have been constrained by the decision to give nature 
emptive policy or proposition made by conservation primacy in the area. 
powerful interests? 
Representation Is the representation of interests balanced Representation within the Steering Group has been confined to 
at each level of decision-making? government organisations, to the exclusion of non-governmental and 
voluntary bodies. 
Power in decision- Who holds the power to determine and/or With increasing power being delegated to the Steering Group, 
making and execute decisions, and is power evenly accountability has been reduced. 
accountability balanced between the parties? 
How accountable are the representatives to 
their interest groups?  
Information Is information freely available to all Availability of information has been limited by restricted representation. 
interests? The information on which the recent evaluation has been based has been 
How objective is the information, i.e. has it gathered by scientific experts who have closer links with conservation 
been gathered by independent sources? interests and has not been seen to as objective by recreation interests. 
Is the information coverage of issues Considerable prominence has been given to the conflicts between 
evenly balanced? recreation and nature conservation, far less to considering the impacts of 
commercial fishing in the estuary. 
Openness of and Are all phases of the process open to all Public consultation in the policy development process has been limited to 
involvement in interest groups? 	 . the later stages of planning and does not conform to the model of full 
decision-making What is their degree of involvement in each public involvement. 
phase?  
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Evaluation of Planning in the Voordelta 
Between 1971 and 1986, three major estuaries in the Rhine Delta were closed as part of the 
flood protection schemes of the Delta Project. This has transformed an area of about 900 km 2 
of the seabed off the coast of Zeeland and Zuid-Holland as the former tidal channels have silted 
and inter-tidal shoals, mudflats and marshes have developed. Water conditions range from salty 
to brackish or fresh in the dunes and associated inland waters, while international measures to 
improve the water quality of the River Rhine aim to achieve a 30-50 per cent reduction of 
contaminants and nutrients. Not only is the Voordeka an increasingly important area for wildlife 
(the populations of eight breeding and overwintering bird species meet the criteria which make 
the area eligible for designation as a Wetland of International Importance under the Ramsar 
Convention), its shoals are also important breeding areas for fish (sole, plaice and herring). Off-
shore fishing has long been an important economic activity for the inhabitants of Zeeland. In 
1991 the commercial value of landings was estimated at about 135 million Dfl. per year and the 
fisheries employed about 700 jobs (van Aiphen and Hoozemans, 1991, 7). However, the area 
has the potential to maintain a stable seal population which disappeared from the Delta because 
of intensive fishing and water pollution. 
As roads were built along the dams, travel times to the Randstad and Ruhr conurbations reduced 
dramatically. The previously isolated islands and small towns of Zeeland became highly 
accessible for mass recreation and tourism. The gentle slopes of the dams provide an ideal 
venue for water sports so that the Brouwersdam, in particular, is extremely popular with swim-
mers, picnickers and windsurfers who can alternate between the waters of the Voordelta and the 
Grevelingen, according to the weather. The day visitor catchment for the area extends well 
beyond the Netherlands, into Belgium and Germany. The tourism industry in Zeeland developed 
rapidly, particularly at the beach resorts of Schouwen, Noord-Beveland and Waicheren. The 
ten municipalities in the Delta can accommodate about 150,000 bed-spaces (about 10 million 
nights per year), compared to an estimated 20 million day trips each year. Recreation and 
tourism spending were estimated at 920 million Dft annually with about 7,600 people employed 
in the sector (van Alphen and Hoozemans, 1991, 7). 
Given the unique morphological development off-shore and the conflicting claims of nature 
conservation, fisheries, recreation and tourism, the Dutch government initiated an integrated 
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planning project for the Voordelta in 1988. In the following year, the national water agency 
(Rijkswaterstaat) invited other national government departments, the provincial and municipal 
authorities to participate in a steering group - Bestuurlijk Overleg Voordelta (BOy). It was 
charged with the task of drawing up the policy plan for the Delta. The initial stages of the work 
prepared an information base for the area, and the subsequent stages of this process are listed 
in Figure 4.7. 
While the initial plan was thought to sati* the conflicting objectives of nature development, 
commercial fishing and tourism (van Aiphen and Hoozemans, 1991), increasing restrictions on 
access for water sports and sport fishing, justified in the interests of safeguarding larger areas 
for nature development, have proved to be particularly controversial 
Terms of Reference and Agenda 
Initially there was a deliberate attempt to balance the objectives of the plan. 
"The objective of the integrated policy analyses (IPA) "Voordelta" is to generate a series 
of policy measures in a framework of four policy options (Nature, Fisheries, Recreation and 
Preferred) in order to find an optimal balance in the natural and socio-economic 
development of the plan area." (van Aiphen and Hoozemans, 1991, 3). 
The plan had to be set in the context of national policies, such as the 'Ecological Main Structure' 
and the so-called 'green policy areas of the Fourth Note on Physical Planning, which seek to 
give higher priority to conservation at the expense of recreation and commercial uses. 
Nevertheless the recreation and tourism interests agreed in general with the main thrust of these 
national policies. It was exactly how these policies were to be implemented that became 
controversial in the relations between recreation and nature conservation interests. 
Planning was undertaken in two main stages. The proposals in the preliminary plan achieved a 
compromise between the interests of nature, fisheries and recreation. This was the Preferred 
Policy Option described by van Aiphen and Hoozemans (199 1) and was based on the following 
principles: 
"It meets the aim of the policy plan, Le., conservation of the natural development of the 
Voordelta; 
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"With these constraints, recreation and fisheries may develop as much as possible by 
incorporation of non-conflicting stimulating measures in the Preferred Policy Option and 
by minimising potential conflicts by a zonation scheme; 
"Investments are limited as much as possible in order to keep future developments open " . 
(Van Aiphen and Hoozemans, 1991, 10). 
They went on to describe how the Preferred Policy Option satisfied each of these main aims by 
the creation of large nature reserves, the protection of new beach and dune developments and 
protecting the food supplies of and water quality for wildlife. Present levels of tourism would 
be stabilised and the quality of recreational services would be increased. Some new 
developments were to be provided where they would not have an adverse impact on nature 
interests. Similarly the proposals for commercial fisheries aimed to stabilise the resource and 
limit the number of vessels operating in the area to the present levels. Other policy options, 
which each gave priority to a particular interest, were also considered at this stage. The 
alternative options were then evaluated against the Preferred Policy Option with the conclusion 
that: 
"The Preferred Policy Option is able to conserve nature interests while recreation and 
fisheries activities may be further developed locally. This is achieved by a scheme of 
zonation in space and time based on our policy analysis" (van Aiphen and Hoozemans, 
1991, 14). 
Thus at this stage, the recreation interests appeared to be reasonably satisfied. The Provisional 
Advisory Council for Outdoor Recreation (VAROR) had commissioned its own report and 
compared its results with the official plans. There was little difference between the two at that 
stage (Vaessen, 1992, Pers. Comm.) and this was confirmed by Van Alphen (1992, Pers. 
Comm.). 
At the'next planning stage, the Draft Policy Plan of May 1992, the goals and objectives were 
unchanged from the Preliminary Policy Plan of August 1991. What had changed were the 
detailed proposals put forward by the Project Group, with greater restrictions on recreational 
access and more limited proposals for recreation development. Although Van Aiphen had stated 
that the Preferred Policy Option achieved the nature conservation goals according to the 
objective criteria set out in a published paper (Van Aiphen and Hoozemans, 1991, 12), he 
subsequently stated that the reason for the changes was that the nature conservation objectives 
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had not been met (Van Alphen, 1992, Pers. Comm.). One possible conclusion is that during the 
'balancing' of interests higher priority was given to national nature policies reflecting the 
respective power of that lobby (Sidaway and van der Voet, 1993). 
pnr 
Policy development in the Voordelta has been undertaken by three groups of officials. The thirty 
member policy development group (BOV) is chaired by the Director of the North Sea 
Directorate of Rgkswaterstaat and this department also provides the secretariat and six other 
members of this group. Three other Ministries are represented, together with two executive 
deputies of the provinces of South Holland and Zeeland while the remaining members are from 
the municipalities or local boards (recreatieschappen and waterschappen). Figure 4.12 sets out 
the membership of the various groups and it is important to note that there are no non-govern-
mental organisations represented. The policy development group is advised by an executive 
committee (Ambtelijk Overleg Voordelta) of twelve officers drawn from the Ministries and 
including a staff member from each of the provinces. However, the key role is undertaken by the 
project group (Projectgroep Voordelta) of nine members, mainly from Rijkswaterstaat who 
undertake the detailed planning. Although the formal responsibilities for planning have been 
entrusted to the policy development group, it meets only once a year, with the effective 
decisions being taken by the executive committee. 
Vaessen (1992, Pers. Comm.) described the discussions within the Provincial Bureau of 
Recreation and the tourist organisations at the provincial level and how the Bureau initiated 
meetings with the respective officials of the municipalities. In the first stage of the policy 
development process, the Bureau was very involved. But this involvement ceased when the 
VAROR took the initiative in preparing a recreation strategy for the Voordelta. Vaessen 
considered that the VAROR study led to polarisation of interests. For as each sector planned 
and pursued its own interests, their involvement on integrated planning was reduced to formal 
consultation on the draft plan. 
127 
FIGURE 4.12: ANALYSIS OF REPRESENTATION - PLANNING IN THE 
VOORDELTA 
PHASES OF PARTICIPATION: Who is represented at each stage? 
PLANNING  National 	Provincial 	Local 	Non- 	Commercial 
Government Government Government government organisations 
/Agencies 	 organisations 
Initial Planning Verker and 
Waterstaat 
(VW) 
Policy 	VW (2), LNV, Zuid Holland, 	1 member each 
development 	VROM, EZ, 	Zeeland, 	from 11 
and approval Rijkswaterstaat Oosterschelde 	municipalities 
Steering Group. 
Coordination 	LNV, VROM, Zuid Holland, 
EZ. 	 Zeeland. 
Rijkswaterstaat 
(9). 
Plan 	 LNV, EZ. 	Zuid Holland, 
preparation 	Rijkswaterstaat Zeeland. 
 
Power of Decision-Making 
The reaction of the policy development group (BOV) to concerted lobbying provided a measure 
of the power and influence of the respective lobbies. In December 1991, the Project Group had 
reformulated their proposals following consultations on the Preliminary Policy Plan. More areas 
were given over to nature while recreational access was decreased considerably. Despite 
representations from the recreation and tourism sector, the policy development group decided 
to publish the report of consultations which included increased restrictions. 
The draft plan agreed by the policy development group in November 1992 did not implement 
all of the restrictions proposed by the project group and the designation of an off-shore nature 
reserve was delayed. However, the sport fishing organisations were still dissatisfied with the 
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plan, particularly the proposals to restrict access to the coast of Goeree and in January 1993 
were continuing to lobby the municipal and provincial councils. Meanwhile, a policy agreement 
had been drawn up for signature by the participating authorities which would have made the plan 
binding upon them." 
All in all, the policy development group appeared to have been unaffected by lobbying from 
recreation and tourism interests and increasingly sympathetic to nature conservation. The 
preliminary plan had been criticised by Stichting Natuur en Milieu in 1991 as a compromise 
which gave too much attention to fisheries and recreation and which fragmented the nature area. 
These arguments appear to have persuaded the Project Group to its viewpoint, although it 
appears that the Executive Committee was particularly influential in changing the emphasis of 
the plan (Den Bakker, 1992, Pers.Comm.). Recreational interests felt that the Directorate of 
Outdoor Recreation within LNV was unable to get the recreational case accepted within the 
Ministry, particularly by its Provincial Director. 
Availability. Independence and Coverage of Research and Information 
Separate reports on the Voordelta were prepared for the nature conservation and recreation 
interests. But while a conservation report, prepared in January 1990 by the Dune Foundation, 
was used effectively by the Nature Management Directorate of LNV, the influence of a 
recreation study was very limited as the results only became available when the draft policy plan 
was being completed. Information on recreational impacts, particularly disturbance to birds and 
seals, has been the subject of much controversy. The objectivity of research and the 
interpretation of its findings has constantly been challenged. 
Openness of and Involvement in Decision-Making 
The decision not to include non-governmental organisations in the policy development group 
was a deliberate one as it was decided to rely on consultation to obtain their views. Consultation 
took place, with the publication of the Preliminary Policy Plan, and the assessment of the project 
team to responses was published in the form of proposed amendments to be incorporated in the 
draft plan. The proposed amendments were also subject to representations from the various 
This was the position when this research was completed in December, 1992. 
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interest groups. Thus, public participation followed the semi-participatory 'consultation' model 
rather than the full public involvement with organisations having to rely on intense lobbying 
rather than direct involvement in the planning process. The process was certainly not seen as 
an open one by the recreation interests who felt that further discussions should have been held 
before the project group made significant reductions in recreational access in the face of pressure 
from nature conservation interests. 
The evaluation of planning in the Voordelta is summarised in Figure 4.13. 
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FIGURE 4.13: EVALUATION OF DECISION-MAKING - PLANNING IN THE VOORDELTA 
CRITERIA PRECONDITIONS ASSESSMENT 
Terms of reference Is the agenda balanced to cover the full Initially a technical appraisal suggested a Preferred Policy Option which 
and agenda range of issues or is it constrained by a pre- achieved nature conservation, recreation and fisheries goals. But this 
emptive policy or proposition made by option was abandoned and the balance has swung heavily in favour of 
powerful interests? nature development drastically reducing the areas available for water 
sports and the possibilities for future recreational development. 
Representation Is the representation of interests balanced The key decision-making groups consist of government officials and non- 
at each level of decision-making? governmental organisations are not represented. 
Power in decision- Who holds the power to determine and/or The policy development group appeared to have been unaffected by 
making and execute decisions, and is power evenly lobbying from recreation and tourism interests and increasingly 
accountability balanced between the parties? sympathetic to nature conservation. Recreational interests felt that the 
How accountable are the representatives to directorate of outdoor recreation within LNV was unable to get the 
their interest groups? recreational case accepted by its Provincial Director. 
Information Is information freely available to all Separate reports were prepared for the nature conservation and recreation 
interests? interests. But the former has been more influential as the results of a 
How objective is the information, i.e. has it recreation study only became available as the draft policy plan was being 
been gathered by independent sources? completed. Information on recreational impacts has been the subject of 
Is the information coverage of issues much controversy. The objectivity of research and the interpretation of its 
evenly balanced? findings has constantly been challenged. 
Openness of and Are all phases of the process open to all Public participation followed the 'consultation' rather than the 'public 
involvement in interest groups? involvement' model with organisations having to rely on intense lobbying 
decision-making What is their degree of involvement in each rather than direct involvement in the planning process. 
phase? I 
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Evaluation of Decision-Making in the Designation of National Parks in the Netherlands 
Outline Description 
The former Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Welfare was made responsible for 
designating protected areas and selected 21 areas as potential national parks in 1975. These 
responsibilities are now held by the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries 
(LNV). In the current programme three national parks have reached the stage of final 
designation, five are in the preparatory stage and two in the initial advisory stage. The 
designation of national parks is one of the crucial instruments to implement the national nature 
development initiative. 
Large parts of the areas selected for designation are already protected by other designations or 
are controlled and managed partially or totally by government authorities, such as the national 
forest and landscape service (Staatsbosbeheer - SBB), or private nature conservation 
organisations such as Natuurmonumenten and the provincial conservation organisations (e.g., 
Provinciale Landschappen). 
Terms of Reference and Agenda 
The criteria for selecting potential areas for designation as national parks in the Netherlands are 
that: 
the habitats are examples of characteristic ecosystems and will form core areas of the 
national ecological infrastructure; 
the area is largely in state ownership or owned by non-government conservation 
organisations (although small areas of private landholding can be included); and 
there is local political support for the proposal and the local authorities (province and 
municipalities) will willingly co-operate with the scheme. 
The national parks have multiple aims primarily concerned with the conservation of nature, but 
also including environmental education and informal'nature-oriented' recreation. Thus national 
parks in the Netherlands have a range of objectives with a degree of balance between them, 
although nature conservation is given priority. 
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Designation of national parks is supervised by a standing commission - the Voorlopige 
Commisste Nationale Parken (VCNP) - which is an independent advisory body reporting to the 
secretary of state (Staatssecretaris) of LNV. The Commission's advice is not binding on the 
minister. The members of VCNP are either experts or members of nature conservation 
organisations or recreational interests drawn from different levels of government. The relevant 
Mlnistiiés are represented by advisory members. The commission has an independent chair and 
a small secretariat within LNV. Its membership is balanced to include representatives from 
ministries and agencies of national government, provinces and municipalities, together with 
nature and recreation non-government organisations (see Figure 4.14). 
FIGURE 4.14: ANALYSIS OF REPRESENTATION: DESIGNATION OF 
DUTCH NATIONAL PARKS 
PHASES OF 	PARTICIPATION: Who is represented at each stage? 
PLANNING National 	Provincial 	Local 	Non-government 
Government I Government t Government I organisations 
Initiative 	 SBB (3 members 1 member from 	3 members from Natuurmonumenten 
and 1 advisor), 	provinces 	municipalities 	(NM), Stitchting 
Advisors from Recreatie, academic 
LNV, VROM 	 ecologist 
(2), NBLF. 
Preparation of Draft LNV, NBLF, 	1 member from 	Members from 	NM, other landowners 
Management plan 	SBB. 	 province 	municipalities, and managers 
water and 
recreation boards 
Policy Decision 	I LNV, 
Implementation 	 NM, other landowners 
and managers 
WORKING GROUPS may be established involving interest groups, e.g., 
Recreational users in the Biesbosch. 
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Once a park has moved to the Preparatory Phase of designation (see Figure 4.15), a local 
management committee (Overlegorgaan) is formed. This committee has representatives of the 
province, municipalities and the local or regional recreation and water boards, together with 
representatives of landowners and managers, such as nature organisations and frmers, as well 
as representatives of the local community. The national ministries are represented by the regional 
officer of the National Nature Management Agency (NBLF) and the provincial director of 
LNV. It is chaired by an independent person. Thus some effort is made to ensure that all the 
relevant local interests are represented as well as government officials. 
Power of Decision-making 
The overall responsibilities and autonomy of the participating land managing agencies are 
unaffected by designation. However, their management is considerably influenced by their 
participation in the preparation of an integrated management plan, and the formal agreement 
which they are required to sign to ensure that they comply with the plan. The main advantage 
to participating landowners is that they are then eligible for additional government finance for 
recreation management and the provision of education and information services. 
The organisational structure of each national park is tailored to meet the local situation. The 
management committee may decide to establish sub-committees and ad hoc working parties. For 
example, the Loonse en Drunense Duinen National Park has an executive committee which has 
set up special working groups on recreation, education and agriculture. In the Biesbosch 
National Park, a special committee of recreational user groups has been formed. 
Availability. Independence and Coverage of Research and Information 
A significant feature of the designation process, particularly the early stages, is the extensive 
public consultation on the suitability of the area for designation and the willingness of the parties 
to participate in national park management. The consultation process includes the publication 
of an information bulletin for every household within the potential designated area or living in 
the immediate neighbourhood. Thus information is freely circulated among interested parties. 
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Openness of and Involvement in Decision-Making 
The extent of the consultation under this open process of decision-making is shown in Figure 
4.15. In the initial. advisory phase, VCNP sounds local opinion on the acceptability of 
designation by a process of increasingly formal consultations. As well as local meetings of 
interested parties, information is circulated to local households in at least two stages of 
exploratory discussions. The process of decision-making closely follows the open participatory 
model described above. 
Not only is there an attempt to balance the representation of interests of nature conservation and 
recreation organisations on the committee responsible for designation (VCNP) but there is also 
a strenuous attempt to involve all the relevant local interests in the local management board 
and/or its sub-committees and working parties. 
The evaluation of decision-making in Dutch national parks is summarised in Figure 4.16 
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FIGURE 4.15 THE PROCESS OF DESIGNATION FOR DUTCH NATIONAL PARKS 
INITIAL ADVISORY PHASE 
	
I PHASE I 	 SELECTION OF AREA BY VCNP 
Sounding of local opinion 
Public 	involvnait 	 Initial Meeting 
Infin.ic Bulletin to local households 
PHASE 2 	 PRELIMINARY DECISION ON DESIGNATION BY VCNP 
Consultations 
Public involvanant 	Review of advice 
Cais*iltious 
Infcirmatiai Buildin to local households 
PHASE 3 	 DECISION BY STAATSSECRETARIS LNV ON 
COMPOSITION OF OVERLEGORGAAN AND 
FEASIBILITY OF DESIGNATION 
PREPARATORY PHASE 
PHASE 4 	 DECISION BY STAATSSECRETARIS LNV 
ON OBJECTIVES 
FORMATION OF OVERLEGORGAAN 
PHASE 5 	 PREPARATION OF MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN BY 
OVERLEGORGAAN 
Review of plan by VCNP 
Advice to STAATSSECRETARIS 
Public mvolvnest Consultation 
PHASE 6 FORMAL AGREEMENT, cunmithng landowners and local authorities to plan 
PHASE 7 DECISION BY STAATSSECRETARIS LNV ON PLAN AND FINANCIAL 
PROGRAMME 
PHASES FORMAL DESIGNATION 
MANAGEMENT PHASE 
PHASE 9 FORMATION OF LOCAL MANAGEMENT COMMITEE (Ovlegorgaan) 
Membership drawn from govanmest and local interests 
Public involvouiuit Standing sub-committees or ad-hoc working groups including local or specialist  
interests 
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FIGURE 4.16: EVALUATION OF DECISION-MAKING - DESIGNATION OF DUTCH NATIONAL PARKS 
CRITERIA PRECONDITIONS ASSESSMENT 
Terms of reference Is the agenda balanced to cover the full The criteria for selecting national parks reflect the multiple aims starting 
and agenda range of issues or is it constrained by a pre- with the conservation of nature but including environmental education and 
emptive policy or proposition made by recreation. Thus the range of objectives is balanced, although nature 
powerful interests? conservation is given priority. 
Representation Is the representation of interests balanced The advisory board responsible for designation includes all levels of 
at each level of decision-making? government, and a range of non-government organisations. This broad 
representation is found in the local management committee for each park. 
Power in decision- Who holds the power to determine and/or The management of participating owners is influenced by the park 
making and execute decisions, and is power evenly management plan prepared in consultation with local committees and ad- 
accountability balanced between the parties? hoc working parties. Land managers are required to sign a formal 
How accountable are the representatives to agreement to obtain the full financial benefits from designation. 
their interest groups? 
Information Is information freely available to all During the extensive consultations prior to designation, information is 
interests? widely circulated among interested parties and local householders. 
How objective is the information, i.e. has it 
been gathered by independent sources? 
Is the information coverage of issues 
evenly balanced? 
Openness of and Are all phases of the process open to all Extensive consultation begins before a decision in principle is taken about 
involvement in interest groups? designation and continues at each subsequent stage. There is a strenuous 
decision-making What is their degree of involvement in each attempt to involve all local interests in the, management board and/or its 
phase? committees and working parties 	 - 
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I FIGURE 4.17: SUMMARY EVALUATION OF DUTCH CASE STUDIES 	 I 








I Terms of Reference I Balanced Balance sought 
between objectives 
despite increasing 
emphasis on nature 
conservation 
Nature conservation 
given primacy over 
most other uses 
Balanced goals 
changed in favour of 
nature development 
Multiple aims, with 
priority given to 
nature conservation 
Representation Balanced Range of interests Representation Representation Broad representation 
Direct involvement but no non- restricted to officials restricted to officials and direct 
government involvement at all 
representatives levels 
Power Dispersed Held by Management Held by Executive of Held by Executive of Dispersed between 









early involvement of 
interests 









Undue emphasis on 
recreation impacts 





Balance sought by 
separate research 






from early stages 
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CONCLUSIONS 
This Chapter has examined Hypothesis 3: 
That the factors which lead to the resolution of conflicts between conservation and 
recreation by negotiation may be identified and used to assess the likelihood of resolution 
being achieved by consensus. 
The Hypothesis was considered by reviewing the literature of participation in decision-making 
and alternative dispute resolution and identifying a set of factors that were likely to lead to 
conflict resolution by negotiation. These factors were set out in the form of an "evaluative 
framework of decision-making". A series of Dutch Case studies were then evaluated to assess 
the likelihood of achieving stable decisions by the development of consensus. 
The summary evaluations of the four case studies have been brought together in Figure 4.17. 
This demonstrates that decision-making in the (urevelingen and in the designation of Dutch 
national parks had many of the characteristics of the 'ideal type' represented by the evaluative 
framework. In both of these examples there was a deliberate attempt to balance objectives so 
that while nature conservation was given priority this was not at the expense of all other social 
needs. Representation of interests was broad, although non-government organisations and local 
interests were not directly represented in the Management Board of the (3revelingen. 
Nevertheless, there was some sharing of power, all interested parties were given access to 
information, which had been objectively gathered and was balanced in its coverage. 
The Dutch National Parks in particular have given great emphasis to interest group involvement 
in the early stages of decision-making. Successive rounds of consultation explain and clarify the 
implications of national park designation and are designed to secure the commitment of interest 
groups to national park objectives. But public participation also informs local households as well 
as the relevant interest groups, and the latter are subsequently involved in park management by 
their membership of specialist working parties. However the fact that consensus and balance 
have been maintained in the (irevelingen, where public involvement has not been so 
systematically developed, suggests that the RIJP initially (and the Board's staff latterly) have 
played a crucial, neutral facilitating role. 
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Decision-making in the Oosterschelde and the Voordelta showed a marked contrast to that in 
the Grevelingen. The goals of nature conservation and nature development goals have been 
given primacy at the expense of other interests. During the period of study, power was 
concentrated in the hands of relatively few national government officials. By excluding non-
governmental and voluntary organisations from key decision-making bodies, their influence 
could only be felt by effective lobbying. Information was gathered selectively and may not be 
publicly available. But it was the consultation procedures that were most open to question, 
public participation being delayed into the late stages of planning and then largely ignored. Thus 
while there is general support for the broad aims of conservation, the detailed proposals for 
implementation attracted public criticism and controversy. This analysis has demonstraied that 
relatively subtle changes in decision-making during different phases of the Delta scheme, albeit 
aimed at implementing national policy, have led to increasing conflict as the goal of balancing 
rival claims between recreation and conservation was abandoned. 
Thus Hypothesis 3 is confirmed in that it has proved possible to identify the factors which lead 
to conflict prevention (via planning) and resolution. The Evaluative Framework also adds an 
important dimension to the analysis of decision-making and should provide a useful analytical 
tool. The case study analyses suggest that participation in balanced open processes is likely to 
lead to consensus, stability and resolution, but they also suggest that balanced processes may 
be disrupted by changes in the balance of power. However, the creation of the conditions 
required to achieve consensus appears to rely on the presence of a benevolent political or 
institutional context, as occurred in the Grevelingen and the Dutch National Parks. The 
processes which condition the distribution of power were described in Chapter 3. It now 
remains to be seen if the two analyses can be combined to provide a fuller explanation of the 
institutions of conflict and conflict resolution. That is the subject of the next chapter. 
140 
CHAFFER 5: A REVIEW OF SOCIAL CONFLICT AND DECISION-MAKING 
The previous chapter contrasted participatory and non-participatory decision-making and the 
extent to which the former leads to consensus. This chapter considers whether this more detailed 
examination of decision-making can be used to extend the analysis of the dynamic processes of 
conflict, developed in chapter 3, and more particularly to predict the outcome of a conflict 
episode. More formally stated the Chapter considers: 
Hypothesis 4 
That a combined analysis of the processes of social conflict and participative decision-
making increases the likelihood of predicting the outcomes of conflicts between 
conservation and recreation. 
THE PROBLEMS OF PREDICTION - THE PARADOX OF POWER AND THE 
INFLUENCE OF DECISION-MAKING 
In Chapter 3, a dynamic framework was used to set out in schematic form the inter-relationships 
between the competing parties. This helped to explain why groups acted and responded as they 
did to the action of others during a conflict episode. The analysis clarified the nature of the 
conflicts under consideration which is intrinsically about attempts to control the social structure 
of access and to maintain or improve the social position of individual competing parties. The 
tactics of the competing parties, the balance of power between them and the form of decision-
making was seen to influence the outcome of the episode. 
Identifying and measuring changes in the balance of power between the parties appears to be the 
key to prediction and herein lies what Coser (1956) calls the 'paradox of power'. He examines 
the proposition that conflict establishes and maintains the balance of power. 
"The paradox derives from the fact that conflicts, as distinct from other forms of 
interaction, always involve power and that it is difficult to appraise the relative power 
of the contenders before a conflict has settled the issue." 
"However, it would seem that without actual exercise [of power], only some types of 
power can be measured with any degree of accuracy." (Coser, 1956, 134-5) 
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He .gives, as an example, financial power which may be measurable in terms of money, but 
concludes by reformulating the proposition in the following way: 
"Conflict consists in a test of power between antagonistic parties. Accommodation 
between them is possible only if each is aware of the relative strength of both parties. 
However, paradoxical as it may seem, such knowledge can most frequently be attained 
only through conflict, since other mechanisms for testing the respective strength of 
antagonists maybe unavailable." ( Coser, 1956, 135). 
The analysis in Chapter 3 suggested that ideology may be used to advance arguments of 
principle and thus to improve the legitimacy and social standing of interest groups, since 
legitimacy is the key to increased power. Political organisation and lobbying in the corridors of 
power are of critical importance to interest groups in their attempts to influence the balance of 
power in their favour. Thus ideology is not sufficient in itsell it is the combination of 
ideological cohesiveness within a 'close knit' group (in Coser's terms) and the group's political 
organisation that makes a highly politicised and politically effective force. To further increase 
their power, such groups may build coalitions with other interest groups or may seek national 
affiliations. 
This suggests the possibility that politicisation and group cohesion might be used as proxy 
measures for power in an attempt to predict the outcome of a conflict episode. 
Coser's (1956) theories of the social function of conflict also suggest how social institutions 
develop to deal with change, once again legitimacy is a key concept of this theory. If conflicts 
are to be contained within the system rather than directed at its overthrow, the decisions these 
institutions make are only accepted within society when they are seen to be legitimate. His 
analysis also suggested that it is the 'rigidity or 'flexibility' of decision-making structures which 
influences the outcome of a dispute. That is: 
- within a rigid social structure, established groups exercise power to maintain the status 
quo. Power is only transferred to a challenging group after a 'power struggle. 
- within a flexible social structure, the outcome of a power struggle might be a 
concession by established groups following negotiations which could also produce a new 
order based 
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on consensus - a degree of power sharing. 
But as 'rigidity' and 'flexibility were identified by Coser in relation to the total system of 
decision-making in society, these concepts are not easily related to the type of decision-making 
institutions under consideration, and there is a need to re-examine them in the light of the more 
detailed discussion of decision-making in Chapter 4. 
In Chapter 4, it was suggested that criteria taken from theories about participatory decision-
making can be used to evaluate the social institutions of decision-making and the conditions in 
which legitimacy is gained. The criteria of balance and openness in decision-making, as set out 
in that chapter, were used to contrast participation and non-participation at various stages of 
planning in the Rhine Delta. This revealed that changes in the form of decision-making lead to 
changes in outcome and/or both of these followed from a re-distribution in the balance of power 
within government agencies. 
Amy's (1987) critique of environmental mediation (and implicitly participatory decision-making) 
suggests that competing interest groups will only negotiate willingly when power is evenly 
balanced between them. Yet ironically, this may only occur when the groups are politicised and 
demonstrating their strength. Thus political struggle might be a response to an adversarial 
system of decision-making. 
With these factors in mind the principal case studies' are now re-examined to see what they 
reveal about: 
- politicisation and group cohesion - as measured by the role of ideology in maintaining 
close knit groups - and their relationship to the balance of power; and 
- flexible and rigid decision-making - reinterpreted as participatory and non-participatory 
decision-making procedures - and the extent to which balance and openness are 
deliberately sought. 
There was insufficient information on politicisation and decision-making within 
the North West Montana and Northern Woods, Maine case studies to include 
them in this analysis. 
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A REVIEW OF THE CASE STUDIES 
The Pentland Hills Regional Park 
In terms of the characteristics set out in the consensus building model of Chapter 4, the 
institutional decision-making of the Regional Council has followed a "semi-participatory" form. 
The Regional Council focused the agenda with pre-emptive policies, representation of interests 
was unbalanced (for example active recreation organisations have been excluded in the recent 
phases), and there has been uncertainty about policy implementation, with limited information 
and an incomplete coverage of topics. The successive phases of determining proposals and then 
seeking consultation (but nevertheless proceeding with those proposals) has failed to build trust 
with the scheme's opponents, particularly the farmers. 
In terms of political organisation, the initial proposals were opposed by landowners, farmers, 
conservationists, ramblers and local community associations alike, but there was no formal 
coalition between them. No individual leaders emerged during the course of the dispute and 
each party acted individually, although many of them were represented on the consultative 
committee. Although some of the component interest groups have a strong ideological base 
(e.g., ramblers, landowners) ideology per se was not a major element in the dispute. The Leisure 
Services Department, which initiated the proposals for designation, failed to establish any 
supporting political lobby and its plans for major recreational developments were shelved by 
the Planning Department in the face of local opposition. The exact balance of power at each 
stage was unclear and it has been assumed, in the subsequent analysis, that there is broad parity. 
In summary, the weak politicisation of the interests has failed to build up a powerfiul enough 
lobby to determine the outcome of the political process. Instead, changes in the power structure 
of the local authorities and the reluctance of the bureaucracy to incorporate interests or to build 
consensus are more significant factors in failing to build local support for the Park. On local 
government reorganisation, the issues within the Park are likely to be regarded as politically 
marginal and with the abolition in 1996 of the common enemy, Lothian Region Planning 
Department, any major controversy is likely to be replaced by a series of smaller disputes, for 
example, between the ramblers and farmers over access to hills and between nature 
conservationists and water recreation interests over the management of reservoirs by a new 
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Water Authority. 
Motor Sports in England 
The conflict over motor sports in England has consisted of successive local episodes and an 
occasional national one. The aftermath of each episode favours local communities and national 
conservation organisadons, as permission for new sports venues is refused or, more frequently, 
existing sites used for competitive events are lost. As episodes are geographically scattered and 
sporadic, there is no formal channel of communication between the various interests apart from 
the confrontation during each episode, when there is a strong emotional, if not ideological 
element to the principled opposition to motor sports. 
Although nature conservation interests and local communities form only loose local coalitions, 
they are politically well organised and therefore relatively powerful. In comparison, the large 
number of motor sports organisations are uncoordinated (despite the formation of an umbrella 
body), lack a unifying ideology and are relatively powerless. This resulting imbalance of power 
means that the strongest groups can influence a form of institutional decision-making that is 
sensitive to lobbying. The policies put forward by the Department of Environment or local 
authorities are pre-emptive, Le., they make little allowance for provision for motor sports; and 
there is no forum in which strong lobbying might be balanced through equal representation of 
interests. There is no open process of information gathering, indeed there is a lack of information 
about the extent or severity of alleged impacts of motor sports either on the environment or on 
local communities. The decision-making process is semi-participatory with limited opportunities 
for the motor sports organisations to make representations on either site-specific or national 
policy proposals. Thus, decisions follow the exercise of official power according to political 
pressure from the nature conservation and local amenity lobbies. 
Moorland Access in the Peak District National Park 
In the earlier episodes of the dispute over access within the Peak District National Park between 
landowners and the access lobby of rambling and climbing organisations, the tactics followed 
by each proponent were highly confrontational. For example, ramblers staged mass trespass 
events to try and force landowners to concede access. With each interest being well organised 
and power evenly balanced between them, the conflict reached stalemate with additional 
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landowners being unwilling to enter into access agreements with the national park authority. 
Another dimension was added to the dispute by conservation organisations trying to limit access 
to protect breeding populations of ground nesting birds from disturbance. Whether disturbance 
has or is significantly affecting these populations is uncertain and contentious. Moves to 
designate the open moorlands under the European Birds Directive triggered the current episode 
of the conflict which has been as confrontational as before. 
Hitherto, the terms of reference of the National Park Authority have been to balance the 
opposing interests with the result that the aims of moorland management are the subject of a 
power struggle between interests. Representation has hitherto taken the form of lobbying but 
was more deliberately balanced by the inclusion of representatives of all the main interests in a 
recently created working party, the Access Consultative Group (ACG). Similarly access to 
information, particularly on nature conservation, was limited, information coverage was 
incomplete and, as it was obtained on behalf of the conservation organisations, its objectivity 
was disputed. Decision-making has hitherto followed the semi-participatory form, but the 
direct involvement of interest groups as members of the ACG made this a more open process. 
The significant features of this case are the even balance of power between highly politicised 
interest groups, the political stalemate and the (potential) change in the type of decision-making. 
The establishment of the ACG using a more open process of involvement may enable the 
national organisations to fulfill long-standing ambitions and any resulting negotiated agreement 
could provide a durable outcome'. 
The Designation of the Skomer Marine Nature Reserve 
Prior to the designation of the Skomer Marine Nature Reserve, the balance of power was 
equally distributed within the management committee of the voluntary nature reserve on which 
both nature conservation and diving organisations were represented. This power balance, 
combined with a participative form of decision-making, should have led to a development of 
consensus and negotiated settlement over the management of a reserve. However, a potentially 
2 	See footnote on p.  82. 
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sound process was affected by the decision of the Nature Conservancy Council (NCC) to 
designate a statutory reserve. This would have allowed the Council to control underwater access 
by legally enforceable bylaws, in direct challenge to the national policy agenda of the British 
Sub-Aqua Club (B SAC), which had successfully resisted national legislation to restrict access 
to military wrecks. Thus the evenly balanced situation in the local committee was disrupted by 
national pressure (from NCC) but later restored (by the response from B SAC). 
Both of the contending parties, the nature conservationists and the divers, proved to be well-
organised and their tactics during the course of the dispute were confrontational. Information 
became a major element of the dispute. Its coverage was uneven, giving more attention to the 
disputed effects of disturbance to cliff.nesting birds than the possible impacts of diving within 
the marine reserve. The objectivity of information put forward by conservation organisations 
was challenged. By changing the decision-making process to a formal one of consultation on 
unilateral proposals, the situation became more polarised rather than less. In this dispute, the 
politicisation of the recreational interests and the resulting power they could exercise at a 
national level proved crucial. As a result the initial proposals by the Nature Conservancy Council 
were significantly modified by the Secretary of State before designation could be confirmed. 
Planning in the Rhine Delta 
During successive episodes - phases of the Rhine Delta scheme - the priorities given to water 
recreation and nature conservation have changed. In the earliest schemes, such as the Veerse 
Meer, recreation provision was given priority. Later phases led to a more balanced development 
with zoning to segregate recreation and conservation. Priorities changed within the initial 
emphasis on recreation in the Grevelingen being balanced by the creation of nature reserves 
within that scheme. More recently higher priority has been given to nature conservation and 
nature development, as is reflected in the designation of the inter-tidal areas of the Oosterschelde 
as a state nature reserve. Thus at the beginning of the planning of the Voordelta there was an 
imbalance favouring nature conservation interests. 
This power balance reflects the extent to which the respective nature conservation and water 
sports lobbies have become more politicised. The conservationists have long been well-
organised with a strong unifying ideological base, while local interests maintained good lines of 
- 	 - 
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communication with their national counterpart organisations. Water sports interests have lacked 
this degree of organisation, had little local presence and their diffuse national organisation has 
been unskilled in political activity. 
The uneven distribution of power was also reflected within the institutional decision-making of 
the national agency charged with the responsibility of developing a policy plan. Although the 
agenda was balanced in the earlier stages, with RIJP playing a crucial facilitating role (see 
Chapter 4). This has altered in the face of strong lobbying from nature conservation 
organisations which was not countered within the decision-making committees. Representation 
was limited to official governmental bodies, the key groups being dominated by national 
agencies, whose policies increasingly reflected the conservation imperative of national policy. 
Information on recreational impacts was not freely available, its coverage was incomplete and 
its objectivity challenged. Decision-making followed the semi-participatory form seen in the 
other case studies. Centralised planning has reflected current priorities of national policy as 
power and influence has been concentrated in key planning teams of officials from central 
government. The lack of a broadly based network within the management structure means that 
change is not mediated at the local level. 
Although this analysis (based on Chapter 4) treats each development as an episode in a 
continuing conflict, arguably they are not. A succession of negotiated settlements in the 
(Irevelingen have produced a stable situation - in the Grevelingen. Elsewhere it is the external 
political context which has produced significant pressures. The growth of tourism in Zeeland 
led to an initially defensive response from nature conservation interests which resulted in the 
designation of the Oosterschelde as a nature reserve. Subsequently, their adversarial campaign 
developed into an ambitious programme of nature development in the Voordelta. 
Case Studies of Co-operation 
In contrast, four cases of co-operation demonstrate how decision-making can be more balanced 
and open. In each of these cases: cliff climbing at South Stack, Anglesey; water sports on the 
Rutland Water in Leicestershire; and the management of the Bob Marshall Wilderness Area, 
Montana, and in the designation procedures for Dutch National Parks, most of the criteria of 
the consensus-building model are met. Although the terms of reference and agenda may be 
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constrained by conservation considerations, representation in decision-making is balanced, the 
representatives are accountable to their interests, power is evenly balanced, information is freely 
available, objectively gathered over a full coverage of topics and the process of decision-making 
is open and participatory, fully involving the relevant organisations. While individual groups 
have coherent ideologies, these are not evident features of any discussion suggesting that any 
differences in ideology have been suppressed in the interests of gaining agreement. South Stack 
is a case in point. 
Summary of the Case Studies 
The first five case studies are summarised, in Figures 5.1 to 5.5, in a simplified form of the 
dynamic framework of Chapter 3, which has been modified to incorporate the evaluation of 
decision-making developed in chapter 4. Each phase of a conflict episode is represented across 
the figure and the key elements of politicisation and decision-making are summarised in the 
bottom left hand corner of each diagram. In four of the cases (Motor sports, Peak, Skomer and 
the Rhine Delta) it can be seen that any change in the balance of power is closely related to the 
degree of politicisation, power being gained by the most ideologically committed and organised 
party. In the other case (Pentland Hills) ideology is not a strong element of the dispute and there 
was no unifying leadership or organisation among the opponents of the proposal to designate 
the area as a regional park. 
Consideration was given to making a further analysis of group cohesiveness, but this was not 
pursued as there are no clear cut distinctions between conflicts and cases of co-operation on the 
basis of whether only close knit or loose knit groups are present. 
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FIGURE 5.1: INTEGRATED ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT AND DECISION-MAKING - THE PENTLAND HILLS REGIONAL PARK 
AFTERMATH OF PREVIOUS LATENT PHASE ACTIVE PHASE INSTITUTIONAL DECISION- AFTERMATH OF EPISODE 
EPISODE MAKING 
BALANCE OF POWER: ROLE OF IDEOLOGY: TRIGGER: AGENDA: BALANCE OF POWER: 
Diffuse, Lothian Regional Basic differences in ideology LRC seeking to designate park. Focused agenda based on pre- Uncertain. 
Council (LRC) does not depend suppressed by defendants, No emptive policies of LRC. 
on rural support. unifying leadership or 
organisation.  
COMMUNICATION: UNDERSTANDING OF TACTICS OF CLAIMANT: REPRESENTATION: ANALYSIS: 
LRC develops proposals with ISSUE (Information): LRC bases its case on national Unbalanced advisory Issue changes from i) threat to 
consultative committee but fails Lack of information on LRCs legislation, uses confrontational committee, sports lack traditional access by LRC 
to establish effective plans leads to uncertainty. tactics, fails to form supporting representation. Leisure Services based on 
communication with wider coalition. assumption of public need to ii) 
interests. Park management and relations 
between Planning Department 
RESPONSE OF INVOLVEMENT. and farmers. The outcome of 
DEFENDANT: Lack of involvement in park each episode has been 
Established interests united in management leaves Council transitory. Without a 
opposition in principle to park with limited political support commitment to building 
status, Press used to escalate and vulnerable to landowner consensus or full involvement 
conflict pressure. by LRC, further conflict 
episodes are inevitable. DEGREE OF POLITICISATION: Weakly politicised: Ideology not a strong element of the dispute; No OPENNESS: 
coherent political organisation. Consultation at late stage leads 
DECISION-MAKING: LRC decision-making is semi-participatory rather than participatory, to formal objections and public 
inquiry. 
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FIGURE 5.2: INTEGRATED ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT AND DECISION-MAKING - MOTOR SPORTS IN ENGLAND 
AFTERMATH OF PREVIOUS LATENT PHASE ACTIVE PHASE INSTITUTIONAL DECISION- AFTERMATH OF EPISODE 
EPISODE MAKING 
BALANCE OF POWER: ROLE OF IDEOLOGY: TRIGGER: AGENDA: BALANCE OF POWER: 
In favour of local communities. Conservation ideology strong, Local community and Focused agenda based on pre- In favour of local communities 
Motor sports lack unifying conservation organisations seek emptive conservation policies and conservation organisations 
ideology and effective to restrict existing motor sports and NIIvIBY. 
organisation. activity. 
COMMUNICATION: UNDERSTANDING OF TACTICS OF CLAIMANT: REPRESENTATION: ANALYSIS: 
No formal channel of ISSUE (Information): Conservation organisations use No forum in which motor sports Marked imbalance of power 
communication. Understanding rests on adverse conservation status of sites as can gain rep,  resentation. within a decision-making 
image of sport rather than legitimation in confrontational system that exercises official 
specific information. campaign. power (whether at local or 
national level) according to 
RESPONSE OF INVOLVEMENT: political pressure 
DEFENDANT: Motor sports Public inquiries adversarial. No Each incremental decision is 
counterattack but perceived to strategic plans to consider sports transitory leading to next phase 
be insensitive to local need. in another location and the 
communities and environment, inevitable demise of motor 
sports in the countryside. DEGREE OF POLITICISATION: Conservation highly politicised: Strong ideology; No formal OPENNESS: 
coalition but well established network of national contacts and local contacts used to good effect. Motor Limited consultation by 
Sports weakly politicised. decision makers. 
DECISION-MAKING: DOE accepted as arbiter but exercises power within semi-participatory 
decisions in favour of more effective political lobby. 
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FIGURE 5.3: INTEGRATED ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT AND DECISION-MAKING. MOORLAND ACCESS IN THE PEAK DISTRICT 
AFTERMATH OF PREVIOUS LATENT PHASE ACTIVE PHASE INSTITUTIONAL DECISION- AFTERMATH OF EPISODE 
EPISODE MAKING 
BALANCE OF POWER: ROLE OF IDEOLOGY: TRIGGER: RA seeking access AGENDA: National Park Plan BALANCE OF POWER: 
Probably evenly balanced Strong ideological and to remaining open areas and provides vehicle for change but Evenly balanced, each party 
between landowners resisting organisational base to each national legislation. Proposed balance of policies is in holding a vetoing sanction. 
and access organisations (RA) group. conservation designation of contention. 
seeking further open access moorland under European This mirrors the national debate 
areas. Directives, in which Peak District sets a 
precedent 
COMMUNICATION: UNDERSTANDING OF TACTICS OF CLAIMANT: REPRESENTATION: ANALYSIS: 
Little direct contact between ISSUE (Information): Each party effective in lobbying No direct representation until Changing balance of power 
parties until recent formation of Considerable uncertainty about especially at national level; establishment of ACG. with effective lobbying by all 
Access Consultative Group impact of access on important using confrontational tactics and groups may have led to local 
(ACG). populations of ground nesting elevating issues to matters of stalemate. Negotiation may suit 
birds. Coverage of issues principle, national organisations making it 
uneven, possible to move from transitory 
outcomes to a durable 
RESPONSE OF INVOLVEMENT: negotiated settlement 
DEFENDANT: Each adversely Currently: negotiation within 
reacting to claims of others. ACG. 
DEGREE OF POLITICISATION: Each interest group has strong ideology and is well organised. OPENNESS: 
Decision-making: National Park Board strives to achieve balance but is seen to be partisan by interest Consultation replaced by 
groups. DECISION-MAKING has been semi-participatory but may change. involvement in ACG. 
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FIGURE 5.4: INTEGRATED ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT AND DECISION-MAKING - SKOMER MARINE NATURE RESERVE 
AFTERMATH OF PREVIOUS LATENT PHASE ACTIVE PHASE INSTITUTIONAL DECISION- AFTERMATH OF EPISODE 
EPISODE MAKING 
BALANCE OF POWER: ROLE OF IDEOLOGY: TRIGGER: AGENDA. BALANCE OF POWER: 
Equally distributed within the suppressed within the NCC designation as a Marine Focused agenda based on pre- Equally distributed with 
voluntary reserve management committee, but differences Nature Reserve with statutory emptive policy of NCC. assertion of power by national 
committee. brought out in later phases. powers. B SAC. 
COMMUNICATION: UNDERSTANDING OF TACTICS OF CLAIMANT: REPRESENTATION: ANALYSIS: 
well established within the ISSUE (Information): NCC bases its case on national Committee membership A potentially sound decision- 
voluntary reserve committee. Data on bird disturbance legislation. balanced but diving making process using 
disputed, No data on marine representative not accountable negotiation within local 
impacts to B SAC. committee is disrupted by 
NCC's move for statutory 
RESPONSE OF INVOLVEMENT: designation. Political pressure 
DEFENDANT: Confrontational Voluntary committee involved exerted by BSAC at national 
response by BSAC advancing interests, level led to eventual agreement 
principle of freedom of seas. of modified proposal. 
DEGREE OF POLITICISATION: Both interest groups have strong ideology and are well organised. OPENNESS: 
DECISION-MAKING: Open participative process is disrupted by NCC designation and BSAC Consultation led to formal 
response. Welsh Office arbitrates in response to lobbying, objections. 
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FIGURE 5.5: INTEGRATED ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT AND DECISION-MAKING - PLANNING IN THE RHINE DELTA 
(VOORDELTA EPISODE)  
AFTERMATH OF PREVIOUS LATENT PHASE ACTIVE PHASE INSTITUTIONAL DECISION- AFTERMATH OF EPISODE 
EPISODE MAKING 
BALANCE OF POWER: ROLE OF IDEOLOGY: TRIGGER: AGENDA: Initially balanced by BALANCE OF POWER: 
Evenly balanced during earlier Strong unifying element within Preparation of policy plan. project group but higher priority Unbalanced in favour of strong 
developments (Grevelingen) but conservation but lacking in given to conservation after conservation lobby. 
subsequently favoured recreation. lobbying. 
conservation. 
COMMUNICATION: UNDERSTANDING OF TACTICS OF CLAIMANT: REPRESENTATION: ANALYSIS: 
Little direct contact. Formal ISSUE (Information): Confrontational claim to control Limited to official bodies. Centralised planning has 
communication restricted to Impacts little researched, area and reduce recreation, reflected current priorities of 
steering group. uncertain and contentious. national policy as power and 
Coverage incomplete, influence has been concentrated 
in key planning teams of 
RESPONSE OF INVOLVEMENT: officials from central 
DEFENDANT: Equally Limited to formal consultation government. A New Order has 
confrontational but amenable to stages. been established but the 
limited change. 
outcome is transitory and likely 
to change if recreation becomes DEGREE OF POLITICISATION: Unequal lobbies: conservation with strong ideology and well OPENNESS: 
established organisation and network; Water sports lack unifying ideology and organisation. Limited to formal consultation, organised. 
DECISION-MAKING: Previous impartiality of decision-making in Delta Schemes has gradually 
changed in face of political pressure. 
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POLITICISATION AND DECISION-MAKING 
Changes in the balance on power from the beginning to the end of these conflict episodes appear 
to reflect the degree ofpoliticisation of the disputing parties rather then their tactics, which are 
invariably confrontational within a semi-participatory form of decision-making. While the 
balance of power may be difficult to measure directly, differences in political organisation and 
the role of ideology are recognisable and these are consistent with the final balance of power and 
its outcome. 
In other words, what the case studies have demonstrated is that in most cases of conflict there 
were clear distinctions between the competing interests in the importance of ideology to them 
and their degree ofpoliticisation. Some marked disparities in this respect were very evident. For 
example, nature conservation interests characteristically demonstrate a strong ideological 
commitment to a conservation ethic and are highly politically organised. In contrast, outdoor 
recreation groups are weaker in these respects and this is demonstrated in recent episodes in the 
Rhine Delta. The Rambled Association were a notable exception among recreation groups with 
the result that in the Peak District there is parity in power. However, as was noted earlier, most 
of the interested parties in the case studies of co-operation have some degree of ideological 
commitment, which may be suppressed in the desire to co-operate with others. The reasons for 
this are examined later. 
Meanwhile, a relatively clear distinction can be made between participatory and semi-
participatory decision-making in the case studies using the criteria of openness and balance. 
The occurrence of these two key elements is summarised in Figure 5.6 which lists all of the cases 
according to disparities in the degree of politicisation in the first column and whether the form 
of decision-making sought to achieve balance in the second. 
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FIGURE 5.6: SUMMARY OF POLITICISATION AND DECISION-MAKING IN THE 
CASE STUDIES 
DEGREE OF POLITICISATION of DECISION-MAKING as measured by the 
interest groups balance sought in participation 
Disparities in Oosterschelde, Semi-participatory Peak (previous 
Politicisation Motor Sports, Unbalanced remit phase), 
One party being Voordelta. which favours Skomer (Marine 
stronger in adversarial tactics Nature Reserve), 
ideological and lobbying Voordelta, 
motivation and Oosterschelde, 
organisation than the Motor Sports, 
other(s) Pentland. 
Parities in Bob Marshall Participatory Peak (recent phase 
Politicisation Wilderness Area, Balanced remit and ACG), 
The parties being Dutch National representation which Skomer (Voluntary 
equally strong or Parks, favours negotiation Reserve), 
weak in ideological Grevelingen3, Bob Marshall 
motivation and Rutland Water, Wilderness Area, 
organisation Peak, Grevelingen 5 , 
Pentland, Dutch National 
South Stack, Parks, 
S/corner. Rutland Water, 
South Stack. 
The distribution of power in unclear in this case. 
' Ditto. 
Decision-making has many of the attributes of a participatory system in this case. 
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Synthesis: Decision-Making and Disparities in Power 
The preceding analysis suggests that two key factors 
- parities or disparities in ideological commitment and political organisation between 
the parties in a dispute, as a proxy measure for the distribution of power; and 
- participatory or semi-participatory decision-making, as a proxy measure for 
legitimacy and acceptance of decisions 
can be used to classify cases of conflict and co-operation, as these factors have a marked 
influence on the outcome of a (potential) dispute. 
By treating disparities in power (using the proxy measure) and decision-making as independent 
dimensions, it is possible to represent the outcomes of (potential) disputes in one diagram 
(Figure 5.7). This scheme appears to apply irrespective of whether conflict is motivated by 
ideology or interest, thereby removing the complication that most of the conflicts studied have 
been seen to contain a combination of motives. 
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FIGURE 5.7: TYPOLOGY OF CONFLICT AND CO-OPERATION ACCORDING TO 
OUTCOME AND ILLUSTRATED BY THE CASE STUDIES 
--- I 
TYPE A Decision-making I TYPE B 
Conflict Semi-participatory j conflict 
Iwith I with 
I Minimum I 	 Remit lacks balance and I Maximum 
]change favours adversarial tactics I change 
RESOLVED 	 Transfer of power: 
Concession of power to maintain 	 OOSTERSCHELDE 
the status quo: 	 VOORDELTA 
SKOMER 	 MOTOR SPORTS 




PEAK (Phase 2) 
PARITY IN DISPARITY 
POWER Negotiation based on consensus: 	Compromise in favour of the IN POWER 
DUTCH NATIONAL PARKS 	powerful. 
PEAK (present episode?) (no example within the case 
Participatory planning: 	 studies) 






TYPE C Decision-making I TYPE D 
I Voluntary 	I Participatory I Involuntary 
I Co- 	I (open) I change 
I operation 	I Balanced remit favouring I ("Unjust" 
("Just" I negotiation change) 
Lc_  
1 
Outcome stable as long as parity of power is I Outcome potentially unstable, at least in the 
Lmaintained . 	 i long term. 
Note that all outcomes on the left-hand side of the diagram are stable as long as the parity of 
power between the parties is maintained, while outcomes on the right-hand side of the diagram 
are potentially unstable, at least in the long term, even where the disparities of power are great. 
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Conflicts where no change occurs because power is evenly balanced between the parties are to 
be found in the NW quadrant of the diagram. Three examples occur within the case studies: 
- both parties exercise their power but are evenly matched with the result that the status quo 
is maintained in the case of Skomer, although there are concessions on each side 
(designation of the statutory marine nature reserve proceeds but without strict controls on 
divers' access); 
- no party is sufficiently well organised or politically committed for a clear outcome 
(abatement) in the case of the Pentlands; and 
- none of the parties is strong enough to overcome the others (stalemate) in the case of the 
moorland access in the Peak District during the 1980s. 
Conflicts which are likely to result in major change, which entirely favours the powerful are to 
be found in the NE quadrant of the diagram. Three examples occur within the case studies: 
- transfers ofpower away from the status quo (existing recreational access) and in favour 
of conservation groups in the Oosterschelde and Voordelta; and 
- in favour of conservation groups and local community interests in the case of Motor 
Sports. 
No example occurs in the case studies of a compromise favouring the more powerful interests 
(SE quadrant). As was suggested in Chapter 4, one of Amy's (1987) criticisms of environmental 
mediation was that it might be used to advantage by powerful economic interests in this way. 
Change is voluntarily negotiated to produce just and durable outcomes (forms of co-operation) 
in the cases depicted in the SW quadrant. These cases include: 
- the participatory plans prepared for the management of the Bob Marshall Wilderness Area, 
the Grevelingen and Rutland Water; 
- 
- the local agreement over climbing at South Stack, and 
- negotiations based on consensus to designate Dutch National Parks and with the 
establishment of the Access Consultative Group to plan the management of moorland 
access in the Peak District (assuming this reaches a successful outcome). 
It should be noted that in cases of co-operation (for example, where plans are prepared for new 
water bodies) there is no established order to be challenged and that ideological differences have 
been suppressed in the interests of obtaining access. Why this occurs is considered below. 
INSTiTUTIONAL POWER WITHIN THE STATE 
Two questions arise from the preceding analysis: 
- why are ideological differences suppressed - is it because there is a participatory system 
of decision-making in place or is there another reason? 
- what does the analysis of disparities ofpower add to the analysis of conflict resolution that 
is not explained by the analysis of participatory decision-making? 
One reason for posing the second question is that (as was seen in Chapter 4) the critics of 
environmental mediation (e.g., Amy, 1987 and Scimecca, 1993) suggest that theories of 
participatory decision-making ignore the distribution of power within a conflict. Their critique 
suggests that mediators are naive to assume that imbalances of power can be rectified by 
procedural changes which initiate discussion. To attempt to answer both questions, it is 
necessary to consider the role of one important source of power - the institutions of the state - 
and of government agencies in particular.' 
At various stages of the analysis, when considering the case studies, reference has been made 
to the active part played by government agencies as interested parties in a dispute. As was noted 
6 	It should be noted that the following analysis draws on the case studies to refine 
the study frameworks and does not attempt to review formal theories from 
political science on the role of the state. 
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at the end of Chapter 2, a conflict episode may be triggered by the action of a government 
agency, for example, in its proposals to designate parks, wilderness areas or nature reserves. 
That a conflict should be triggered by government action is hardly surprising. Executive 
agencies are established and mandated by government to implement government policy. Public 
policies are likely to be controversial when they directly affect established local interests. Often 
their remits pursue a sectoral interest and they act partially to further those interests, whether 
these are in the environmental field (e.g., the nature conservation councils) or in recreation (e.g., 
the Sports Council). 
However the government and its agencies may play a second role - that of arbiter - seeking to 
balance the claims of competing interests. Resource managing agencies may have a primary 
purpose which is tempered by the need to balance this with other interests, such as conservation. 
The interpretation of these obligations -where the balance lies - may be controversial, for 
example, the management of national forests in the USA may be the subject of conflict (e.g., 
designation of Wilderness Areas) whilst that of the US national parks is not.' It is a simpler 
task to follow a single remit - to conserve - than a dual one - to produce nd  conserve. 
In theory at least, the arbitrating role of the legal system of the state should be clear. This 
system adjudicates according to rights enshrined in legislation, while the planning system 
allocates land uses and adjudicates on what is an appropriate use according to a set of 
(commonly held) values. Common to the legal and planning systems is the principle that 
aggrieved parties may use processes of appeal to higher levels of decision-making (arguably a 
form of neutral arbitration) which may have the effect of redressing imbalances of power. 
Within the case studies, both roles can be observed, indeed one arm of government may attempt 
to initiate change by developing and implementing government policy and acting as an interested 
party while another arm acts as an arbiter. Because of the power of government, the 
interventions its agencies make within disputes can markedly affect the balance of power. Such 
There are notable exceptions where the management of the National Park Service 
has been heavily criticised, such as wildfire control in Yellowstone National Park 
(see Chase, 1987). 
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partial policy interventions may trigger conflicts by creating disparities in the distribution of 
power, or may even redress imbalances of power. In other cases, planning systems may attempt 
to act impartially to create a balance between policies or between interests but even when acting 
as an arbiter (via the appeals system) intervention may be partial - to secure the implementation 
of a policy or by responding to political pressure. 
In this analysis, interventions have been classified as partial when they are made in pursuit of 
a particular public policy (e.g., a government agency acting as interested party or an appeal 
decision determining whether a public policy should be implemented in a particular case). They 
are considered impartial when balance is sought between a range of interests (e.g., planning new 
provision or fhdilitáting negotiations between disputing parties). 
These forms of intervention are set out schematically in figure 5.8 to assess how they influence 
the distribution of power and the outcome of the dispute using examples from the case studies. 
It should be born in mind that not all logical combinations of power and intervention are 
represented in the case studies and the scheme is illustrative rather than representative. 
However in some case studies, several interventions occur and this allows their effects on the 
outcome to be traced. 
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FIGURE 5.8: INTERVENTIONS OF GOVERNMENT AGENCIES OR THE STATE WHICH EFFECT THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER 
BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND THE OUTCOMES OF DISPUTES 
INITIAL INTERVENTIONS AS INTERESTED PARTY INTERVENTION AS ARBITER 
DISTRIBUTION OF 
POWER which create a which achieve or IMPARTIAL as facilitator PARTIAL to achieve 
DISPARITY in the strengthen a BALANCE policy 
balance of power of power 
PARITY SKOMER -designation SKOMER - SKOMER - Appeal to 
proposal by NCC. representations by SCW. Welsh Office confirmed 
suitability as reserve but 
upheld access for divers. 
PENTLAND - PENTLAND - Public 
designation proposal by inquiry into designation 
LRC/CCS. confirmed suitability of 
hills as Regional Park. 
OOSTERSCHELDE and OOSTERSCHELDE and 
VOORDELTA - VOORDELTA - 
designation proposals by Executive power used to 
LNV/NBLF. implement policy. 
PEAK - Multiple PEAK - Park Authority 
interventions over time employed neutral 
/ which may give temporary facilitator for Access 
advantage but result in Consultative Group. 
stalemate. 
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FIGURE 5.8 (continued): INTERVENTIONS OF GOVERNMENT AGENCIES OR THE STATE WHICH EFFECT THE DISTRIBUTION 
OF POWER BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND THE OUTCOMES OF DISPUTES 
INITIAL 
DISTRIBUTION OF 
POWER which create a 
DISPARITY in the 
balance of power 
which achieve or 
strengthen a BALANCE 
of power 
IMPARTIAL as facilitator PARTIAL to achieve 
policy 
INTERVENTIONS AS INTERESTED PARTY 
	

















DISPARITY MOTOR SPORTS - 
Appeals to DOE 
reinforced the disparity of 
power in absence of a 
clear policy favouring 
some provision for the 
sport. 
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SiTUATIONS ILLUSTRATED BY TILE CASE STUDIES 
The case studies set out in Figure 5.8 illustrate the following combinations of interventions and 
outcome. 
Interventions by Government Agencies As interested Parties Which May Effect the 
Balance of Power. 
These interventions may create panty or disparity in the balance of power between the disputing 
parties. 
As has been noted earlier, parity of interest group representation is sought in the cases of 
co-operation and the presence of government agencies may be an important balancing factor 
as in the case of Rutland Water, when a number of such agencies were fully involved in the 
planning stages including the Countryside Commission, the Nature Conservancy Council 
and the Sports Council. This also occurred in the management of the Bob Marshall 
Wilderness Area and in the designation procedures for Dutch National Parks. 
Partial interventions by a government agency with a sectoral interest are very likely to 
disrupt the balance of power when there is no countervailing force. Proposals to designate 
areas as parks or reserves may have the effect or creating a disparitji in power and 
triggering conflict as happened in the Pentland Hills, the Oosterschelde and the Voordelta. 
This also occurred at Skomer but a second intervention from both governmental (the Sports 
Council for Wales) and non-governmental national organisations (the British Sub Aqua 
Club) redressed the balance. In the Peak District, continuing interventions from various 
national organisations are temporarily disruptive, each sustaining the conflict but the overall 
effect is one of balance, albeit stalemate. 
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Interventions as Arbiter 
These interventions may be partial or impartial and their effects will vary depending on whether 
there is parity or disparity in the balance of power between the contending parties. 
Examples of impartial interventions where there was parity between the parties are: 
- the Bob Marshall Wilderness Area where the US Forest Service acted as a facilitator using 
in the Limits of Acceptable Change approach to managing the impacts of recreation; 
- the designation procedure for Dutch National Parks which uses participatory planning to 
achieve consensus; 
- in the Grevelingen, the Polder Authority (RIJP) acted as a technical planning agency to 
achieve balanced provision for a range of interests; and also 
- during the creation of Rutland Water, the Anglian Water Authority secured a balance 
between recreation and nature conservation provision. 
- in the Peak District National Park, the Park Authority employed a neutral facilitator to 
conduct negotiations between the disputing parties within the Access Consultative Group. 
Examples ofpartial interventions where there was parity between the parties occurred during 
the designation of the Skomer Marine Nature Reserve and of the Pentland Hills as a Regional 
Park. 
- In the case of Skomer, the Secretary of State for Wales arbitrated by confirming the 
designation order but allowed continued underwater access for divers off the island and in 
so doing recognised the respective power of the opposing parties; and 
- The terms of reference of the Reporter considering objections to the designation of the 
Pentland Hills as a regional park were whether the criteria for designation were met, not 
whether the policy was locally acceptable. This phase of conflict was "resolved " by the 
exercise of official power in favour of public policy. As the affected parties were not 
compensated, this added to their sense of injustice. 
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No examples of an impartial intervention where there was disparity between the parties occurs 
in the case studies. Thus it can neither be confirmed that conflict resolution techniques, such 
as mediation can be used in these circumstances, nor that Amy's (1987) view that this form of 
negotiation only proceeds when there is parity between the parties. 
Examples ofpartial interventions where there was disparity between the parties are: 
Non-participatory systems of decision-making which favour consultation and not 
involvement are, in effect, partial interventions by government. 
- For example, the Dutch -government's decision to give primacy to nature 
conservation policies in the Oosterschelde and the Voordelta, instead of striving for 
balance as had happened earlier in the Rhine Delta scheme (i.e., the Grevelingen). 
Arbitration and appeals systems may have the same effect. 
- For example, the series of appeal decisions on local provision for Motor Sports 
dealt with each case on its merits without any policy framework on where provision 
for the sports might be made so that the overall effect of government intervention has 
been partial.' 
Overall the outcomes of these cases suggest that decisions, whether taken under partial or 
impartial regimes, reflect the distribution of power, following any intervention on the part of 
government agencies. A 'just' outcome, that is one that recognises the interests of all parties, 
is more likely to occur where there is parity of power, irrespective of the 'partiality' of the 
decision-making system. Where there is a marked disparity in power, the stronger party is likely 
to prevail when a partial decision-making system is in operation. These conclusions help to 
answer the first of the questions posed earlier in this chapter. This was: 
8 	This injustice has recently been recognised by the House of Commons 
Environment Committee (1995) which wishes to ensure that some provision is 
made for motorsports. 
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- why are ideological differences suppressed - is it because there is a participatory system 
of decision-making in place or is there another reason? 
The evidence from this set of case studies suggests that interventions by the government 
agencies are likely to have a marked affect on the distribution of power within a dispute. 
Moreover, where parity is achieved as a result, the necessary conditions for negotiation from 
strength are fiilfiUed. In these circumstances, ideological differences are likely to be suppressed 
in the interests of reaching agreement. In other words, parity in power is more likely to be the 
determining factor than participatory decision-making, despite the claims made by its exponents 
that this factor on its own can influence the outcome of a dispute. However, it should be 
remembered that no examples were studied of the combination of marked disparities in power 
and impartiality in decision-making. 
REFINING THE DYNAMIC FRAMEWORK 
In Chapter 3 the alternative outcomes that could be predicted using the dynamic framework 
were depicted in Figure 3.2. This considered situations of conflict and co-operation and power 
struggles within rigid and flexible social structures. But the conditions of 'rigidity and 'flexibility' 
were not easily applied in the context of the case studies. Following the combined theoretical 
analysis in this Chapter, this framework can now be modified to recognise: 
- the importance of analysing disparities of power between the disputing parties; 
- forms of intervention by national organisations which affect the distribution of power and; 
- the non-participatory and participatory nature of decision-making. 
The framework set out in Figure 5.9 provides a diagnostic tool which helps to predict the 
outcome of a dispute. It may not form a fully predictive model, in that the distribution of power 
on which the prediction depends may not be evident and the action interested parties may take 
cannot always be foreseen. However, it does focus the analysis onto a limited number of factors 
and types of outcome. 
To use the framework, an initial analysis of the distribution of power would be followed by 
assessments of the likelihood of politicised challenges which might affect the power balance. 
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As well as interventions by national government or non-government agencies, there might be 
changes in the type of decision-making, although these are likely to be rare. The presence of 
diagnostic symptoms of conflict and co-operation, regarding access to information, 
communication and tactics, would assist that assessment. Once the eventual distribution of 
power has been assessed, in terms of parity or disparity, and the type of decision-making is 
known, whether it is participatory or semi-participatory, then the likely outcome can be 
classified into one of the four categories that were identified in Figure 5.7. Parity in power is 
more likely to produce stable outcomes while marked disparities suggest that while the 
likelihood of imminent conflict may be low in the short term, it is inevitable in the longer term. 
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FIGURE 5.9: AN INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK OF CONFLICT AND CO -OPERATION 
AFTERMATH OF ACTIVE PHASE TYPE OF TYPE OF STABILITY OF 
PREVIOUS DECISION- OUTCOME OUTCOME 
EPISODE!LATENT MAKING 
PHASE  
What is existing INTERVENTIONS What is resulting Are criteria of What Is likelihood of 
distribution of BY INTERESTED distribution of balance and new episode? 
power (degree of PARTIES power likely to be? openness met? 
politicisation)?  
PARITY 	 PARTICIPATORY 	CO4PER.ThN 	Low as long as 
Are interventions likely which will change balanced 	 parity Is maintained 
PARITY the balance of power' agenda 
weak/weak representation 
strong/strong DISPARITY 	involvement 	COMMAOMS1 	High risk because of 
Is a highly politicised challenge likely' disparity of power.  
Are policy mandated agencies likely to 
intervene? 
Are there Diagnostic Symptoms of conflict 
(leading to escalation) or co-operation (when 





Low as Long as 
parity Is maintained 
artial DISPARITY 
weak/strong i.e., Lack of/easy access to information agenda 
Poor/good communication representation 
Adversarial/conciliatory tactics consultation M-WM1171T-T.11"7  
DISPARITY CONFIJC 	' High risk because of 
disparity of power 




This chapter has examined Hypothesis 4: 
That a combined analysis of the processes of social conflict and participatory decision-
making increases the likelihood of predicting the outcomes of conflicts between 
conservation and recreation. 
Two aspects of the hypothesis are considered in turn: 
- what does the analysis of disparities of power add to the analysis of conflict resolution that 
is not explained by the analysis of participatory decision-making alone? (The second 
question posed earlier in the chapter); and 
- the issues of measurement and prediction. 
The Value of an Analysis which Combines Decision-Making and the Processes of Conflict 
The combined analysis of intervention and power provides a complementary and fuller picture 
of a conflict than that of participatory decision-making on its own. In particular, it demonstrated 
that two forms of intervention occur, partial interventions by government agencies or other 
national organisations mandated to pursue sectoral policies and partial or impartial interventions 
by the state as arbiter in disputes about public policy. The analysis showed the various effects 
of intervention on the processes of conflict. The former may disrupt the existing balance of 
power and trigger conflict unless they redress disparities in the distribution of power and provide 
balance. The latter may be partial if their primary purpose is to determine whether policies 
should be implemented and not to secure equity for all parties. Alternatively they may be 
impartial when they establish balanced ground rules for an open, participative process of 
planning. 
The conditions required to obtain one type of outcome - co-operation, ie. conflict resolution 
by negotiation - are demonstrated by the cases of participatory planning. Although these may 
appear to start with a clean slate, they may well represent a response to previous episodes of 
political struggle (conflict) elsewhere. Examples, such as Rutland Water, illustrate this with the 
national agencies providing the necessary initial balance for the negotiation of interests to 
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proceed. Sintihrly, local interests recognise this factor when they seek to exploit any potential 
national dimension of a dispute knowing that this will help to increase their bargaining power. 
Conclusion 
By combining the analysis of the distribution of power with an analysis of participation in 
decision-making, it has proved possible to undertake a more detailed analysis of conflicts 
between outdoor recreation and nature conservation. It provides a means of assessing the 
partiality of public intervention, its effects on the distribution of power and the potential 
contribution of methods of conflict resolution. 
Issues of Measurement and Prediction 
Recognising the 'paradox of power' it was suggested that ideological commitment and the extent 
ofpoliticisation might be used as proxy measures of the distribution of power within a conflict. 
This might allow the distribution of power and the outcome of the conflict to be predicted, thus 
circumventing the paradox. In most cases, an assessment of the distribution of power between 
the disputing parties could be made. Certainly these distinctions were clear in those cases where 
there was a marked disparity in power but uncertain where the balance was marginal, i.e., 
disparities may be more easily identified than parities. While in any future research, the method 
could be improved by focusing more clearly on this aspect of the case study, together with 
factors like group cohesiveness, it has to be recognised that any such analysis is retrospective. 
Thus the paradox still holds and remains a barrier to prediction. Many of the twists and turns 
of political struggle, the timing of interventions and the duration of a conflict, are likely to 
remain unpredictable. 
Although it appears that the combined analysis of chapter 5 provides only marginal 
improvements over the framework used in Chapter 3, it has enabled two important aspects of 
conflict to be more clearly identified - the distribution of power and the legitimacy of the system 
of decision-making. These factors provided the basis of a typology of conflicts (presented as 
Figure 5.7), which clarified the range of possible outcomes and the circumstances in which they 
occur, and also permitted the dynamic framework to be refined into a practical diagnostic tool 
(which is presented as Figure 5.9). 
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These two factors also underlie assessments of the likelihood of a new episode of conflict, 
presented in the final column of Figure 5.9. A new round of political struggle could be 
stimulated by inequalities in the distribution of power or in the inequity of a partial system of 
decision-making. This is shown in simplified form in Figure 5.10. 













DISPARITY An Unstable outcome 
because of two causes of 
injustice - the inequitable 
distribution of resources and 
the partial system of 
decision-making. 
Probably an Unstable 
outcome because of 
disparity of power (but no 
example in the case studies). 
Where there is parity in power and a partial system of decision-making, the outcome of a conflict 
episode is likely to prove stable, as long as parity of power is maintained. However the partial 
system of decision-making presents a long-term risk of instability. Skomer provides an example 
of the first situation, the Pentlands Regional Park the second, the risk in the latter case seems 
particularly high as the power balance is uncertain. 
Where there is parity in power but an impartial system of decision-making, the outcome of a 
conflict episode is likely to prove stable, as change can be renegotiated within the system. The 
Dutch National Parks, the Bob Marshall Wilderness Area and Rutland Water provide examples 
of this situation. 
Where there is disparity in power and a partial system of decision-making, the outcome of a 
conflict episode is likely to prove unstable and further conflict episodes seem likely because of 
two potential causes of injustice - the inequitable distribution of resources and the system of 
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decision-making. The Oosterschelde, the Voordelta and Motorsports provide examples of this 
No case study illustrated conditions of a participatory system of decision-making being 
introduced in conditions of marked disparity between the disputing parties, which may be 
significant in itself but does not enable conclusions, to be drawn on the potential of methods of 
conflict resolution, such as mediation, in these circumstances. This would seem to be a topic 
worthy of further research. 
Conclusions. 
The combined analysis identifies two major components which are likely to lead to future 
conflict - changes in the distribution of power and the perceived inequity of a partial 
decision-making system. These provide a method of risk assessment but the risks cannot 
be quantified. This element of the analysis clarifies but does not solve the problems of 
prediction. 
The combined analysis presented in this Chapter suggests that the two analyses - of 
disparities of power and of systems of decision-making - are complementary and necessary 
to a filler understanding of conflicts and conflict resolution. 
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INTRODUCHON 
This chapter presents a concluding analysis of the four frameworks and the theories on which 
they are based to assess the strengths and weaknesses of each of the frameworks and their 
potential utility. It concludes by reviewing the issues raised by the study, relating to: 
- the nature and causes of environmental conflict; 
- environmental decision-making and conflict resolution; 
- theory and prediction; and 
- future research. 
SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT OF THE FRAMEWORKS 
Four frameworks were presented in the earlier chapters: 
- A Diagnostic Framework - presented in Chapter 2 which highlighted the contrasting 
conditions to be found in cases of conflict and co-operation; 
- A Dynamic Framework - presented in Chapter 3 which enabled the course of a 
conflict to be explained and provided a basis for attempting to predict the outcome of 
the episode under examination; 
- An Evaluative Framework of Decision-making- presented in Chapter 4 comprising 
a set of criteria which could be used to judge whether the process of decision-making 
was considered legitimate and whether its outcome would be considered just by the 
participants. 
- An Integrated Framework of Conflict and Co-operation - presented in Chapter 5 
which combined elements of the Dynamic and Decision-making Frameworks. 
The Diagnostic Framework of Conflict and Co-operation 
The empirical analysis in Chapter 2 categorised the factors which discriminated between 
situations of conflict or co-operation in four groups, namely: biological impacts, conflicting 
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interests, inter-relationships and social institutions. The comparison of case studies of conflict 
and co-operation, using this framework, suggests that it is not the ostensible cause - the issue 
around which the dispute revolves - that determines whether conflict or co-operation occurs; 
but that the motivation of the interest groups, their relationship and the institutional setting in 
which they attempt to broker a reallocation of resources can all be contributory factors. 
However, none of these groups of factors appears to act alone, suggesting that multiple rather 
than single causality is more likely to be the norm. 
Indeed the value of this framework may be in what it reveals about co-operation rather than 
conflict. Examination of the co-operation cases suggests that co-operation is largely about 
suppressing ideological differences because of agreement over aims, about understanding and 
good communication and about the interest groups being sufficiently organised to represent 
themselves effectively. The form of decision-making in these cases is negotiative rather than 
adversarial and this is supported by the institutions involved. 
Thus these factors could be used as evaluative criteria to establish whether the basis for co-
operation exists, but it is a static analysis which correlates factors and explains little if anything 
about the processes of conflict or how conflict arises. Its weaknesses are demonstrated when 
external change occurs. For example, the pattern of co-operation established within the 
Advisory Committee of the voluntary marine reserve at Skomer probably suggested to the 
Nature Conservancy Council that designation of a statutory reserve would be uncontroversial. 
An analysis using this framework would have supported that view and it could not have been 
used to predict how external factors - such as the intervention of national organisations (the 
Council and the British Sub-Aqua Club) - would trigger the events that led to conflict. Thus 
the framework has limited analytical value and this is restricted to demonstrating a presence 
of co-operation. It cannot be used to predict the intensity, duration or outcome of a conflict 
and these possibilities need to be pursued by other means. 
The Dynamic Framework of Conflict 
The dynamic framework was based on the concept of phasing of successive episodes of a 
conflict over access to resources which is fought out on a political stage. Such conflicts may 
or may not be resolved depending on whether the outcome is reached by the exercise of power 
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or by negotiation. 
Compared to the diagnostic framework, the re-allocation of factors into phases within the 
dynamic framework provides a more logical grouping as it demonstrates their inter-
relationships during the course of a conflict episode. However, the separation of conflict 
episodes into phases may often be more easily accomplished in a theoretical analysis than in 
practice as phases may overlap considerably. 
A particular advantage of this analysis comes from the insights that it provides into the role 
that ideology and arguments of principle play in emphasising group solidarity during the course 
of a dispute and why basic beliefs are not negotiable. The close examination of the respective 
goals of each interest group, whether they are seeking to maintain or improve social position, 
enables the tactics of each group to be better understood during the phases of a conflict. 
The distribution of power and how this changes during the course of the dispute is a crucial 
part of the analysis. It appears to be the dominant factor in determining whether the outcome 
of a dispute will be achieved by the exercise or transfer of power or by negotiation. Political 
organisation appears to be an important factor in the quest for power. 
The analysis gives some insights into decision-making structures and their rigidity or flexibility 
in influencing the outcome of a dispute. However, the concepts of rigidity and flexibility 
proved to be unsatisfactory in this analysis as some decision-making systems had elements of 
both rigidity and flexibility. Neither concept allows for the confusion of roles that may occur 
if a local authority or government agency act as both protagonist and adjudicator, thereby 
affecting the legitimacy of that organisation as a neutral and impartial decision maker. 
The more extended analysis afforded by the use of this framework led to tentative predictions 
on the outcomes of the case studies under analysis. While the analysis suggests with some 
confidence the instability of certain situations or the hopeless political position of others, not 
all the eventual outcomes were as clear. The framework has limited predictive ability 
depending on whether the likely balance of power between the competing parties can be 
ascertained. 
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The Evaluative Framework of Decision-Making 
The evaluative framework presented in Chapter 4 did not attempt to explain how conflicts arise 
but only how they may be resolved when certain circumstances apply. The analysis of case 
studies using this framework contrasted two forms of decision-making, namely: 
- a balanced, open participatory process, in which all parties were involved at an early 
stage and which resulted in a mutually beneficial negotiation; and 
- a biased, partial, semi-open process, in which many of the parties were not consulted 
until a late stage. Lack of information led to uncertainty and controversy and the 
outcome was determined by the exercise of power. This latter form of semi-
participatory decision-making can, in itself; contribute to the escalation of conflict. 
Power is again identified as an important factor but mediators tend to concentrate on 
procedural issues which are amenable to modification and shed little light on the questions of 
how power can either be measured or redistributed. 
This framework could be used by practitioners to identify the necessary conditions for fair, 
open and principled negotiations in which all interests are represented and uncertainty is 
reduced. It also provides a theoretical means of assessing administrative decision-making and 
planning systems in terms of their ability to prevent conflicts. 
The Integrated Framework of Conflict and CO-operation 
In Chapter 5, elements of the dynamic framework were combined with the evaluative 
framework to consider whether it is possible to develop an integrated predictive model. The 
analysis suggests that the predictive power of the dynamic framework can be increased by 
integrating into it the analysis of participatory decision-making. By setting out on one 
dimension the disparities of power between competing groups against semi-participatory and 
participatory nature of decision-making on another, it is possible to categorise the full range 
of possible outcomes to political struggle or negotiation into a simple typology (see Figure 
5.7). 
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The dynamic framework was further modified by considering the effects of different types of 
public intervention on the distribution of power and the resulting analysis is more focused than 
that presented in Chapter 3. Interventions might take the form of politicised challenges by 
organised groups or government agencies, or of constraints imposed by the type of decision-
making. The presence of diagnostic symptoms of conflict and co-operation, regarding access 
to information, communication and tactics (identified in Chapter 2) assist this analysis. The 
value of this integrated framework lies in its use as a diagnostic tool to follow the course of 
a dispute. 
The predictive power of the integrated framework depends upon the assessment of a limited 
range of factors, namely: 
- whether there has been a previous episode to the dispute; 
- the motives of the disputing parties - their ideological commitment and political 
organisation - as proxy measures for disparities of power between them; 
- whether the social institutions of decision-making are semi-participatory or 
participatory in nature (using the evaluative criteria identified in Chapter 4). 
-the likelihood, nature and timing of interventions, including those by government 
agencies, and their effect on the distribution of power. 
- the identification of the major components of risk of future conflict 
- for those seeking justice: inequalities in the distribution of power and an 
inequitable system of decision-making; and 
- for those seeking to reduce access of other parties to resources: opportunities 
to increase their power. 
As the integrated framework is an adaption of the dynamic framework, it shares the same 
limitations as a predictive model, namely: 
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- that the detailed course or duration of a power struggle cannot always be predicted 
because the likelihood, nature and timing of interventions, particularly by government 
agencies, cannot be foretold. These can have considerable effects on the distribution 
of power and changes in the distribution of power are not easily measured- the paradox 
of power. 
The strengths and weaknesses of each framework are summarised in Figure 6.1 
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Suggests multiple causation but 
rarely due to ostensible issue. 
Relationship of parties more 
crucial than impacts. 
Identifies conditions of co-
operation. 
Provides initial diagnosis of 
conflict/co-operation. 
Provides no explanation of 
relationships, especially power 
Cannot predict effects of 
change. 
DYNAMIC 
Depicts processes of conflict 
escalation and political struggle 
and how they are perpetuated. 
Indicates whether 
durable/transitory outcomes are 
likely to be achieved. 
Explains why conflicts take a 
particular course. 
Prediction based on power 
struggle which is itself 
unpredictable. 
DECISION-MAKING 
Contrasts participatory (open) 
and non-participatory (closed) 
decision-making. 
Predicts whether outcome will 
be fair (stable). 
Evaluates ability of decision-
making to reduce conflict and 
provide durable solutions. 
Cannot predict effects of 
change. 
INTEGRATED 
Analyses interventions by the 
state and their effects on the 
distribution of power. 
Indicates whether outcomes are 
likely to be durable/transitory; 
fair/unjust and the extent of 
change according to the 
distribution of power and the 
type of decision-making. 
Predicts a range of outcomes on 
a limited number of variables. 
Identifies the major components 
of risk of conflict. 
As not all elements of a power 
struggle are predictable, the 
detailed course and duration of 
conflict cannot be predicted. 
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DISCUSSION OF ISSUES RAISED BY THE STUDY 
The Nature and Causes of Local Environmental Conflict 
The analysis of social theory in Chapter 3 suggested that local environmental conflicts have to 
be seen within a broader perspective of social change. From this perspective, the nature and 
causes of environmental conflict are partly explained by understanding the role of conflict in 
mediating change and partly by seeing it as a dynamic process. 
The analysis of social and managerial theories identified a series of organising concepts that 
are helpful in this analysis. For example, conflicts pass through phases, that is, each conflict 
consists of an episode which has an aftermath, which in turn conditions the episode of conflict 
that follows, as suggested by Pondy (1972) amongst others. This acknowledges a process of 
aftermath/episode/aftermath which continues in a repeating pattern and sets the current episode 
in an historical perspective. 
The control of resources, i.e., their distribution between the competing interests who gained 
access to them on whose terms, was central to the case studies under consideration. In this 
analysis Thurlings (1962) conceptualisation of social position is helpful in that it distinguishes 
between autonomy, the ability to exercise a right, and authority, a say in the process of 
allocation. It illustrates that conflicts do not exist in a social vacuum and that the allocation 
process is important because it confers power. 
The recreation versus conservation debate is partly a local conflict over access to resources 
and partly symptomatic of a wider process of social change, whereby the old order is gradually 
challenged and replaced by a new one. It contains an inherent contradiction between two sets 
of rising public expectations: of increased access to the countryside and of higher 
environmental standards. Local conflicts provide a means of redressing the balance between 
these expectations and testing the strength of their support. It is no coincidence that the 
individual conflicts studied here are both place-specific and also incidents in a broader 
campaign of local and national change. 
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To take two examples, the conflict over moorland access in the Peak District National Park 
is the centre piece in a national debate about public access to private land and its possible 
environmental impacts. Local resolution would set national precedents, hence the hesitancy 
about reaching agreement. The motor sports controversy comprises many local conflicts but 
the national dimension of institutional structures is lacking. One side (the nature conservation 
and amenity lobbies) can take advantage of this policy vacuum. 
Coser (1957) distinguished between conflicts "within the system" - concerned with goals and 
interests - and conflicts "of the system" which were seeking changes to the social structure on 
the basis of beliefs and ideology. Indeed in every case studied, at least one group was 
advancing or defending its cause from a position of principle. Amy (1987) suggests that 
conflicts of interest and misunderstanding may be negotiable whereas conflicts over beliefs are 
not. Thus it may be reasonable to infer that beliefs and ideology are concerned with how the 
system should be and any group which is primarily based around beliefs and ideology is 
concerned with changes of the system. As far as the group is concerned, these issues are not 
negotiable and attempts to change the system inevitably result in political struggle of one form 
or another. Meanwhile, groups that are primarily acting to protect or expand their interests are 
concerned with the distribution of resources within the system and are prepared to negotiate 
accordingly. 
Conservation groups appear to be arguing for both changes of and within the system. At the 
macro level they are seeking radical change within the social structure so that environmental 
values predominate. At the same time, they are seeking to control the access of others to 
"natural" resources. 
Thus there remains the issue of what degree of environmental change (or loss of environmental 
quality) a society will allow while accommodating a certain degree of social change (or gains 
in human enjoyment). Yet almost as important as the issue itself is the question of whether 
existing social institutions are adequate to the task of mediating change on this level. This is 
the topic of the next section. 
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Environmental Decision-Making and Conflict Resolution 
In practice, the agents of change may be competing government agencies, each mandated to 
develop and implement public policy, although they have to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of 
an affected and often critical public. But the role of government may be obscured by its dual 
function as interested party and arbiter, particularly when the role of arbiter is not impartial - 
to seek balance or justice - but partial to ensure policy is being applied appropriately. 
Thus there are particular problems for (recreational) minorities seeking (to maintain) rights of 
access when confronted by: 
- agencies attempting to execute an environmental brief which seeks to redistribute 
resources in favour of the environment, i.e., representing conservation values and seeking 
environmental justice, and 
- legal institutions which protect existing rights but do not redistribute rights of access. 
Participation in decision-making may confer some power but it does not automatically redress 
any imbalance and, as has been evident throughout this study, it is the distribution of power 
that determines the outcome of a dispute. Participatory planning can promote co-operation and 
perform a useful role in preventing rather than resolving conflict, but only if power is balanced. 
The case studies illustrated that environmental disputes are no exception to these rules. Where 
environmental groups are fighting development interests and are relatively powerless, the 
stronger interest will prevail. But where conservation groups are pitted against less powerful 
recreation interests they act like any other powerfiul group, particularly where they have 
powerful allies within the agencies of the state. Justice may be done in the name of the 
environment but it should not be confused with social justice. 
These problems are compounded when there is no forum which considers minority claims for 
socialjustice. In these circumstances, minorities have no option but to use the political process 
and thereby initiate conflict. 
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Almost without exception, the public institutions operated semi-participatory decision-making 
systems and were not politically neutral Indeed the case studies demonstrated that they were 
susceptible to political strength, either in seeking to produce an equitable distribution of 
resources between equally powerful lobbies or an inequitable one in favour of the politically 
organised and powerful These institutions reflected the current balance of power and what 
they did not (and arguably were not constituted to) do was empower the weak and secure 
equitable treatment for minority groups. 
Civil law legitimates the status quo and any resolution of disputes by litigation operates within 
the existing distribution of rights. Certain quasi-arbitration processes, in which there is an 
element of political discretion (such as the appeal system on development control) may be 
accepted as a legitimate use of power. But the greater political discretion, the more likely it 
is that minority groups will sense injustice and question the legitimacy of this form of decision-
making. 
This highlights an institutional inadequacy, the absence of an effective conflict resolution 
mechanism in British rural planning which can steer a dispute towards a just negotiation and 
secure a redistribution of rights of access. Its absence is likely to delay resolution of access 
issues or result in a continuing cycle of conflict episodes. Certainly few existing rural planning 
agencies would qualify as independent arbiters, on the grounds that they are not policy neutral. 
Agencies with multiple policy aims, such as national park authorities, have difficulty in 
achieving an appropriate balance in the eyes of competing stakeholders and even then are not 
perceived as neutral (Sidaway, 1993). While the remit of project officers in, for example, 
countryside management schemes may be balanced, they are relatively powerless. Any 
informal negotiation they initiate are outwith the conventional ambit of official decision-
making. To become legitimated, they would need to protect the rights of minorities and to 
operate within a legal structure (see Brown and Marriott, 1993 and Hodge, 1993). 
Whether such mechanisms can be put in place is an open question. To be perceived as 
legitimate and to achieve consensus, they would need to contain the critical elements identified 
in this study, such as effective communication, negotiative decision-making, plans or policy 
statements which can be revised to allow for change, and a decision-making body which is 
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prepared to involve the interest groups directly rather than consult them on proposals prepared 
away from public scrutiny. An extension of this analysis in further research may provide the 
basis for suggestions to rectify this institutional inadequacy. 
Theory and Prediction 
Theories operate within prevailing paradigms. Early theories of social conflict operated within 
the metaphor of the diseased body in which conflict was seen as a 'dysfunction' to be cured or 
eradicated. Later theorists used the metaphor of earth movement and the adjustment of 
tectonic plates. Within this paradigm conflict performs a functional role. Given the prevailing 
interest in conflict resolution, with its emphasis on management to 'solve the problem' of 
conflict, the broider perspective of social change has been neglected. This may be in part a 
semantic issue, as initiatives to 'build consensus' use the same techniques as mediation but 
move the emphasis towards seeking co-operation and away from crisis management. 
Nevertheless, the perspective of social change, with its emphasis on the inevitability of power 
struggles to test the support for public policies, may help to define the limits of mediation. 
This study has attempted to utilise and develop theory to practical ends. if the search for 
theory and method that provide better means of prediction has proved to be something of a 
mythical quest, at least this focus has proved a means of sharpening the analysis of conflicts. 
What the more rigorous theoretical analysis provides is clearer insight into which factors come 
into play at which stages of the dynamic process of conflict; a more realistic assessment of how 
decision-making can influence but not determine the outcomes of disputes; and the crucial 
contribution of power as an impetus to secure and control access to resources. These insights 
have been obtained by reviewing a range of theories, making an eclectic selection and 
identifying their complementary elements. This has also demonstrated that conflicts can be 
subject to formal analysis based on theory and that the construction of frameworks enables 
contributory factors to be organised to provide increased understanding of both conflict and 
co-operation. 
In the final analysis, the result (in terms of prediction) may be much the same as the assessment 
prepared by a mediator or negotiator who intuitively assesses the 'ripeness' of a dispute for 
negotiation, who considers the parties' willingness to negotiate and their 'best alternatives to 
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a negotiated agreement'. Neither the experienced practitioner not the theoretical analyst can 
predict the outcome with certainty. But their skills are complementary and each can learn from 
the other 
Issues for Future Research 
The analyses in this study have identified a number of issues that may warrant further 
investigation. 
Environmental Decision-making and the Basis for Public Intervention - Intervention in the 
public interest by national organisations with limited sectoral remits was a common feature 
of many of the case studies. These agencies are mandated to achieve certain policy goals 
and are not prepared, initially at least, to negotiate. Such agencies are powerful players in 
a political struggle and when they act unilaterally and neglect to involve the public, their 
decision-making is no longer seen as legitimate. 
The earlier analysis identified an institutional inadequacy: the absence of an effective conflict 
resolution mechanism in British rural planning which can steer a dispute towards a just 
negotiation and secure a redistribution of rights of access. The analysis developed in this 
study could be usefully replicated to cover a wider range of environmental conflicts and 
extended to explore the extent of "institutional inadequacy", Le., whether the arbitration 
offered within designation procedures or within the planning system perform benign roles 
of ensuring social and environmental justice, whether there is a need to reform systems of 
environmental decision-making and how such a system might operate. 
The Potential Contribution ofEnvironmental Mediation - This study has demonstrated the 
difficulties of applying a classification approach to assess whether certain types of conflict 
are more amenable to resolution by negotiation. It has shed some light on the distinctions 
between belief, interests and principles and how these may be depicted during the active 
phases of a conflict. Further investigation might explore these relationships further to 
identify the limits of mediation in this respect. Given the critique of environmental 
mediation, which suggests that it may be used by the powerful as a method of social control, 
research on decision-making might also assess the potential contribution of 'Alternative 
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Dispute Resolution' techniques as supplements to the administrative, legal and political 
processes of environmental decision-making. 
Theory and Modelling - This study has demonstrated the advantage of using both social and 
negotiation theory in developing conceptual frameworks. This eclectic approach to theory 
might be extended to investigate the development of predictive models. Further 
consideration might be given to the role that beliefs and principles play in defining and 
maintaining group cohesiveness. Organisational theory might be examined to provide 
insights into the extent to which internal organisational issues influence the action of key 
players (e.g., government agencies) in complex multi-party environmental conflicts. 
Political science theory might be utilised to extend the limited analysis in this study of the 
role of the state and functions of its institutions in environmental decision-making. 
Research Method - Methodological issues have not been examined in this study. The 
emphasis on examining the dynamic processes of environmental conflicts over time presents 
a classic dilemma. If conflict is only understood by following processes over a period of 
time via longitudinal research, can the findings from intensive case studies be generalised 
to obtain reliable results which validate theory? This topic is worthy of detailed 
consideration. 
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CONCLUSIONS ON HYPOTHESES 
In relation to the Hypotheses it can be concluded that 
Hypothesis 1 
It is possible to identify a series of characteristic factors which distinguish between 
conflicts and co-operation concerning conservation and recreation irrespective of 
their institutional, cultural and geographical settings. 
With the caveat that these conclusions are particular to conflicts between conservation 
and recreation, they may well apply to other environmental conflicts but are unlikely 
to be capable of wider generalisation. 
Hypothesis 2 
It is possible to identify the underlying theoretical concepts and social processes which 
govern the development of conflicts and which may be used to predict their outcomes 
Hypothesis 3 
The factors which lead to the resolution of conflicts between conservation and 
recreation by negotiation may be identified and used to assess the likelihood of 
resolution being achieved by consensus. 
These objectives were met by developing a series of conceptual frameworks. 
Hypothesis 4 
4 A combined analysis of the processes of social conflict and participative decision-
making increases the likelihood of predicting the outcomes of conflicts between 
conservation and recreation. 
The combination of theory proved valuable in providing complementary elements in a 
more detailed analysis but the improvement in prediction was marginal, given the 
inherent difficulty of measuring the distribution of power. 
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ANNEX 1: EXAMPLES OF CONFLICT DEFINITIONS 
To a large extent the concepts that are used to describe conflicts are themselves a product of the 
author's perspective. Rex (196 1) recognises "that social relations and activities can be judged 
necessary or unnecessary, functional or dysfunctional, according to which of a number of 
conflicting standpoints they are looked at" (ibid. 120). He points out that Weber implies that 
"the conceptual scheme of the sociologist might be affected by the particular value-standpoint 
which he himself adopts" (ibid. 121). Added to that is the problem of identifying cause and effect 
in a sequence of events. The range of definitions which have been identified in this review 
certainly illustrate a varying range of perspectives. These definitions were analysed to see how 
far they focus on the causes of conflict, its effects, or the process which relates them. 
Coser (1956) emphasises cause and process by including motives (competition for scarce 
resources, etc.) and struggle: 
"... the struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources in which 
the aims of the opponents are to neutralise, injure or eliminate their rivals. This working 
definition serves only as a point of departure" (Coser, 1956, 8). 
Deutsch (1973) is alone in emphasising the effects of conflict by basing his definition on the 
effects that incompatibilities are likely to have on the opposing parties: 
"A conflict exists whenever incompatibilities occur... An action that is incompatible with 
another action prevents, obstructs, interferes, injures or in some way makes the latter 
less likely or less effective" [He suggests competition can produce conflict] 
"Competition implies an opposition of goals of the independent parties such that the 
probability of goal attainment for one decreases as the probability for the other 
increases". [But he also suggests that conflict may occur in a cooperative situation where 
goals are compatible] (Deutsch, 1973, 10). 
Blalock (1989) is concerned about the process of conflict and its outcome in writing about "an 
exchange" which leads to "negative sanctions or punitive behaviours": 
"[Social conflict is the] international mutual exchange of negative sanctions or punitive 
behaviours by two or more parties which may be individuals, corporate actors or more 
closely knit quasi-groups" (Blalock, 1989). 
Two definitions are concerned with the process alone, Weber (quoted in Baumgartner et al, 
1978) and Beals and Siegal (1966) where the emphasis is on power relationships or an 
"exchange of opposition" (ie., adversarial struggle): 
"Social conflict is social interaction where each actor in a conflict relationships attempts 
to carry out his or her own will over the opposition or resistance of others" (attributed 
to Weber in Baumgartner et al, 1978, 109). 
"... Conflict should be described in terms of breaches of normally expected behaviour 
that lead to dialogue recognised as exchange of oppositions" (Beals and Siegal, 1966, 
26). [They strongly contest the view that conflict is invariably over scarce resources]. 
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The initial description of conflict in Baumgartner et al focuses on the incompatibilities of the 
actors (cause) but they subsequently discuss both the process and effect (the attempt to realise 
incompatible goals etc, in the face of opposition): 
"Conflict arises when actors engaged in a situation have incompatible viewpoints, beliefs, 
goals or preferences with respect to conditions in that situation" (Baumgartner et al, 
1978, 107). 
"...Such conflict occurs when actors involved in a concrete setting try to implement or 
realise incompatible goals or preferences with respect to particular conditions, 
interaction patterns or outcomes in the face of one another's opposition" (Baumgartner 
eta], 1974, 110). 
Miller (1974) deals with cause and effect by emphasising value differences and competition for 
scarce resources as well as the threat to the interests of others (potential effect): 
"By social conflict I mean that state of a social relationship in which incompatible 
interests between two or more persons give rise to a struggle between them. The notion 
of a clash of interests presupposes something more than what is typically implied by 
such terms as "disagreement", "difference of opinion" or "controversy". The conflict 
may involve value differences or personal animosities or competition for scarce 
resources [author's italics] or some combination, but in any case, the personal interests 
of one or more parties must appear to be threatened" (Miller, 1974, 177- 8). 
If the reason why the different emphases given in these definitions is not immediately clear, 
Pondy (1967) neatly circumvents the issue. His immediate concern is to recognise the dynamic 
nature of conflicts which he sees as a process of episode and aftermath which in turn sets the 
stage for the next episode. This seems to be a necessary prerequisite for any successful attempt 
at definition which should attempt to describe cause (relative to the situation in which the 
conflict occurs), the relationship or process during the course of the conflict and its potential 
effect so that in this way the event is distinguished from a routine disagreement or decision: 
"The term 'conflicf has been used at one time or another in the literature to describe: a) 
antecedent conditions (for example, scarcity of resources, policy differences) of conflict 
behaviour); b) affective states (e.g., stress, tension, hostility, anxiety, etc.) of the 
individuals involved; c) cognitive states of individuals, i.e., their perception or awareness 
of conflict situations and d) conflict behaviour, ranging from passive resistance to overt 
aggression. Attempts to decide which of these classes - conditions, attitude, cognition 
or behaviour - is really conflict is likely to result in an empty controversy. The problem 
is not to choose among these alternative conceptual definitions since each may be a 
relevant stage in the development of a conflict episode, but to try to clarify their 
relationships. 
"Conflict may more readily be understood if it is considered a dynamic process" (Pondy, 
1972, 395). 
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Within this thesis a working definition of conflict has been adopted which contains the following 
elements: 
- competing actors; 
- motives: claim on resource; 
- controversy: more than disagreement; 
- power: to gain access to or to control the access of others. 
Conflict is therefore defined as "... an unresolved dispute between competing interest groups 
which has reached the public arena, is controversial and may have political consequences. 
Typically one group is attempting to control the action of another or their access to a 
semi-natural resource" (Sidaway, 1991, 1). 
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APPENDIX 2: DEFINITION OF FACTORS USED IN THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
IN CHAFFER 2 
Group 1: NATURE OF BIOLOGICAL IMPACT 
Factor 1: Type of recreational activity 
Categorisation based on activity/habitat type, eg. watersports on inland water, access to remoter 
areas, motor sports, innovative sports. 
Factor 2: Nature conservation status of site 
Categorised by protected designations or notifications such as: Site of Special Scientific Interest 
(SSSI); Special Protection Areas (SPA) for breeding birds EC Directive 79/409; internationally 
important Ramsar wetland sites or by impacts on a Charismatic Species ie: Endangered/ 
threatened or large species (US "charismatic megafauna") eg bears, moose, raptors. or Schedule 
1 Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 (UK) species. 
Factor 3: Type and incidence of impact 
Quantified as extent, timing and/or frequency of damage to vegetation, e.g., area affected; it may 
be possible to quantify disturbance: e.g., per cent breeding population affected, or nos. disturbed 
per nesting season in a given area. 
Factor 4: Level of visitor pressure 
Quantified as levels of visitor use within impact area. 
Factor 5: Understanding of impact 
Level of knowledge of impact including information on critical periods eg. breeding/resting 
seasons. Classified as understood or uncertain. 
Group 2: CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERESTS 
Factor 6: Nature of interests 
To cover the range of interests concerned with the resource 
Categories: Material - commercial; proprietorial; Altruistic - public access; resource 
conservation; Managerial or professional; Self-interest - recreation. 
Factor 7: Number of Interests 
Number of interest groups or stakeholders in the dispute. 
Factor 8: Conflicting ideologies 
Categories: Opposed or shared by interest groups 
Factor 9: Advancement of principles 
Whether motive of interest group is presented either as a principle (a broad altruistic aim such 
as freedom to roam or protection of the countryside) which should be applied generally but 
advanced within the dispute; or the advancement of an interest or material benefit to an 
interested party. 
- 	 2O3 
Factor 10: Environmental Awareness of Interest Groups 
Relates to knowledge of interest groups and their perception of and response to their biological 
impact on the resource. Categorised according to their perception and response - sensitive or 
insensitive 
Group 3: INTEREST GROUP INTERACTIONS DURING DISPUTE 
Factor 11: Appropriateness of resource use 
Whether recreation activites are considered to be an appropriate or inappropriate use of the 
resource, as defined by existing resource users and/or managers, and whether this has become 
an issue in the dispute. Appropriatness not/disputed 
Factor 12: Communication networks 
Whether formal and/or informal communication networks are established and/or used. 
Categorised as well established, poorly established; effective or ineffective. 
Additional information: Whether interest groups are prepared to establish a common pool of 
information (qv. conflict mediation). 
Factor 13: Reaction to new claim on resource 
Perceived impacts of one interest group on another, particularly on part of established interest 
group/users when status quo is challenged. Categories: adverse or tolerant. 
Factor 14: Negotiating Strategies of interest groups 
Method of negotiation categorised as: Confrontational, i.e., conducting campaigns to present 
a sectional view (only one side of argument), acting provocatively or taking pre-emptive 
actions; or Conciliatory, i.e., prepared to compromise to reach agreement, responsive to others' 
interests. 
Factor 15: Involvement of media 
Level of involvement categorised as high or low 
Group 4: INSTITUTIONAL SETTING 
Factor 16: Level of political organisation 
Level of organisation as indicated by Unorganised, ie,. unable to operate politically, individuals 
attempting to represent interest, inept at using media; Organised, i.e., volunteer officers and 
committee structure, limited contacts with other organisations of similar interest; or Highly 
organised: i.e., professionally represented, iflThated to wider political network, effective in using 
media. 
Factor 17: Acceptance of management aims 
Whether aims set out in management plan are clearly articulated and leave scope for ambiguity 
and therefore may be challenged. Categorised as accepted or challenged. 
Factor 18: Public involvement in decision-making 
Categoried as:no public involvement, limited involvement, i.e., limited to immediate 
stakeholders; or wide involvement, i.e., deliberate attempt made to canvass a wide range of 
public views. 
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Factor 19: Type of decision-making 
Categories: adversarial, i.e., the extent to which specialist or legal representation of interests 
forces people or groups into role-play, e.g. at public inquiries or hearings. Planning may be 
reductionist in its approach itemising interests and therefore polarising them; or negotiative, i.e., 
interests are drawn into a discussion to establish common interests and a collaborative approach 
to problem solving. 
Factor 20: Mechanisms to deal with change 
Whether there is decision-making structure that is responsive to changing situations e.g., habitat 
degredation; species decline or colonisation or the advent of new sport. Categorised as: Exists 
or absent. 
Factor 21: Authority of decision maker 
Whether authority of (final) decision maker is accepted because decison-making process is 
perceived as open and decision maker is accountable to wider constituency including interest 
groups (Justice is seen to be done). Decisions may be appealed to higher authority to whom 
decision maker is accountable. Conversely decisions may be seen to be arbitrary, undemocratic 
and unjust. Categories: Accepted or challenged. 
Factor 22: Distribution of power 
Whether the access to resources is equally or unequally distributed. May be assessed at national 
regional (provincial) or local levels. Categories: balance between them is equal or unequal. 
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APPENDIX 3: SYNOPSES OF CASE STUDIES ANALYSED IN CHAPTER 2 
RECREATIONAL USE OF TILL BOB MARSHALL WILDERNESS COMPLEX, 
MONTANA 
NB: Based on descriptions ofLimits ofAcceptable Change planning approach introduced in a 
controversial situation but no information obtained on previous history of conflict 
HISTORICAL SUMMARY 
1921 Aldo Leopold suggests wilderness areas are set aside within national forests. 
1930s Concept of wilderness areas promoted by Bob Marshall, US Forest Service (USFS) 
Chief of Recreation, who founds the Wilderness Society. 
1940 Following Marshall's untimely death, a 950,000 acre wilderness area is set aside in 
his memory. 
1960s Oil companies refused entry into the area. 
1964 Conservationists defeat proposals to dam the Sun River and flood the wilderness. 
1964 Passage of Wilderness Act by US Congress. 
Bob Marshall Wilderness Area of 1,009,356 acres classified. 
1972 USFS publishes management plan for Bob Marshall Wilderness Area which aroused 
public opposition and was never implemented 
Scapegoat Wilderness Area of 239,296 acres classified. 
1976 National Forest Management Act requires USFS to make regulations for wilderness 
areas which "limit and distribute" recreational use. 
1978 Great Bear Wilderness Area of 286,700 acres classified completing the Bob 
Marshall Wilderness Complex (BMWC) to be managed as a single unit. 
1981 Draft of "Limits of Acceptable Change" (LAC), developed in Maroon Bells- 
Snowmass Wilderness Area, Colorado and circulated within USFS for comment. 
1982 Proposals for oil and gas exploration in BMWC rejected for the second time. 
LAC Task Force for BMWC appointed by USFS. 
1982/5 Publication of background research on: 
recreational use patterns and solitude preferences (Lucas), campsite conditions 
(Cole) and LAC methodology (Stankey et al). 
1986 Formal Public Review process considers LAC exercise for BMWC as an amendment 
to forest plans. 
1987  Completion of Task Force exercise. 
Amendments to management area directions to Flathead, Helena, Lewis and Clarke, 
and Lolo Forest Plans accepted without appeals by individuals or organisations. 
1988- Monitoring of LAC with occasional Task Force involvement. 
Sources: McCool(1989), Stoakes (1990), USFS (1987); 
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NATURE OF BIOLOGICAL IMPACT 
Factor 1: Types of recreational activity Backpacking, horse trails, hunting, overnight camping, 
river rafting, overflying by light aircraft (Reference 1). 
Factor 2: Nature conservation status of site Designated Wilderness Area; protected habitat for 
charismatic Endangered Species: Grizzly Bear. Designated 
Factor 3: Type and incidence of impact Vegetation damage can be severe but localised around 
campsites, horses used by outfitters compete for grazing with local species, congestion at popular 
campsites effects enjoyment of backpackers, noise from aircraft disturbs other users (References 
1 and 2). Extent and frequency of damage and disturbance known from surveys (Reference 3). 
Factor 4: Level of visitor pressure Estimate of total use was 250,000 visitor days per year in mid-
Eighties (Reference 1). 
Factor 5: Understanding of impact Information on certain impacts (vegetation damage and 
number of encounters between visitors using trails) was obtained from surveys and used to 
manage zones. Not an issue of contention. (References 1 and 2) Understood. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERESTS 
Factor 6: Nature of interests i) Proprietorial: USFS; ii) Commercial; Outfitters, pilots 
iii) Altruistic/self-interest: Wilderness lobby [recreation and conservation organisations]; iv) 
Professional: USFS, academic researchers (Reference 4). 
Factor 7: Number of Interests Four groupings represented by 35 individuals in the Task Force 
(Reference 4). 
Factor 8: Conflicting ideologies Despite previous differences between backpackers and riders; 
outfitters and independent parties; pilots, other users and wilderness managers; outfitters and 
wilderness managers, the environmental community and the USFS (Reference 3), there is a 
general commitment to keep the area pristine with no development (Reference 2). Even a 
consistent critic of the LAC approach agreed there was a common purpose within the pro-
wilderness coalition (Reference 5), i.e., differences in ideology were respected but ignored. 
Shared 
Factor 9:_Advancement of principles Issues not elevated to a matter of principle, the LAC 
discussion were thought to have reduced tension and antipathy among users (Reference 4). 
Factor 10: Environmental awareness of interest groups Need for restrictions was generally 
understood and respected. Many of the users were as sensitive to impacts as the USFS officers 
and added to the knowledge of management issues (Reference 2). Horsemen regularly undertook 
maintenance for the USFS although there was some dispute about the seriousness of impacts of 
horses (Reference 5). Sensitive 
INTEREST GROUP INTERACTIONS DURING DISPUTE 
Factor 11: Appropriateness of resource use Permitted (appropriate) activities within Wilderness 
Areas are prescribed by the enabling legislation, while intensities of use are defined by zones as 
part of the LAC exercise so that this is not an issue (Reference 3). Appropriateness not disputed 
Factor 12: Comiithcation networks Direct contact between the users and the USFS was 
established by the formation of the LAC Task Force (Reference 3), while certain user groups have 
regular liaison meetings on management issues with local USFS staff (Reference 5). Well 
established 
Factor 13: Reaction to new claim on resource Any new claims have been resisted, whether from 
recreation users (e.g., mountain bikes) or development (e.g., oil and gas exploration) (Reference 
4). Adverse. 
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Factor 14: Negotiating strategies of interest groips Compared to the 'usual' approach of 
protesting at USFS decisions, appeal and then sue, discussions within the LAC Task Force were 
conciliatory. User provided solutions to problems (Reference 2). Conciliatory 
Factor 15: involvement of media Not known 
INSTiTUTIONAL SETTING 
Factor 16: Levelpf political orgnisaion Users represented on LAC Task Force by organisations. 
Organised 
Factor 17: Acceptance of management aims Broad agreement on management aims and detailed 
LAC measures as set out in agreed plan (some disagreement on detailed prescriptions by 
horsemen (References 2 and 5). Accepted 
Factor 18: Public involvement indecision!m&cing LAC based on transactive planning theory of 
public involvement throughout the planning process. Detailed involvement of users groups in the 
Task Force followed by public hearings to check whether there was wider acceptance within the 
community (References 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6). Wide Involvement 
Factor 19: TypQQfdecision-maldng LAC approach encourages negotiation within the Task force 
(Reference 2). Negotiative. 
Factor 20: Mechanisms to deal with change Concept of LAC (being based on change) should 
allow for adaptation but this is bound to be within the constraints of the composition of the Task 
Force and the Wilderness Act. However new impacts have been accommodated in the monitoring 
programme (Reference 7). Exists 
Factor 21: Authority of decision maker The use of the Task Force has legitimated USFS 
management decsons so that they have been accepted without challenge. In marked contrast to 
USFS experience elsewhere, the amended plan was not subject to any appeals (Reference 4). 
Accepted 
Factor 22: Distribution of power The composition of the Task Force was deliberately constructed 
to provide an even balance (Reference 4). Evenly balanced 
REFERENCES 
1. McCool(1986), 2. Personal interview on 22.8.90. with Arnie Bolle, Chair of LAC Task Force, 
3. Stoakes (1990), 4. Stoakes (1987), 5. Personal interview on 12.8.90. with Roland Cheek, Back 
Country Horsemen of Montana, 6.Ashor (1986). 7. Sidaway (1994). 
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NATURE CONSERVATION AND WATER RECREATION ON RUTLAND WATER 
HISTORICAL SUMMARY 
1960s Planning began to select reservoir site from 64 alternatives. 
1965 Water Resources Act created Welland and Nene River Authority. 
1970 Welland and Nene (Empingham and Mid-Northamptonshire Bill considered by 
Select committees of both Houses of Parliament, Act received Royal Assent. 
Empingham Reservoir Committee of river authority officers formed to supervise 
scheme. Local consultations began, including site meetings with farmers and 
landowners who received initial payments of compensation. Traffic Management 
Committee formed to monitor construction traffic. Nature Reserve Advisory 
Committee fcmed to coordinate development of nature reserve. Reservoir 
Working Party of engineering staff, landscape consultants, highway authorities, 
phinnmg Officers, Nature Conservancy Council and Leicestershire and Rutland 
Trust for Nature Conservation formed to oversee production of land use, recreation 
and landscape plans. 
1971 Empingham Reservoir Research Committee established to record and research 
archaeological and environmental changes. Technical staff appointed including 
nature reserve warden. 
1972 Empingham Reservoir Nature Reserve Committee appointed and contract to design 
and manage reserve awarded to Leicestershire and Rutland Trust for Nature 
Conservation. 
1972-6 Landscape and amenity works constructed. 
1974 Reorganisation of water industry creates Anglian Water Authority 
1976 Name of reservoir changed to Rutland Water. 
1977 First record of wildfowl breeding on site. 
1979 Top water level achieved for the first time. Official opening of nature reserve. 
Consultative Users Panel formed. 
1981 Part of area notified as Site of Special Scientific Interest (extended in 1983 and 
1987). 211 bird species recorded. 
1987 World Fly Fishing Championships held at Rutland Water. 
Sources: Appleton, 1982; Knights, 1982. 
NATURE OF BIOLOGICAL IMPACT 
Factor 1: Types of recreational activity Game fishing (trout), dinghy and board sailing, canoeing, 
sub-aqua, informal recreation, pleasure boat cruises (Reference 2). 
Factor 2: Nature conservation status of site 142 hectare nature reserve planned as an integral part 
of the reservoir scheme, which has since become a Grade 1 SSSI, later scheduled as a Special 
Protection Area for birds, a Ramsar site, and is rated as one of the most important inland 
wildfowl and wader sanctuaries in Britain (Reference 1). Designated 
Factor 3: Type and incidence of impact Disturbance to birds. The large scale of the reservoir 
(1254 hectares) allows any potentially harmful impacts to be mitigated by segregating activities 
into separate zones. Water sports are excluded from the nature reserve and there are seasonal 
restrictions to protect overwintering wildfowl (Reference 2). 
Factor 4: Level of visitor pressure Annual levels of use estimated at half million day visitors, and 
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50,000 anglers in 1990 (Reference 1). 
Factor 5: Understanding of impact Need for restrictions on water sports considered from the 
outset. Regular monitoring of bird populations and water sports activities are undertaken to 
ensure impacts are minimal, need for zones is accepted by water sports. Understood 
CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERESTS 
Factor 6: Nature of interests 
i) Propnetorial, commercial, professional:- water engineers and recreation managers; ii) Altruistic: 
conservation; iii) Altruistic/self recreation. 
Factor 7: Number of Interests Three groupings. 
Factor 8: Conflicting ideologies Differences in conservation and recreation ideologies remained 
but are largely ignored although suspicions remain (Reference 2). Opposed but suppressed 
Factor 9: Advancement of principles Tssues not elevated to a matter of principle, (Reference 2). 
Factor 10: Environmental awareness of interest groups Need for restrictions understood and 
generally respected by water sports, although there were moves to extend the fishing and sailing 
seasons which might affect the wintering populations of wildfowl (Reference 2). Sensitive. 
INTEREST GROUP INTERACTIONS DURING DISPUTE 
Factor 11: Appropriateness of resource use Zones allocated to different uses, not an issue. 
Appropriateness not disputed 
Factor 12: Communication networks Contacts were formed during the planning consultations. 
Conservationists, farmers and recreation users have been represented in the Consultative Users 
Panel which was established in 1979 (Reference 3). Well established. 
Factor 13: Reaction to new claim on resource Occasional claims for tourist development around 
the reservoir (Reference 2). Adverse. 
Factor 14: Negotiating strategies of interest groups Co-operation within the Consultative Users 
Panel. Conciliatory. 
Factor 15: Involvement of media: No information. 
INSTITUTIONAL SETTING 
Factor 16: Level of political organisation Conservation and recreation interests organised but no 
campaigning issues. (Reference 1). Organised 
Factor 17: Acceptance of management aims Management aims accepted within the framework 
of an agreed plan. Accepted 
Factor 18: Public involvement in decision-making A broad range of interests was considered 
during the consideration of the enabling legislation. Extensive local consultation during the 
planning phase and continued during reservoir construction. Regular liaison via the Consultative 
Users Panel (Reference 3). Wide Involvement. 
Factor 19: Type of decision-making Negotiative. 
Factor 20: Mechanism to deal with change Review of management plan allows for change but 
only within the scope of existing provision, i.e., motorised water sports were excluded from the 
outset. Exists. 
Factor 21: Authority of decision maker Authority of water company accepted, given that it 
operates within the enabling legislation. Accepted. 
Factor 22: Distribution of power Not evident but considered to be balanced. Evenly balanced 
REFERENCES 
1. Sidaway, (1991a); 2. Sidaway, (1988); 3. Knights, (1982). 
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CLIFF CLIMBING AT SOUTH STACK, ANGELSEY 
NATURE OF BIOLOGICAL IMPACT 
Factor 1: Types of recreational activity: Climbing bird watching, and sea canoeing (Reference 1). 
Factor 2: Nature conservation status of site: Nature reserve managed by Royal Society for the 
Protection of Birds (RSPB (Reference 1). Undesignated but protected species. 
Factor 3: Type and incidence of impact: Any potential disturbance to cliff nesting reserves is 
reduced to negligible levels by a voluntary seasonal restriction which bans climbing during the 
nesting season. This has been agreed by RSPB and British Mountaineering Council (BMC) and 
the site is wardened by RSPB (Reference 1). 
Factor 4: Level of visitor pressure: Incidence of climbing not recorded. 
Factor 5: Understanding of impact: Potentially damaging consequences of climbing near colonies 
of auks and other protected species is accepted by climbers and BMC. Understood. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERESTS 
Factor 6:Nature of interests: Proprietorial/altruistic: RSPB; Altruistic/self. BMC; Professional: 
both organisations. 
Factor 7: Number of Interests: Two 
Factor 8: Conflicting ideologies: Both climbing and nature conservation have strong ideologies 
but there is also a strong commitment to conservation by BMC in its policy documents. 
(Reference 2). Shared 
Factor 9: Advancement of principles: Any differences are respected and ignored by both parties 
in negotiating the voluntary restriction (Reference 2, pages 13-17). 
Factor 10: Environmental Awareness of interest groups: The need for restrictions is understood 
and respected by BMC who have well developed conservation policies (Reference 2) Sensitive 
INTEREST GROUP INTERACTIONS DURING DISPUTE 
Factor 11: _Appropriateness of resource use: Not an issue, seasonal restriction is used as a 
precautionary measure. Appropriateness not disputed 
Factor 12: Communication networks: The need for the restriction is renewed annually and there 
is frequent local liaison between the two organisations (Reference 1). Well established 
Factor 13: Reaction to new claim on resource: None has arisen or is likely. 
Factor 14: Negotiating strategies of interest groups: Both organisations favour negotiation, i.e., 
BMC policy is to favour voluntary access agreements where necessary, whilst RSPB prefer 
voluntary restrictions where the responsibility for enforcement is placed on the user (Reference 
1). Concilzatoy 
Factor 15: Involvement of media: None recorded. 
INSTITUTIONAL SETTING 
Factor 16: Level of political organisation: Both RSPB are BMC are highly organised, BMC 
employing a professional Access and Conservation Officer (Reference 2) . Highly organised 
Factor 17: Acceptance of management aims: BMC accept RSPB's aims in managing the reserve. 
Accepted. 
Factor 18:Public involvement in decision-making: The local agreement is also part of a national 
agreement between the two organisations which is negotiated directly between them with the 
knowledge of their members. There is no public involvement. 
Factor 19: Type of decision-making: Direct negotiation. Negotiative. 
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Factor 20: Mechanisms to deal with change: The annual review and frequent liaison about the 
restrictions allow for adjustment to change. Exists. 
Factor 21: Authority of decision maket There is shared responsibility for the decisions concerning 
restriction. 
Factor 22:Distribution of power: Both parties are in a strong position to negotiate as equal 
partners. Evenly balanced. 
REFERENCES 
1. Sidaway, (1991a); 2. Sidaway, 1988. 
WATER RECREATION AND THE DESIGNATION OF THE OOSTERSCHELDE 
NATURE RESERVE 
HISTORICAL SUMMARY 
1953 	Disastrous flooding of 150,000 ha. 72,000 people evacuated, 1,835 lost their lives. 
Establishment of Delta Commission to examine feasibility of closing the estuary by dams and/or 
raising and re-enforcing the sea dikes. 
1955 	Final report of the Commission. 
1958 Delta Act. 
1961 Enclosure of Veerse Meer by completion of Zandkreek Dam (1960) and Veerse Gat Dam (1961). 
1967 	Zeeland Society of Science conference initiates formal opposition to closure of Oosterschelde. 
1971 Enclosure of Grevelingen with completion of Grevelingen Dam (1965) and Brouwers Dam (1971). 
Enclosure of Haringvliet with completion of Volkerak Dam (1969) and I-laringvliet Dam (1971). 
1973 	Klaasesz Commission examines feasibility of tidal barrier. 
1975 Sea dikes raised around the Oosterschelde. 
1976 	Agreement to build tidal barrier. 
1982 Publication of Policy Plan by the Stuurgroep Oosterschelde (Oosterschelde Steering Group). 
1983 	Participants in the Stuurgroep Oosterschelde signed the 'declaration of intent based on the Policy Plan. 
1986 Completion of Oosterschelde barrier, Philips Dam and Oesterdam. 
1989 	Designation of inter-tidal areas of Oosterschelde as Ramsar reserve. 
Adoption of the Policy Note Oosterschelde as official extension to the Streekplan (Regional Plan) for 
Zeeland. 
1990 	Designation of inter-tidal area of Oosterschelde as (State) Nature Reserve based on the Nature 
Conservation Law. 
Protest rally by Recreatie Overleg Oosterschelde (Action group of Recreation Interests). 
1992 	Publication of the draft report Evaluation Policy Plan Oosterschelde (Evaluatie Beleidsplan Ooster- 
schelde) and approval by the Stuurgroep Oosterschelde. Zoning regulations introduced for the 
Oosterschelde nature reserve. 
Sources: 	Ministry of Transport and Public Works (1989); Zeeland Information Department (1983); 
Stuurgroep Oosterschelde (1992); personal interviews by R. Sidaway (1991) 
NATURE OF BIOLOGICAL IMPACT 
Factor 1: Types of recreational activity Wide range of water sports including bait digging, 
canoeing, charter boats, cruising, jet skiing, sailing, sport fishing (by boat), sub-aqua diving, 
windsurfing (Reference 1). 
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Factor 2: Nature conservation status of site The entire estuary is designated as a wetland site of 
international importance, under the Ramsar convention, on account of its breeding and over-
wintering bird populations. It regularly attracts significant proportions of European populations 
of wildfowl and waders (Reference 1). Designated 
Factor 3: Type and incidence of impact Disturbance to birds and seals. Not directly assessed, 
general correlations between recreational use and apparent changes in population are cited by 
conservation bodies as justifying restrictions (Reference 1). 
Factor 4: Level of visitor pressure Recreational use of the water bodies and intertidal areas were 
not assessed, nor was the survey data collected by conservation bodies publically available 
(Reference 1). 
Factor 5: Understanding of impact Potential recreational impacts, such as disturbance to birds 
or seals have not been researched locally but inferences made from research elsewhere, some of 
which are contradictory. Impacts of restrictions on pleasure boats and their effects on the local 
economy were not assessed (Reference 1, p.  12-13). Uncertain and contentious. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERESTS 
Factor 6: Nature of interests i) CommerciaL shell fishing and tourism; ii) Altruistic: conservation; 
iii) Altruistic/self recreation; iv) Professional: government planners. 
Factor 7: Number of Interests Three main groups, the professionals being replicated at three levels 
of government. 
Factor 8: Conflicting ideologies Sailors and fishermen are keen to assert their rights of freedom 
to navigate the high seas, whilst nature conservationists are enthusiastically defending nature 
development. "There are two different worlds and there is no way to bring them together." 
(Reference 1). Opposed 
Factor 9: Advancement of principles Issues have been elevated to a matter of principle, e.g., 
conservation officials have insisted on the principle of blanket restriction instead of introducing 
zoning to separate competing activities (Reference 1). 
Factor 10: Environmental awareness of interest groups The lack of convincing local data on the 
effects of recreation on wildlife engendered suspicion among sailors who required proof of 
damage (Reference 1). Insensitive. 
INTEREST GROUP INTERACTIONS DURING DISPUTE 
Factor 11: Appropriateness of resource use The designation order for the nature reserve excluded 
motorised water sports from the estuary as an inappropriate use and curtailed access to 
sandbanks. Appropriateness disputed 
Factor 12: Communication networks There was little effective communication between the 
interests which were not directly represented on the Steering Group, which in turn was considered 
remote (Reference 1). Poorly established. 
Factor 13: Reaction to new claim on resource The attitudes of nature conservation organisations 
reflects their adverse reactions to previous recreational use and tourism pressure in Zeeland. 
Local communities and recreational groups may support designation in principle but resist 
conservation measures being put into effect (Reference 1). Adverse. 
Factor 14: Negotiating strategies of interest groups Conservation organisations have chosen to 
impose regulations and confront other interests rather then negotiate with them (Reference 1). 
Confrontational. 
Factor 15: Involvement of media Little direct evidence obtained, but there appears to have been 
high (albeit temporary) press interest in the protest rally by sailing boats, while conservation 
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organisations maintained close contacts with the provincial press (Reference 1). High 
INSTiTuTIONAL SETTING 
Factor 16: Level of political organisation Nature conservation interests were highly organised, the 
Zeeuwse Milieufederatie (ZMF) membership includes 30-3 5 local organisation and about 1800 
individual members. It had a professional staff and maintains close contacts with members and 
officials in the provincial government and a range of national contacts. In comparison, the 
recreation sector was weakly organised latterly forming a federation - Recreatie Overleg 
Oosterschelde - in an attempt to counter ZMFs activity (Reference 1). Marked disparity between 
recreation - Organised - and conservation -Highly organised. 
Factor 17: Acceptance of management aims Although the nature reserve was unchallenged in 
principle, the detailed regulations were bitterly opposed by water sports organisations (Reference 
1). Challenged 
Factor 18: Public involvement in decision-making Public hearings were held during the formal 
stages of planning consultation but there was no wider forum to broker views resulting in a lack 
of local consent (Reference 1, pp. 7,19). Limited Involvement. 
Factor 19: Type of decision-making Autocratic - in that the restrictions were imposed- and 
adversarial - in that ZMF successflAlly appealed to the courts to secure the closure of Scheiphoek 
as a recreational harbour (Reference 1). Adversarial. 
Factor 20: Mechanisms to deal with change Lack of a management board or project team which 
might mediate change and a strategic plan for tourism and recreation in the Delta which might 
balance uses over a wider scale (Reference 1). Absent. 
Factor 21: Authority of decision maker The authority of national government and its agencies 
is accepted. Accepted. 
Factor 22: Distribution of power Uneven, the greater strength of the conservation lobby is shown 
to be the way in which conservation officials in the Hague hold power (Reference 1). 
Unequal. 
REFERENCES 
1. Sidaway (1992b). 
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DESIGNATION OF SKOMER MARINE NATURE RESERVE 
HISTORICAL SUMMARY 
Early 1900s. - initial interest shown in island by ornithologists 
1944 	Detailed biological survey by West Wales Field Society 
1954 Island notified as SSSI by Nature Conservancy 
1959 Island acquired as National Nature Reserve (NNR) by Nature Conservancy and West Wales 
Naturalists' Trust 
1971 	Local proposal for marine reserve. 
1974 Steering committee for marine reserve established. 
1976 Management plan for marine reserve prepared and Management Committee formed. 
1981 Wildlife and Countryside Act provided powers to designate Marine Nature Reserves (MNR). 
1982 	Skomer designated as a Special Protection Area for wild birds. 
1986 Nature Conservancy Council (NCC) circulated proposals for MNR in draft consultation document 
1987 	Appointment of liaison officer for MNR, first collation of dat on diving and potential disturbance. 
Secretary of State for Wales requires NCC to undertake further consultations after representations 
from British Sub-Aqua Club and Sports Council for Wales on proposed bylaws. 
1989 Revised consultation document accepted by Secretary of State. 
1990 Designation of MNR confirmed by Secretary of State. 
1991 First meeting of Advisory committee to MNR. Marine Conservation Officer for MNR appointed. 
1993 	Agreed Management Policy issued by Countryside Council for Wales. 
Sources: Countryside Council for Wales, 1993, NCC, 1986, 1987; Sidaway, 1988. 	-- - 	I 
NATURE OF BIOLOGICAL IMPACT 
Factor 1: Types of recreational activity Sub-aqua; canoeing, fishing (Reference 1). 
Factor 2: Nature conservation status of site Skomer island was notified as a SSSI in 1954, 
designated as a NNR when it was purchased by conservation bodies. Designation of the MINK 
was proposed in 1986 and confirmed in 1993. (References I and 2). Designated. 
Factor 3: Type and incidence of impact Disturbance data on cliff nesting sites and seal calving 
areas sporadic and disputed. Data on damage to marine wildlife by divers not known (Reference 
1). 
Factor 4: Level of visitor pressure Estimates of divers using reserve waters of 450 in 1973, 1560 
in 1985 (Reference 3) and 1433 in 1987 (Reference 4). Diving is concentrated on wrecks away 
from breeding sites (Reference 4). 
Factor 5: Understanding of impact Value of records on disturbance events collected by NCC was 
challenged by divers and Sports Council for Wales, Potential damage to marine wildlife by divers 
not assessed (Reference 1). Uncertain and contentious. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERESTS 
Factor 6: Nature of interests i) Proprietorial/AltruisticfProfessional: NCC/conservation; ii) 
Altruistic/sell divers 
Factor 7: Number of Interests Two 
Factor 8: Conflicting ideologies Both divers (espousing the right to dive anywhere in British 
territorial waters) and nature conservationists (wanting to protect birds and marine wildlife) have 
a strong ideological commitment (Reference 1). Opposed. 
Factor 9: Advancement ofprinciples Underwater access became elevated to a matter of principle 
to the divers who had successfully campaigned against marine wreck legislation (Reference 1). 
Factor 10: Environmental awareness of interest groups Diving organisation require proof of 
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damage although many are also active members of the Marine Conservation Society (Reference 
1). Insensitive 
INTEREST GROUP INTERACTIONS DURING DISPUTE 
Factor 11: Appropriateness of resource use Bylaws proposed during consultation would exclude 
inappropriate use from most sensitive areas of potential reserve (Reference 1). Appropriateness 
disputed 
Factor 12: Communication netwodcs Although there was regular contact between the 
conservation and diving organisations within the local management committee of the voluntary 
reserve, it appears that the diving representatives failed to report back to their national 
organisation (Reference 1). Well established but ineffective. 
Factor 13: Reaction to new claim on resource Divers not opposed to MNR in principle but 
resisted the voluntary code of practice becoming legally enforceable bylaws (Reference 1). 
Adverse. 
Factor 14:Negotiating strategies of interest groups Local discussions became confrontational 
when national secretary of British Sub-Aqua Club (B SAC) took legalistic approach (Reference 
1). Confrontational. 
Factor 15: Involvement of media Probably high locally. Not measured 
INSTITUTIONAL SETTING 
Factor 16: Level of political organisation Conservation "coalition" of NCC and local wildlife trust 
was well organised as were the divers nationally (Reference 1). Highly organised. 
Factor 17: Acceptance of management aims Although the principle of the marine reserve was 
accepted by the divers, the proposed bylaws were challenged vigorously (Reference 1). 
Challenged. 
Factor 18: Public involvement in decision-making There was direct involvement of most interests 
on the management committee of the voluntary reserve. Formal consultations were made on the 
designation order and there is now even wider representation on the advisory committee of the 
MINR (References 1 and 2). Limited to wide Involvement 
Factor 19: Type Qfdec1stonmak1n.g Once the legal process of formal consultation with rights of 
appeal was instituted, decision-making became adversarial (Reference 1). Adversarial. 
Factor 20: Mechanisms to deal with change Management plan provides mechanism to consider 
change. Exists. 
Factor 21: Authority of decision maker Whilst the exercise of NCC's statutory powers was 
challenged, the ultimate authority of the Secretary of State for Wales was accepted. Accepted. 
Factor 22: Distribution of power NCC's statutory power was matched by BSAC legal expertise. 
Strong and evenly balanced 
REFERENCES 
1. Sidaway, (1988); 2. Countryside Council for Wales, (1993); 3. NCC, (1986); 4. NCC, 1987 
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COUNTRYSIDE ACCESS FOR MOTOR SPORTS IN ENGLAND AND WALES 
NB: A generalised case covering many localities. 
HISTORICAL SUMMARY 
1907 	World's first purpose-built motor racing circuit established at Brookiands, Surrey. 
First Tourist Trophy motorcycle race on Isle of Man 
1920s Off road motor cycling begins as a specialist activity. 
1950s Off road events become a spectator sport 
1960s Off road rallies become popular. 
1970s Decline of British motorcycle industry and emergence of Japanese manufacturers. Replacement of two 
stroke with four stroke engines. Membership of ACU clubs at peak, decline in adult competition, 
growth of youth motor cycling. Introduction of specific trail motorcycles. 
1974 	National Park Policies Review Committee considers noisy pursuits to be out of place in national parks. 
1976 Public inquiry into Traffic Regulation Order on the Ridgeway long distance route finds that trail riders 
should not be excluded from its use. 
1986 	Motor sports organisations found the Land Access and Recreation Association to represent their 
countryside interests. 
1987 	A survey by the Royal Society for Nature Conservation instances damage or disturbance in 68 SSSIs 
and 44 County Wildlife Trust reserves. 
1991 Department of Environment (DOE) removes the limited exemptions from planning permission for 
motor sports within SSSIs. 
National Parks Review Panel recommends that the second purpose of national parks be redefined as 
"promoting quiet enjoyment" and that permitted development rights for motorcycle scrambling should 
be reduced from 14 to 7 days. 
1992 	Second public inquiry into Traffic Regulation Order on the Ridgeway confirms that trail riders should 
not be excluded from its use 
1995 	House of Commons Environment Committee recommends regional planning strategies to identify sites 
for noisy and obtrusive activities and that national park and highway authorities initiate collaborative 
negotiations to manage green lanes. 
Government rejects House of Lords amendment to Environment Bill promoting quiet enjoyment in 
national parks. 
Sources: Elson et al (1986), DOE (1991), Edwards (1991), LARA (1993), House of Commons Environment 
Committee (1995). 
NATURE OF BIOLOGICAL IMPACT 
Factor 1: Types of recreational activity 19 different types of motor sport recognised by motor 
sports organisations (Reference 1). 
Factor 2: Nature conservation status of site Varies, motor sports events are not permitted in 
SSSIs but informal local use occurs (Reference 2). There is strong opposition to motor sports 
events in national parks (Reference 3) although events have taken place there long before the 
parks were designated. Designated and undesignated 
Factor 3: Type and incidence of impact Impacts of competitive events include: noise, smoke, 
fumes, traffic generation, large numbers of people, site erosion and general disturbance to local 
residents and wildlife (Reference 1). A survey by the Royal Society for Nature Conservation 
(RSNC) instanced damage or disturbance in 68 SSSIs and 44 County Wildlife trusts reserves 
(Reference 2). The impacts within national parks were said to be ". . . environmentally intrusive - 
noisy, ugly and damaging to wildlife and vegetation." although the extent of the impacts was not 
quantified in this report (Reference 3). Local data exists, e.g., the locations used by informal 
motor sports were identified in an earlier survey by the Dartmoor National Park (Reference 1). 
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Factor 4: Level of visitor pressure Formal participation in events via motor sports clubs estimated 
at 2000,000; informal participation (local casual use) not known; trail riders (off road motor 
cycling on 'green lanes') estimated at 5000 (Reference 1). Motor cycle sales declined over the 
period 1990-1995 while sales of four wheel drive vehicles (but not necessarily their recreational 
use in the countryside) increased (Reference 4). 
Factor 5: Understanding of impact Damage to ground conditions at competitive events 
undoubtedly occurs but the extent of environmental disturbance is controversial (Reference 1). 
For, example, damage on rights of way from agricultural use may be attributed to recreational 
vehicles (References 1,4 and 5) and survey data in the Yorkshire Dales National Park has been 
challenged for this reason (Reference 6). Uncertain and contentious. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERESTS 
Factor 6: Nature of interests i) Preprietorial/seif landowners who may benefit financially; ii) 
Altruistic: nature conservation organisations; iii) Altruistic/self motorsports participants and 
organisations; iv) Self-interest: local residents particularly recent incomers (Reference 1). 
Factor 7: Number of Interests Four groupings 
Factor 8: Conflicting ideologies Nature conservationists are strongly committed to resource 
protection (Reference 2); newcomer residents are strongly committed to "peace and quiet" in the 
countryside and this is echoed within the national parks movement (References 1 and 3); while 
organised trail riders may be seeking the same exhilaration of moving through attractive 
countryside as walkers or horse riders and this gives rise to a conflict of interest between different 
sets of rural values (Reference 1). Opposed 
Factor 9:Advancement of principles Differences have become elevated to a matter of principle - 
"A true country lover would no more wish to ride a motorcycle across the fields and moors than 
a true cathedral lover would wish to ride up and down the aisles" (quoted in Reference 1). Trail 
riders research public rights of way records for evidence of ancient vehicular use and'.. regard it 
as a duty of life to keep open the ancient pre-Roman "green roads." (Reference 7). 
Factor 10: Environmental awareness of interest groups There is considerable variation. Examples 
of sensitivity include official events being highly regulated, clubs negotiating local access, codes 
of practice and access guides being issued by motoring organisations and manufacturers of off 
road vehicles and clubs undertaking repairs to rights of way. Nevertheless informal users may 
remain unsympathetic to environmental concerns or the interests of others (References 1 and 8). 
Both sensitive and Insensitive 
INTEREST GROUP INTERACTIONS DURING DISPUTE 
Factor 11: Appropriateness of resource use Opposition to the appropriateness of motor sports 
in the countryside is focused on the national parks. For example, "..noisy pursuits will nearly 
always be out of place in national parks." (Reference 10); "We recognise the intrusion caused by 
several noisy sports... .While we do not support their total prohibition in national parks, they 
should only take place on those rare sites where they do not cause undue annoyance to other park 
users or damage to the fabric of the park themselves. In most cases, there may be more 
appropriate sites outside the parks and recreation provision of this kind should be determined on 
a regional scale;" (Reference 3). Appropriateness disputed 
Factor 12: Communication network In an adversarial debate there seems to be little direct 
contact between the parties. Poorly established. 
Factor 13: Reaction to new claim on resource Conservation organisations (notably SRNC and 
the Council for National Parks) continue to press for further regulations and succeeded in 
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removing the limited exemptions from planning permission for local motor sports events within 
SSSIs (Reference 11). Local opposition has generally been successful in closing existing venues 
for events, refusing planning permission for new venues and obtaining Traffic Regulation Orders 
to restrict vehicular use when ancient rights have been legally established (References 1, 8 and 
11). Adverse. 
Factor 14: Negotiating strategies of interest groups Walker organisations are universally opposed 
to motorised use of rights of way (References 1 and 13) although the motoring organisations have 
attempted to negotiate, in some cases successfully and in others not. A local highway authority 
has even refused to hold a public inquiry to hear evidence against the downgrading of a right of 
way to exclude vehicles (References 1,4 and 8). However the motoring organisations have also 
taken an aggressive approach and answered in kind (References 12 and 13). Confrontational. 
Factor 15: Involvement of media Erratic and tending to misrepresent the motor sports case 
(Reference 1). Locally High. 
INSTITUTIONAL SETTING 
Factor 16: Level of political organisation Motor club network not federated with the national 
motoring organisations - the Royal Automobile Club Motor Sports Association and the Auto-
Cycle Union - which are reluctant to get involved in "political" action. Indeed there are conflicts 
between sports, and the need to provide a national forum and provide an effective lobby has been 
recognised (Reference 1). To some extent the Motoring Organisations' Land Access and 
Recreation Organisation (LARA) is filling that gap (Reference 4). In comparison, the nature 
conservation organisations and local communities are highly effective lobbies. Marked disparity 
between recreation - Organised and conservation -Highly organised: 
Factor 17: Acceptance of management aims The current aims of national park policy have been 
challenged by conservation organisations in seeking a legislative change towards "quiet 
enjoyment" (References 3 and 8). Challenged. 
Factor 18: Public involvement in decision-making While there is consultation on national planning 
issues and on a proposed noise code to be issued by DOE, the motoring organisations feel 
disadvantaged by this process, as they do over local planning decisions or traffic regulation 
hearings (References 1, 9 and 14). Limited Involvement. 
Factor 19: Type of decision-making Clubs have negotiated with landowners and LARA has 
changed its stance now seeking co-operation but most decisions are taken in the adversarial 
setting of a court or public inquiry (References 1 and 8y. Adversarial. 
Factor 20: Mechanisms to deal with change Change within the sport is continual, social attitudes 
are changing against the sports and access is being lost. Motor sports organisations tend to be 
excluded from any fora or feel these are biased and tending to formalise opposition against them. 
Planning is supposed to balance and mediate change but fails to secure access for motor sports 
(Reference 1). Absent. 
Factor 21: Authority of decision maker The opposing parties are working within the system and 
accept its jurisdiction. Accepted. 
Factor 22: Distribution of power Nature conservation organisations have proved to have 
considerable influence on this issue at a national level, while local residents have also been 
successful in advancing their interests. In comparison the motoring organisations have "lacked 
clout" (Reference 1). Unequal distribution ofpower. 
REFERENCES 
1. Elson et al(1986), 2. RSNC (1987), 3. Edwards (1991), 4. Stevens (1995), 5. Taylor (1993), 
219 
6. Stevens (1988), 7. Stead (1978), 8. LARA (1993), 9. National Park Policies Review 
Coitiiiittee (1974), 10. DOE (1991), 11. Motorsports Facilities Unit (1993), 12. IARA (1994a), 
13. LARA (1994b), 14. LARA (1991). 
WILDERNESS DESIGNATION IN NORTH WEST MONTANA 
HISTORICAL SUMMARY 
1921 	Aldo Leopold suggests wilderness areas are set aside within national forests. 
1930s Concept of wilderness areas promoted by Bob Marshall, US Forest Service (USFS) Chief of 
Recreation, who founds the Wilderness Society. 
1940 Following Marshall's untimely death, a 950,000 acre wilderness area is set aside in his memory. 
1954 USFS announces plans to log the Northern Swan range and the Middle Fork of the Flathead drainage 
(catchment). 
1960- Oil companies refused entry into the Bob Marshall wilderness. 
1964 Conservationists defeat proposals to dam the Sun River and flood the wilderness. 
1964 Passage of Wilderness Act by US Congress. 
Bob Marshall Wilderness Area of 1,009,356 acres classified. 
1972 	Scapegoat Wilderness Area of 239,296 acres classified. Bunker Creek in the Northern Swan logged 
despite public protest 
1976 Federal Land Protection and Management Act authorises Bureau of Land Management to begin 
wilderness studies. 
1978 	Great Bear Wilderness Area of 286,700 acres classified completing the Bob Marshall Wilderness 
Complex (BMWC) to be managed as a single unit Flathead river designated a Wild and Scenic River. 
Montana Wilderness Study Act passed providing temporary protection for 900,000 acres of national 
forest wildlands. 
1982 	Oil and gas exploration refused in the BMWC for the second time. 
1984 Congressional Bill to protect Monture Creek and Southern Swan but release Northern Swan and 
Rocky Mountain Front for logging is defeated. 
1988 Montana Wilderness Bill passed by Congress but vetoed by President Reagan. 
1990 	National Recreational Trails Fund Bill is promoted by the Blue Ribbon Coalition to construct 
backcountry trails for off road vehicles. 
Conservation groups propose Bob Marshall National Forest to be managed to protect wildlife and 
[appropriate forms of] recreation. 
Alliance for the Northern Rockies proposes 6.4 million acres of wilderness in Montana and no further 
forest land released for logging. 
Rival bills put before Congress propose 0.62 million acres of wilderness and 5.78 million acres of 
forest land released for logging (promoter: Senator Burns, Rep.); 2.08 million acres of wilderness and 
3.55 million acres of forest land released for logging (promoter. Representative Bauchus, Dem.); and 
3.3 million acres of wilderness and 3.1 million acres of forest land released for logging (promoter: 
Montana Wilderness Association). Representative Pat Williams (Dem.) submits Badger-Two Medicine 
Act to designate 93,000 acres on Rocky Mountain Front as wilderness area supported by petition with 
6,000 signatories. 
Kootenai-Lolo Accord is locally negotiated and signed by conservationist, hunting, fishing 
organisations, sawmill and logging trade unions and timber companies. It would secure the designation 
of 680,000 acres as wilderness and release 616,000 acres for logging. 
Sources: Montana Wilderness Association, 1990b; Montana Wildland Coalitions, undated. 
NATURE OF BIOLOGICAL IMPACT 
Factor 1: Types of recreational activity The following recreational activities are permitted in 
designated wilderness areas: backpacking, horse trails, hunting, overnight camping; fishing, cross 
country skiing, climbing, river rafting; while motorised use by off-road vehicles (ORVs) is not 
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permitted (Reference 1). 
Factor 2: Nature conservation status of site The conservation status of 6 million acres of roadless 
National Forest is in dispute with a range of claims being made as to the areas that should be set 
aside as Wilderness Areas (see historical summary). These areas include habitats of Endangered 
Species such as grizzly bear, bald eagle and grey wolf 
Factor 3: Type and incidence of impact Within the potential wilderness areas recreation impacts 
are not quantified (see synopsis of Bob Marshall Wilderness Area). Landowners were concerned 
about trespass by ORVs, poaching, illegal grazing in Badger-Two Medicine (References 2 and 
3). 
Factor 4: Level of visitor pressure Not assessed but not considered an issue compared to, say, 
the effects of logging. USFS does not collect figures on trail use and many registration stations 
have been abandoned (Reference 4). 
Factor 5: Understanding of impact Local impacts of logging understood, but there is controversy 
over its effects on endangered species and the socio-economic effects of a cessation of logging 
on local communities (References 5 and 6). Understood but contended 
CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERESTS 
Factor 6: Nature of interests i) Proprietorial; Blackfoot Indians; Proprietorial/Altruistic/ 
Professional: USFS; ii) Commercial: Lumber companies sawmillers and employees; iii) 
Altruistic/self Wilderness lobby - outdoor recreation and resource conservation; iv): 
Altruistic/self Blue ribbon Coalition (ORV users backed by lumber companies). (References 2, 
3 and 4). 
Factor 7: Number of Interests Two main lobbies which are coalitions of multiple parties. 
Factor 8: Conflicting ideologies Strongly opposed views on "wilderness preservation" vs" 
economic development" with some divergence on tactics within the wilderness movement 
between the hard line Alliance for the Northern Rockies and those prepared to back local 
negotiations, such as the Kootenai-Lolo Accord (Reference 3). Opposed. 
Factor 9: Advancement of principles Although the main protagonists are motivated by furthering 
their interests, they espouse symbolic arguments of principle such as Wilderness values and 
"crusading for Badger-Two Medicine" (MWA); "quality of life and freedom from control" (Blue 
Ribbon Coalition); "Horses and the culture of the West, akin to God and Motherhood" (Back 
Country Horsemen of Montana) (References 2, 3 and 7) 
Factor 10: Environmental awareness of interest groups Wilderness users are sensitive but 
developers are unsympathetic to environmental concerns (References 2, 3 and 7). Insensitive. 
INTEREST GROUP INTERACTIONS DURING DISPUTE 
Factor 11: Appropriateness of resource use Appropriateness of development (roads, oil and gas 
exploration and logging) and motorised access is at the heart of the debate. (Reference 4) 
Appropriateness disputed 
Factor 12: Communication networks Little direct contact between the two sides who 
communicate mainly via the media (except in the case of Kootenai-Lolo) Poorly established. 
Factor 13: Reaction to new claim on resource Adverse reactions to claims and counter claims 
whether for wilderness designation or road construction and logging proposals (References 2, 3 
and 4). Adverse. 
Factor 14:_Negotiating strategies of interest groups The main debate is highly confrontational 
lobbying for the rival Congressional bills, e.g. References 1, 5 and 8, although the Kootenai- Lob 
Accord is a local negotiation aimed at breaking the deadlock (Reference 9). ConfrontationaL 
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Factor 15:_Involvement of media High, and used by both sides. N.B. The press were excluded 
from the Kootenai-Lolo discussions (Reference 4). High. 
INSTITUTIONAL SETTING 
Factor 16: Level of political organisation Both lobbies highly organised with broad coalitions 
(References 3 and 10). Highly organised. 
Factor 17: Acceptance of management aims Management aims of the USFS are at the core of the 
dispute. Challenged 
Factor 18: Public involvement in decision-making The formal consultation procedures that the 
USFS is bound to follow are set out in legislation but there is intensive lobbying over the content 
of legislation which would "resolve" the dispute by designating certain areas (the range of options 
being canvassed in 1990 is given in the historical summary. The Kootenai- Lolo discussions 
between local wilderness groups and trade unions was an exceptional example of direct 
involvement and significantly did not involve the USFS (Reference 9). Limited Involvement. 
Factor 19: Type of decision-making Political lobbying to obtain state-wide legislation polarises 
any discussion in a highly charged adversarial atmosphere (again the Kootenai-Lolo Accord is the 
exceptional example of negotiation) (Reference 5). Adversarial. 
Factor 20: Mechanisms to deal with change Adjustment to change is difficult as USFS plans and 
rival legislation are highly contested. Exists in theory but largely Absent in practice. 
Factor 21: Authority of decision maker USFS decisions are likely to be challenged by appeals to 
higher authority all the way to the Supreme Court. Challenged. 
Factor 22: Distribution of power Difficult to assess. While the environmental lobby is seen to 
be locally well organised compared to local ORV groups (Reference 2), the combined strength 
of business interests and its Congressional lobbies is probably greater (Reference 11). Montana's 
elected representatives in Congress and the Senate have considerable influence. "Under the clubby 
rules of congress, especially the Senate, such matters as one small timber sale on one small forest 
with as few votes as Montana has is commonly decided by that state's delegation. It only took 
[Senator] Burns and [Representative] Baucus to cut the deal on the Yaak [forest land]" 
(Reference 5). Strong but Unequal. 
REFERENCES 
1. Montana Wilderness Association (undated), 2. Personal interview on 22.8.90. with Arnie Bolle, 
University of Montana, 3. Personal interview on 19-20.8.90. with Lou Bruno, President of 
Montana Wilderness Association, 4. Personal interview on 20. 8.90. with John Gatchell, Director 
of Montana Wilderness Association, 5. Montana Wilderness Association (1990a), 6. Power 
(1989), 7. Personal interview on 12.8.90. with Roland Cheek, Back Country Horsemen of 
Montana, 8. Montana Wilderness Association (1990b), 9. Montana Wilderness Association 
(1990c), 10. Alliance for the Northern Rockies, (1989), 11. Amy (1987). 
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RECREATIONAL ACCESS TO THE NORTHERN WOODS, MAINE 
HISTORICAL SUMMARY 
1783 	State lands in Maine first offered at auction 
1820 State of Maine separated from Massachusetts, by which time 10 million acres (half state) in private 
ownership. 
1854 Maine buys from Massachusetts the remaining rights to forest land in state. 
1895 	Industrial Journal of Bangor proposes 576,000 acre state park around Mount Katandin. 
1908 Maine State Federation of Women's Clubs propose commission to investigate purchase of Mt 
Katandin. 
1910 Congressman Guernsey introduces resolution in US House of Representatives for federal purchase of 
forest reserve around Mt Katandin. 
1919 	Representative Percival Baxter introduces bill for the creation of state parks and forest reserves in 
Maine. 
1931 Governor Baxter buys 200,000 acres including Mt Katandin and gives them to the state which become 
the Baxter State Park 
1937 Moves to create a national park which would include Mt. Katandin. 
1960s Forest land owners begin to collect recreational user fees. 
1971 North Maine Woods (NMW) association formed to operate perimeter checkpoints. 
1978 Bald eagle declared an endangered species in Maine 
1980 NMW becomes non-profit organisation covering 3 million acres. 
1982 	James Goldsmith acquires Diamond International Corporation, sells most of its assets but holds 1.7 
million acres of forest land in the northern New England States 
1987 Nature Conservancy (NC) acquire 3,800 acre Big Reed Forest Reserve. 
French water utility General Occidentale buys Goldsmith's holdings 
1988 Claude Rancourt (developer) buys 90,000 acres in Vermont and New Hampshire from Diamond 
Occidental Forests Inc. 
Congress directs USES to work with the Governor's Task Force on the Northern Forest Lands Study 
(NFLS) covering the forest areas of upper New York State, Vermont, New Hampshire and Maine. 
James River Corporation buy 560,000 acres from Diamond Occidental 
Rate of development increases with 17,000 acres subdivided into 331 lots, compared to 23,000 acres 
subdivided into 590 lots in previous three years. 
1989 NMW produces 5 year recreational management plan. 
NC acquire 1013 acre extension to the Big Reed Forest Reserve but negotiations for a further 1700 
acres collapse in summer 1990. 
Wilderness Society proposes Maine Woods Reserve of 2.7 million acres around Baxter State Park. 
Draft NFLS released for consultation. 
Great Northern Nekoska Corporation taken over by Georgia-Pacific Corporation who thereby acquire 
2.1 million acres of forest land and two pulp and paper mills in Maine. 
1990 NC and Land for Maine's Future Board acquire 40,000 acres from Diamond Occidental. 
Final version of NFLS suggests 27 strategies but makes no recommendations 
Governor's Task Force produce an action plan including the creation of a Northern Forest Lands 
Council to continue its work with Federal funding for land acquisition, easements, research and land 
conservation programmes. 
Sources: Austin, 1990; Kellert, 1989; Nature Conservancy, June 1990; Maine Audobon Society, October 1989; 
North Maine Woods, 1989a Stegner, 1990-, USFS and Governor's Task Force (1990), Governor's Task Force 
(1990). 
NATURE OF BIOLOGICAL IMPACT 
Factor 1: Types of recreational activity Backpacking, hunting, bird watching, fishing, camping, 
canoeing, cross country and downhill skiing, snowmobiling, off-road and all-terrain vehicle riding 
(Reference 1). 
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Factor 2: Nature conservation status of site Contains habitats of Endangered Species, e.g., bald 
eagle (Reference 2). Proposed Maine Woods Reserve provides habitat for black bear, moose, 
deer, beaver, otter, fisher, pine marten, great blue heron, broad-wing hawk, loon, bald eagle, 
osprey, peregrine and golden eagle (Reference 3). 
Factor 3: Type and incidence of impact Present recreational use is not an issue, public concern 
focuses on silvicultural practice, e.g., the effects of large scale clear felling and the subdivision of 
forest land, particularly on lakesides for holiday home development with the loss of traditional 
open access, decline in water quality, replacement of native vegetation and the disruption of 
wildlife migration routes (Reference 1). 
Factor 4: Level of visitor pressure Visitors to 3 million acres operated by North Maine Woods 
(NMW) increased from 43,000 in 1976 to 82,000 in 1988 (References 4 and 5). In 1985, NMW 
attracted 73,000 visitors, 425,000 hunting and fishing licences were issued in the State in 1985, 
while there were 73,000 visitors to Baxter State Park, 44,500 river rafters in northern Maine and 
11,600 canoeists on the Allagash River (Reference 6). Visits to Great Northern Paper Company 
lands exceed 155,000 in 1988 (Reference 3). 
Factor 5: Understanding of impact Surroundings ofbald eagle nesting sites protected by legal and 
voluntary agreements (Reference 2). Effects of logging and residential or cabin development 
known (Reference 1). Understood 
CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERESTS 
Factor 6: Nature of interests i) Proprietorial: Recreational land purchasers, developers, industrial 
landowners (timber companies); ii) Altruistic: Conservation organisations e.g., Wilderness 
Society, Maine Audobon Society, Maine Natural Resources Council, Nature Conservancy); iii) 
Altruistic/self recreational users, Appalachian Mountain Club; iv) Professional: State agencies, 
USFS (Reference 1). 
Factor 7: Number of Interests A large number of organisation forming two lobbies. 
Factor 8: Conflicting ideologies Recreational users: "open access to the woods" and Nature 
conservationists: "protection of resources" vs Landowners: property and development rights. 
Opposed 
Factor 9:Advancement ofpiinciples Issues elevated to a matter of principle, "Preserving northern 
New England's forests is a righteous cause.. .The effects of conservation are so far reaching that 
they amount to a moral imperative." (Reference 3). 
Factor 10: Environmental awareness of interest groups Sensitivity of recreational users not an 
issues with codes of practice for their use of private forests. New legislation to control 
silvicultural practice has been introduced to curtail insensitive logging. Developers remain 
insensitive. Insensitive 
INTEREST GROUP INTERACTIONS DURING DISPUTE 
Factor 11: Appropriateness of resource use Forest fragmentation, reduced public access and loss 
of wildlife habitat seen as threats to the traditional values of the Maine Woods (Reference 3). 
Appropriateness disputed 
Factor 12: Communication networks Little direct contact, largely through the media. Poorly 
established. 
Factor 13: Reaction to new claim on resource Conservation groups opposed to potential 
development plans of new landowners Existing users adverse to change of ownership/ potential 
loss of access; Owners adverse to potential wilderness designation, State adverse to Federal 
involvement (Reference 7). Adverse. 
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Factor 14:_Negotiating strategies of interest groups "I am vehemently against what the 
Wilderness Society has proposed. They would shut down northern Maine" (Woodland manager), 
[Professional foresters are] 'itinerant professional vandals" (former logger, Friends of Maine 
Woods) (Reference 8). Confrontational 
Factor 15: Involvement of media High, and used by all parties. High 
INSTITUTIONAL SETTING 
Factor 16: Level of political organisation Both lobbies highly organised with good political 
contacts. Highly organised: 
Factor 17: Acceptance of management aims Timber company's plans and silvicultural practices 
challenged by wilderness groups and former employees (References 8 and 9). Challenged 
Factor 18: Public involvement iiidecision-maki ng Limited consultation, each side producing 
counter proposals NFLS published two newsletters, circulated to 4,000 and 5,000 people in the 
two states and held two rounds of 21 public meetings attended by 1,000 people, as well as 
circulating its draft report to 1,200 individuals and organisations (8,000 copies of a summary) in 
the four states. It received 870 responses from 42 states (Reference 1). Limited Involvement. 
Factor 19: Type of decision-making Unclear. Publically adversarial but possible negotiations 
behind the scenes. Unclear. 
Factor 20: Mechanisms to deal with change No clear mechanism with many counter proposals 
and initiatives. Absent. 
Factor 21: Authority of decision maker Unclear, as there is multiple jurisdiction "It's just a fact 
of political life that no governor, no state legislative body is going to willy-nilly assign part of their 
sovereignty to some sort of regional of federal agency.....It's easier to identify the threat than it 
is to identify those areas where a town or unincorporated place or state has to look to higher 
authority. It remains to be seen what Congress will do. It could well be that the money that 
comes down from congress has strings attached to it." (Reference 10). "They [the Maine 
delegation] wanted to keep the decision-making very much in Maine (Reference 7). Challenged. 
Factor 22: Distribution of power Both sides hold certain veto powers but the situation is 
complicated by potential Federal intervention (Reference 10). Difficult to assess. 
REFERENCES 
1. USFS and Governor's Task Force (1990), 2. Maine Audobon Society (1989), 3. Kellert (1989), 
4. North Maine Woods (1989), 5. North Maine Woods (1990), 6. Land and Water Resources 
Center (1987), 7. Kukka, (1990), 8. Boucher, (1989); 9. Keehn (1989), 10. Capone, (1990). 
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MOORLAND ACCESS IN THE PEAK DISTRICT NATIONAL PARK 
HISTORICAL SUMMARY 
1826 Society for the Preservation of Ancient Footpaths founded in Manchester. 
1880 Manchester YMCA Rambling Club founded. 
1900 Sheffield Clarion Ramblers founded. 
1931 	National Council of Ramblers' Federations founded. 
First Winnats Pass rally campaigns for access in the Peak District 
1932 Mass Trespass of Kinder Scout, five ramblers imprisoned. 
1935 	National Council of Ramblers' Federations becomes the Ramblers' Association (RA). 
1939 Access to Mountains Act allows local authorities to apply for access orders but also made trespass a 
criminal offence (repealed by 1949 Act). 
1947 Special Committee on Footpaths and Access to the Countryside (Hobhouse) recommended need for 
access orders to all suitable land in national parks but not where this would seriously conflict with 
other users. 
1949 National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act gives powers to local authorities to enter into formal 
access agreements and to prepare maps of open country. Where access with landowners could not be 
agreed application could be made for compulsory access orders. 
1951 	Peak District National Park designated. 
1952 Peak Park Joint Planning Board (PPJPB) publishes open country map. 
1953-70 - 19 access agreements made within the Peak District covering 76 square miles. 
1970s First concerns by naturalists and moorland owners that 'wander-at -will' access might harm wildlife. 
1978 	National Park Plan (NPP) suggests that access might be limited in areas of high conservation value. 
1981 PPJPB acquires Roaches Estate. 
1984 PPJPB acquires Eastern Moors. Peak Park Wildlife Advisory Group prepared report on access and 
wildlife. 
1985 PPJPB and RA identifies six moorland areas for new agreements. 
1989 	Review of NPP promotes concept of access corridors and research on effects of access on wildlife. 
1990 Anderson's report for PPJPB suggests evidence of wildlife disturbance from access. RA responds by 
publishing harsh critique by Watson. Chatsworth Estate enters into access agreement with PPJPB 
which contains access corridors and sanctuary areas. 
1991 Review of National Parks (Edwards) promotes access management RA stages mass trespass 
campaign. 
1992 	Government response to Edwards reaffirms voluntary access agreements. PPJPB circulates draft 
Access Strategy advocating 'limits of acceptable change'. 
1993 	Dark Peak SSSI renotifled, consultation on Special Protection Area for wild birds. Renegotiations on 
terms for renewal of existing access agreements begins. Access consultative group established which 
recommends collaborative procedure for preparing access management plans. 
Sources: Peak Park Joint Planning Board (undated),Evidence submitted by the Peak Park Joint Planning Board 
to the 
 
use of Commons Environment Committee (1995). Stephenson, 1989. 
NATURE OF BIOLOGICAL IMPACT 
Factor 1: Types of recreational activity Climbing, hang gliding, mountain biking and walking 
(Reference 1). 
Factor 2: Nature conservation status of site National Park (designated 1951), Dark Peak SSSI 
(31,852 hectares, notified 1951, renotified 1993) and Special Protection Area for the conservation 
of wild birds EC Directive 79/409 (Reference 2). Designated 
Factor 3: Type and incidence of impact i) Path Erosion: common on peat hags, gritstone edges, 
popular routes, one tenth of the 3253 kni of public paths and rights of way considered to be in 
an unacceptable condition at the end of 1993/4 (Reference 3). ii) Disturbance to birds: Any 
serious disturbance is likely to be concentrated along the most popular routes but this is 
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unmeasured. "Even in the Peak District, with some of the most heavily used moorland areas in 
the country, there is limited firm evidence to link recreational use to wildlife decline." (Reference 
3). 
Factor 4: Level of visitor pressure 22 million visitor days to the national park (Reference 3). 
Factor 5: Understanding of impact Evidence on path erosion is clear but "The degree of 
disturbance caused by visitors to wildlife has been the subject of much conjecture." (Reference 
3). Research suggesting there is prime facie evidence for disturbance to certain ground nesting 
birds, such as curlew and golden plover has been challenged on methodological grounds. 
(References 3, 4, 5, 6). Uncertain and contentious. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERESTS 
Factor 6.: Nature of interests Proprietorial and commercial: landowners; Altruistic: nature 
conservation organisations; Altruistic/seIf access and active recreation users; Professional: 
national park authority staff 
Factor 7: Number of Interests 4 groupings 
Factor 8: Conflicting ideologies Each interested party has a strong ideological commitment. 
Ramblers' Association (RA) and Open Spaces Society are committed to introducing national 
legislation to allow "Freedom to roam" over uncultivated land. BMC share these views but also 
have a strong conservation ethic. Nature Conservation organisations have been pressing for 
sanctuary areas for birds justified by the "precautionary principle". Landowners: stress property 
rights and the need to control access (Reference 1). Opposed 
Factor 9: Advancement of principles The issues have become elevated to a matter of principle, 
exemplified by the Ramblers' Association campaign for legislation for public right of access to 
uncultivated land (Reference 7). 
Factor 10: Environmental awareness of interest groups Although the RA have adopted 
conservation policies which include the precautionary principle they require proof of damage 
before they will accept constraints on access (Reference I and 6). Insensitive 
INTEREST GROUP INTERACTIONS DURING DISPUTE 
Factor 11: Appropriateness of resource use Wildlife sanctuary areas advocated by English 
Nature would exclude "inappropriate" access, (Reference 1). Appropriateness disputed 
Factor 12: Communication network There has been little direct contact between the interested 
parties, rather they have communicated with the Board in bilateral meetings or via the media. The 
Access Consultative Group (ACG), convened in 1993-4, was the first attempt to promote round 
table discussion between the principle parties. Poorly established. 
Factor 13: Reaction to new claim on resource Consistently adverse as each interest is affected by 
a new claim e.g., landowners objecting to public access and ramblers objecting to possible 
restrictions on access in the interests of wildlife (Reference 1). Adverse. 
Factor 14: Negotiating strategies of interest groups Generally confrontational, e.g. Anderson's 
claims about the harmful effects of access which provokes Watson's critique of her work, while 
all parties are critical of the Board (Reference 1). Confrontational. 
Factor 15: Involvement of media High and deliberately used by RA in their mass trespass 
campaigns. High. 
INSTiTUTIONAL SETTING 
Factor 16: Level of political organisation Each sector is well organised and represented by 
professional organisations, local networks and national links are well used. Highly organised. 
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Factor 17: Acceptance of management aims BA are keen to change land management to extend 
public access. The Board's Access Strategy which seeks a middle way has been challenged by 
conservationists (Reference 1). Challenged 
Factor 18: Public involvement in decision-making Decision-making has been semi-participatory 
with the Board preparing plans and consulting the interested parties quite widely. There was no 
direct involvement on pliinnmg until the ACG was established. Limited Involvement. 
Factor 19: Type Qfdcs1onmk.mg The Board has conducted bilateral negotiations with the 
different parties, which have been "difficult" at times (Reference 1). The more general tenor of 
the public debate have been adversarial. Adversarial. 
Factor 20: Mechrnisrns to deal with change The Board is charged with balancing the interests of 
conservation, recreation and the local economy. It brokers change via the National Park Plan. 
Exists. 
Factor 21: Authority of decision maker Park Board challenged by each interest in turn. 
Challenged 
Factor 22: Distribution of power Evenly balanced as each party holds veto power, as in theory 
at least, the landowners could deny access, English Nature could use its statutory powers to 
restrict new access, the ramblers could trespass into new areas. Each local organisation is linked 
into a national network and tests the others' strength by tactical manoeuvres. Strong and evenly 
Balanced 
REFERENCES 
1. Peak Park Joint Planning Board (undated). 2. Papers provided to Access Consultative Group 
by English Nature, 20.9.93. 3. Evidence submitted by the Peak Park Joint Planning Board to the 
House of Commons Environment Committee. 4. Sidaway, (1988). 5. Anderson, (1990). 6. 
Watson, (1991). 7. Stephenson, (1989). 
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THE DESIGNATION OF THE PENTLAND HILT S REGIONAL PARK 
HISTORICAL SUMMARY 
1967 	Countryside (Scotland) Act confers powers on local authorities to conserve the countryside and to 
make recreation provision. 
1968 	Local amenity groups concerned about threat of encroachment onto the Pentland Hills by residential 
development on the outskirts of Edinburgh. 
1969 The Army decided to modernise their ranges at Castlelaw and Dreghorn amidst public objection. 
1970 Establishment of Pentland Hills Technical Group by local authorities and CCS to consider countryside 
recreational needs. 
1972 Publication of the report of the Technical Group: Pentland Hills, Conser'ation and Recreation (the 
"Blue Book"). 
1973 	Establishment of consultative committee with wideranging membership to discuss the "Blue Book". 
1974 Publication of Park System for Scotland by CCS. 
1975 	Creation of Lothian Regional Council's (LRC) Leisure and Recreation Department Director-designate 
appointed to co- ordinate the project and supervise the ranger service. 
Formation of Advisory Committee with local authority and local organisation membership to 
implement the "Blue Book" and to prepare a series of "locality schemes" over the next three years. 
1978 Advisory committee replaced by smaller Rural Land Management Group to offer advice to planning 
team from owners, farmers and other land users. 
1981 	Countryside (Scotland) Act confers powers on Regional Councils to designate Regional Parks and to 
manage land under the control of the council as a single administrative unit. 
Initial recreation developments at Flotterstone. 
1982 LRC's Leisure and Recreation Department dissolved. 
Discussions between the three Regional Councils culminates in the exclusion of areas in Borders and 
Strathclyde from the proposed park. 
1983 Publication of A Policy for Regional Park! by CCS. Meeting with Scottish Landowners' Federation 
(SLF) results in one third of the area being removed from the proposals. 
1984 	Consultation on LRC's proposals, including public hearing followed by decision by LRC to designate, 
which confirms the principles of "Blue Book" and other safeguards for land uses; the making of the 
designation order. 
1985 	Public inquiry considers objections to designation order. 
1986 Confirmation of order by Secretary of State with recommendation that Subject Local Plan be prepared. 
1987 Appointment of Consultative Committee. 
1988 	Draft Plan issued for consultation. 
1989 Appointment of Regional Park Manager and Advisory Committee. 
Adoption of Pentland Hills Regional Park Plan. 
Withdrawal of MOD proposal to extend training areas. 
First management agreements and farm plans under new authority. 
1990 Park authority publishes Farming and the Regional Park -Cultivating a Partnership. 
1993 
	
	National Farmers Union sends letter of complaint to Chairman of the Advisory Committee. 
Farmers Sub-group to Advisory Committee formed. 
Evening News Article writes of "open war" between farmers and Park Authority. 
1996 	Abolition of Lothian Regional Council. 
SOURCES: Pentland Hills Technical Group (1972), Precognition of E. Langmuir to public inquiry into the 
designation order, First Annual Report of Pentland Hills Regional Park, Carlyle et al (1993). 
The following analysis is based on the first phase of conflict between 1972 and 1986 
NATURE OF BIOLOGICAL IMPACT 
Factor 1: Types of recreational activity Hill walking, mountain biking, horse riding, grouse 
shooting, angling [water sports would like access to compensation reservoirs] (Reference 1). 
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Factor 2: Nature conservation status of site Limited areas within the hills have been notified as 
SSSI but this is not an issue within the conflict. 
Factor 3: Type and incidence of impact Erosion of bill paths is locally severe but this has not been 
quantified (Reference 2). 
Factor 4: Level of visitor pressure Relatively high levels of recreational use all year round but not 
quantified (Reference 2). 
Factor 5: Understanding of impact Lack of information on potential social impacts i.e. 
"commerciaF' recreation on peace and quiet, farm income and private property (Reference 1). 
Uncertain 
CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERESTS 
Factor 6; Nature of interests i) Proprietorial, commercial; Private landowners, public water 
supply; ii) Altruistic: conservation; iii) Altruistic/self recreation, local community groups; and 
iv) Professional: planners and park managers. (Reference 1). 
Factor 7: Number of Interests Four main groups. 
Factor 8: Conflicting ideologies The proposal to designate the park and increase recreation, 
including the creation of a country park was based on the ideology of public welfare provision. 
This was opposed by the landowners on the basis of the effects on their property rights, and 
conservation interests who wished the hills to be undisturbed. There is latent conflict between 
the ramblers who advocate "freedom to roam! ' in the hills and the landowners (Reference 1). 
Opposed 
Factor 9:Advancement of principles Opposition to designation was elevated to a matter of 
principle particularly by those whose opposed the use of the term "park" The proponents of 
designation (the Regional Council and the Countryside Commission for Scotland) were keen to 
see their legislative powers implemented (Reference 1). 
Factor 10: Environmental awareness of interest groups The exponents of the park were 
insensitive to the established interests of the landowners and the local community (Reference I). 
Insensitive 
INTEREST GROUP INFERACTIONS DURING DISPUTE 
Factor 11: Appropriateness of resource use Early plans recommended that a limited range of 
appropriate recreation activities should be permitted in the area, this was a principal reason for 
objection by local communities and the Ramblers' Association and this limitation on recreation 
was ratified by the Subject Local Plan (References 1 and 3). Appropriateness disputed 
Factor 12: Communication networks Although various advisory committees were established 
there was little direct contact between the Regional Council staff; local inhabitants and 
recreational users (Reference 2). Poorly established. 
Factor 13: Reaction to new claim on resource Landowners and local community interests were 
opposed to designation, while the support in principle for the park from nature conservation and 
recreation was so muted by the detailed criticisms of the proposal that they were in effect 
opponents of the scheme (Reference 1). Adverse. 
Factor 14: Negotiating strategies of interest groups Debate became increasingly confrontational 
particularly after a public meeting at Currie High School in September 1984 (Reference 1). 
Confrontational. 
Factor 15: Involvement of media The controversy gained considerable coverage in the local press 
which was influential in turning public opinion against the proposal (Reference 1). High 
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INSTiTUTIONAL SETTING 
Factor 16: Level of political organisation All interests were represented by organisations but there 
was no formal coalition nor any clear leadership (Reference 1). Organised: 
Factor 17: Acceptance of management aims Designation challenged by all interests 
Challenged 
Factor 18: Public involvement in decision-twi!cing Proposals were developed by Regional council 
officers prior to consultation while any involvement of the advisory committees was purely 
tokenistic (Reference 2). Limited Involvement. 
Factor 19: Type of decision-making As opposition to the designation order was formally 
considered within a public inquiry there was no attempt to negotiate on the proposals (Reference 
1). Adversarial. 
Factor 20: Mechanisms to deal with change The lack of clear proposals in the form of a 
management plan created uncertainty and was a major feature of opposition by the conservation 
interests. [This is now accommodated by the Subject Local Plan.] (Reference 1). Absent 
Factor 21: Authority of decision maker The Regional Council has been constantly challenged but 
the Secretary of State's decision following the due process of a public inquiry was generally 
accepted. Accepted. 
Factor 22: Distribution of power Difficult to assess but probably evenly balanced. Weak and 
evenly balanced 
REFERENCES 
1. Sidaway (1991b), 2. Sidaway (1992a), 3. Pentland Hills Technical Group (1972). 
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